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1 
A – Politics of financial regulation – 
The ‘productivity’ of shadow 
banking 
 
The ‘productivity’ of shadow banking marks the organizing power of finan-
cial interaction via and beyond financial regulation. By analysing shadow 
banking as new monetary institutional form, this introduction contributes to 
the socio-political debate on financial regulation. Whereas contemporary dis-
cussions regarding financial regulation often solely point to its efficacy, little 
attention is drawn on how the space off the regulatory provisions organise the 
financial field.  
 To clarify the present state of the debate, this introduction marks the 
limitations of research associated with International Political Economy. It dis-
plays central origins for regulatory thinking along early debates concerning 
information and efficiency in Financial Economics; and it contrasts this or-
thodoxy with the critical review by the French regulation school. To highlight 
the regulatory productivity of shadow banking, the article conceptualizes it as 
a new kind of monetary institutional form.  
 In conclusion, the introduction proposes a conception of financial regu-
lation as itself a socio-political relation. This missing focus in the literature 
serves as the point of departure for the following socio-political perspectives 
on (shadow) banking 
 
 

3 
1. Introduction 
Financial regulation and shadow banking seem to be two sides of the same 
coin. Indeed, analysing this relationship provides not only a perspective on 
their mutual enforcement, but it also mirrors political struggles more broadly 
(Kessler and Wilhelm 2013; Nesvetailova 2014a; Lysandrou and 
Nesvetailova 2015; Ban and Gabor 2016; Ban et al. 2016; Gabor 2016b; 
Helgadottir 2016; Murau 2017). To account for the latter aspect, this paper-
based dissertation provides four perspectives on financial regulation and 
(shadow) banking with the common aim to better understand how, in recent 
years, the transnational dimension of politics has been produced and inscribed 
via financial practices across national jurisdictions. So far, recent studies re-
garding shadow banking offered a map of its ‘plumbing’ (Ashcraft et al. 
2010), its strategic role in tax avoidance (Bryan et al. 2016), the power of its 
actors to capture regulation (Young 2012) and the political economics of its 
evolution and persistence (Gabor 2016a). 
 A central access point for the socio-political relevance of regulatory con-
cerns is how knowledge is institutionalised via regulatory networks 
(Moschella and Tsingou 2013), procedures (Newman and Bach 2014) and or-
ganisations (Quaglia 2014). Most prominently, this can be observed with the 
capital standards of banks (Lall 2012; Thiemann 2014; Greenwood and 
Roederer-Rynning 2015; Lall 2015; Howarth and Quaglia 2016). It shows 
how financial practices have been (dis)associated and (dis)entangled with and 
from the so-called traditional banking sector, usually by taking into account 
new regulatory measures regarding financial innovation, technological ad-
vancement or economic globalisation (Gorton and Metrick 2010; Stein 2010; 
Acharya 2012; Adrian and Ashcraft 2012; Moe Grung 2012; Bengtsson 2013; 
Mehrling et al. 2013; Chernenko and Sunderam 2014; Plantin 2014; Colombo 
et al. 2016; Duca 2016).  
When it comes to financial regulation and associated limitations and imple-
mentation problems, recent perspectives account for moral hazard (Hardie 
and Macartney 2016), regulatory arbitrage (Riles 2014), structural power 
(Flaherty 2015), regulatory capture (Young 2012), regulatory competition 
(Thiemann 2014), two-level games (James 2016), multi-level governance 
(Bakir and Woo 2016), lobby groups (Pagliari and Young 2016), path depend-
ency (Schimmelfennig 2016), national perception (Munnich 2016), varieties 
of capitalism (Howarth and Quaglia 2016), paradigm change (Kudrna 2016a), 
public-private delineations (Cherednychenko 2016), principle-agent relations 
(Epstein and Rhodes 2016), conflicts of interest (Kruck 2016), fragmented 
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expertise (Ziegler and Woolley 2016), policy entrepreneurs (De Rynck 2016), 
insider expertise (Kudrna 2016b), elite networks (Lall 2015) and coordination 
failure (Knaack 2015). What these perspectives have in common is their focus 
on how regulation is effected be it in a good or bad way. Little attention has 
been drawn, however, to the productive power of regulatory texts themselves.  
 If so, then such accounts tend to rely on neoliberal governance as the 
structural cause of the sustainability of finance-dominated politics which, for 
instance, emanates via neoliberal deregulation (Campbell and Bakir 2012) or, 
in its so-called second face, via ‘reregulation as depoliticization’ (Major 
2012). Thus, the financial crisis may count as evidence for failed neoliberal 
ideals (Crouch 2011) or even epistemologies (Davies and McGoey 2012; Datz 
2013); and financial reform may represent either a gradual shift in paradigms 
(Baker 2013a; 2013b) or a continuation of business as usual (Wigger and 
Buch-Hansen 2013), with similar rhetorical devices (Nørholm Just 2015), and 
even being reinforced by the new supervisory infrastructure (Casey 2015). 
These perspectives thus situate neoliberalism as either an empirical fact which 
can be explained via regulatory mechanisms or a causal factor for socio-po-
litical outcomes. Whereas those accounts again hold that the neoliberal para-
digm in financial regulation is one of the effects, Martijn Konings (2016), for 
instance, enters the debate by showing how neoliberalism is able to reproduce 
itself via concepts such as risk and how it makes (financial) things governable 
(see also Kessler 2007; 2008; 2010). 
 In this respect, this introduction contributes to the socio-political debate 
on financial regulation. The article continues by providing an account of how 
financial regulation is approached especially in International Political Econ-
omy (IPE); it displays central origins for regulatory thinking by looking at the 
debates on information and efficiency in financial Economics; it then shows 
how even the alternative regulatory debate, instantiated by the French regula-
tion school, is limited in conceptualizing regulation as itself a productive 
force. Finally, this limitation is exemplified by the problem of shadow bank-
ing as a new monetary institutional form. The article concludes with a plea to 
reconceptualise the study of financial regulation by also considering its own 
productive contingency as a socio-political relation. 
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2. Regulation and its context 
This section gives an account of the socio-political debate on financial stand-
ards and regulation.1 It provides an initial basis on which the analytical parts 
of the respective research papers can be placed, before giving a more specific 
account of the debates concerned with shadow banking and its association 
with the money market. Shadow banking was a central nexus for understand-
ing the so-called Great Financial Crisis and how it relates to regulatory mat-
ters in place, plus its recent evolution as a reaction to the crisis (Hellwig 2009; 
Shin 2010; Deutschmann 2011; Krippner 2011; Lavoie 2013; MacKenzie and 
Spears 2014; Langley 2015). Indeed, regulation is not only seen as a reaction 
to a state of financial turmoil but may also play a part in triggering a crisis in 
the first place (Thiemann 2014). Another relation is expressed by the hare and 
the tortoise (Troeger 2014), i.e. regulation seems to be always behind the hare, 
whereas financial innovation functions as an already and ever-present tortoise 
(see also Seabrooke and Tsingou 2010).  
 The recent financial crisis gave the hare (again) a strong feeling of being 
first. After its seemingly local origin, the market interruption challenged 
longstanding procedures of central banks, transnational banking and interna-
tional financial regulation (Yellen 2013; Borio 2014; Mehrling 2014), and 
called for ‘better regulation’ (EC 2015). The capacity to understand the con-
sequences of financial procedures was no longer provided by routine: Eco-
nomic theory failed to understand the fallout of market stability (Bryan et al. 
2012; Lall 2012) and exceptional political decisions had to be taken 
(McCulley 2010). Academic debates within International Political Economy 
(IPE) reflected not only a struggle to understand the phenomenon but also 
triggered some reflection on how the politics of international economic rela-
tions can be analysed (Cohen 2009; Kessler 2009; Helleiner and Pagliari 
2011; Germain 2013). 
 The crisis intervened in economic and political procedures previously 
perceived as normal ways for financial interactions to proceed (Best 2014). In 
the United States, new regulation of bipartisan support came about, the Fed-
eral Reserve used new mechanisms to stabilise the credit system and, in the 
private sector, new banking corporations were created, whereas others filed 
for bankruptcy (Maxfield 2011). In Europe, after the crisis impacted on its 
banks and the so-called real economy, the solvency of certain states raised 
concerns (Boy 2015; Langenohl 2015). Step by step, these unprecedented 
challenges for the common-currency area led to far reaching institutional 
changes(Dunlop and Radaelli 2016). New regulations, new institutions and 
                                                             
1 There is a broad discussion in IPE about the problem of history in relation to a discipline and hence 
understanding how a discipline produces knowledge and identity (e.g. Patomaki 2009). On the prob-
lem of epistemology and its historical account see Hall (1990) and Samman (2015). 
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new financial as well as regulatory practices evolved (Posner and Veron 2010; 
Maxfield 2011; Baker 2013b; Moschella and Tsingou 2013; Mugge 2013; 
Rixen 2013; Newman and Bach 2014). This complex field, still in transition, 
has now found some reiterations of its new state.2  
 On the finance side, the new state of a volatile financial system has been 
associated with market-based finance or the so-called shadow banking system 
(FSB 2015b; Pozsar 2015; Ban et al. 2016; Bryan et al. 2016; Gabor 2016a).3 
Via the shadow banking system, the concept of credit, understandings of debt 
and even what is labelled as value or money appear to be different compared 
to more traditional understandings of banking.4 Hence, the realm of shadow 
banking allowed for the production of new practices and institutions which 
grew to a major network for orchestrating financial flows (FSB 2015a). Fi-
nancial innovations are still at the centre of the debates regarding the causes 
of systemic risk (Hellwig 2009; Nesvetailova 2014b; Centeno et al. 2015; 
Kavalski 2016; Lombardi and Moschella 2017). Practices like securitisation 
(Lavoie 2013; Nesvetailova and Palan 2013), products like over-the-counter 
derivatives (Carruthers 2013) and diverging jurisdictional contexts (Bach and 
Newman 2010) all point to conflict areas of private and public concerns5 – 
also since the shadow banking system is not bound to political borders and, 
hence, represents a transnational field (Graz and Nölke 2008; Young 2012; 
McKeen-Edwards and Porter 2013; Underhill 2015). 
 The characteristics of these orders relate to political, social or economic 
dynamics, i.e. the respective contexts within which decisions are made, and 
so order is consolidated or exchange is rationalised (Langley 2004). In IPE, 
three distinctions to understand the regulatory context during and after the 
crisis can be made. First is the focus on institutions, their evolution as well as 
their interactions (Hall 2014; Moschella 2015); second is the growing concern 
with distinctive practices of especially the financial economy (LiPuma and 
Lee 2004; Mugge 2009); and, finally, there is the (generally more critical) 
focus on the root causes of financial instabilities (Nesvetailova and Palan 
2013). Here, especially the latter strand complements this dissertation’s effort, 
as it is concerned with the instability of financial markets, its constitutive con-
ditions as well as its consequences for politics and society (Kessler and 
Wilhelm 2013; Bryan et al. 2016). One possible way to understand instability 
                                                             
2 In Europe, that means especially the new rules for capital ratios for banks as well as the Banking 
Union, which put the single rulebook for European banks in place and which involves the single-
resolution and supervisory mechanisms, as well as a prospective European deposit insurance scheme 
to come (Gros and Schoenmaker 2014; Howarth and Quaglia 2014; Spendzharova 2014; Epstein 
and Rhodes 2016). 
3 For an overview of the resent history of shadow banking see Lysandrou and Nesvetailova (2015) 
and Pozsar (2016). 
4 Or, short, what Mehrling (2012) has denoted as money-market funding of market-based credit. 
5 For a broader discussion of the private/public relation see Cutler (2003). 
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is to compare unstable relations to stable ones within a given system of finan-
cial order. This means, for example, to look at stable conditions as they might 
have prevailed during the time of the second gold standard, or the more recent 
so-called ‘great moderation’ to extract the dynamics which contributed to in-
stability before, during and in the aftermath of crises (Boyer 2005; 
Dannreuther and Petit 2006; Montgomerie 2006; Engelen 2008; Erturk et al. 
2008). 
 To complement this comparative approach, a co-evolutionary perspec-
tive stands out. This means that the instability of financial markets is very 
much contingent on a very specific setting of market relations (Kessler 2008; 
2013). This in turn accentuates that stability and instability are in a mutual 
and co-constitutive relation, where the former is only understood through the 
latter and vice versa. This second perspective interrogates more fundamen-
tally the autonomy of market systems via political or social constellations 
(Boyer 2013; Knafo 2013; Nesvetailova and Palan 2013; Palan 2013; Gabor 
and Vestergaard 2016). The evolving problems of such a perspective struggle 
more with the ends of financial markets, in contrast to fixing their means. This 
implies that an evaluation of regulations for financial markets refers not only 
to functional conditions but also to normative understandings. Reconstructing 
financial regulation, therefore, can highlight not only market failures and 
cures, but also what kind of normative framework is realised by the operations 
of financial markets. Especially if an event is called a ‘systemic crisis’, it be-
comes more than only a functional or legal question related to the inner work-
ings of finance (Aglietta and Scialom 2010; Yellen 2013). What a systemic 
event incorporates is an exception to the rule, which makes it difficult (if not 
impossible) to evaluate such operations alongside legal rules established to 
govern the normal state of affairs (Centeno et al. 2015, 72–75).  
 The (international) credit system exemplifies the relation between nor-
mal and exceptional times. Its crisis brought the fragility of the market-based 
credit system (based on complex intermediation chains) to the fore. This sys-
tem represents highly interconnected financial entities, and their interconnect-
edness also made them prone to the expansive (global) spread of 
(destabilising) local events (e.g. Thiemann 2014; Mertens 2017). To under-
stand the contemporary relevance of shadow banking, the following two sec-
tions provide two contradicting views on how financial regulation can be 
conceptualized: The rise of Financial Economics after the 1970s (as a func-
tional perspective) and the French regulation school (as a normative endeav-
our). Their confrontational position is highlighted via the notions of 
information and efficiency. 
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3. Information, efficiency and the need for regulation 
This section concentrates on how two basic parameters for financial regula-
tion evolved in Financial Economics: information and efficiency (Fama 1970; 
Grossman and Stiglitz 1976). From a Financial Economics perspective regu-
lation can only restrict and provide access to information without having itself 
an impact on what information may tell. The existence of information stays 
in a neutral position. It serves as the starting point from which the degree of 
efficiency of markets can determined. Though both concepts, information and 
efficiency, represent long-lasting discussions in Economics up until today, 
looking at their rise in the late 1960s and early ’70s, these debates provide the 
basic rationale of how finance should work and what regulation in this respect 
can achieve. It was then when the discussion around the economics of infor-
mation, signals and noise emerged, and when the political idea that a govern-
ment is helpful to organise fair market structures through institutions was 
questioned, or set aside in favour of the capacity of markets being self-sus-
taining. How information and markets interact, as well as how information for 
future investments in financial markets can be modelled, was understood 
through several milestones within financial economics (Fama 1970; Black 
and Scholes 1973; Merton 1973; Grossman and Stiglitz 1980).  
 A main point of critique regarding this economic fashion crystallises 
around the origins of a crisis. Based on the logic that efficient pricing allows 
for an efficient financial system under the condition of fair competition, the 
internal workings of finance are forced to work in optimal ways and are thus 
only problematic if external events or irrational behaviours affect equilibrium 
assumptions in rather radical ways. ‘From this comes a general conception of 
the economy in which any form of collective organization, state intervention, 
or regulation inevitably becomes a cause of crisis.’ (Boyer 1990, xxv) 
 Concepts of financial economics are closely linked with information 
economics. This relation is not surprising when looking at how trading in fi-
nancial markets is triggered, i.e. through changing patterns of information re-
lated to markets as a whole, asset classes or individual stocks. On the one 
hand, the market provides information about market participants through 
price movements. On the other, market participants inform themselves via in-
formation which they, in turn, provide to the market. In the 1970s, theories in 
financial economics started to discuss the differences between perfect and im-
perfect information, i.e. they understood information as a definite whole 
which can be processed – failures could thus be specified and described via 
‘asymmetric’ or ‘imperfect’ information (Akerlof 1970; Stiglitz and 
Rothschild 1976). This was side-lined by a discussion about the value of in-
formation and an assumption of informed market participants (Grossman 
1981).  
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 This kind of Financial Economics focused on how information and ex-
change relate to each other. One specific mode of this theorisation (or model-
ling) was organised through temporality. Time in this sense organises the 
problem of information, and its development – especially when projected into 
the future – is uncertain, and thus strategies to reduce uncertainty gain finan-
cial value. In this way, imperfect information tends to become a condition of 
markets (Grossman and Stiglitz 1980), rather than being a negligible param-
eter for understanding market exchanges. Future markets had been described 
as one instance of how information about the future can be integrated into 
market mechanisms of pricing without having only a presentist price/time 
conjunction. The information/time-nexus became a meta-financial product, 
which could also be traded in therefore created markets (MacKenzie and 
Millo 2003). In this sense, the quality and quantity of information became a 
calculative practice (Black and Scholes 1973). To be calculated though, in-
formation had to be clearly separated from noise or wrong information, as the 
following quote exemplifies: 
It is surely noise when a company named Computer Literacy, Inc., 
changes its name to fatbrain.com and its price rises 36 percent in a 
day, as actually occurred on Monday, March 29, 1999. (Bernstein 
2007, 19) 
 However, this also implies that there is a grey area where it is difficult 
to decide if market fluctuations represent ‘noisy’ or ‘real’ information adjust-
ments, whereby the real is then a ‘true’ way of representing value within mar-
kets and the noise is just false perceptions. To know everything means to 
separate the everything from the nothing, the information from the non-infor-
mation. Both aspects are, however, important for understanding the move-
ments of the markets, as this separation is not independent of its resulting 
parts. The separation of a real market value (i.e. the market as a representation 
of fundamental values based on all available information) from a distorted 
representation through noise is only valid insofar as the market becomes an 
object of calculation serving itself as a generator of information on future val-
ues (Merton 1973). 
 The calculation of future values based on experience in the form market 
practice had already been introduced by Irving Fisher and his work on infla-
tionary expectations (Fisher 1930). Also here it is crucial that the past presents 
some evidence upon which a future outlook can be based.6 And it is not just 
                                                             
6 Indeed, the assumed hierarchy of present values over future ones closes off any contrasting as-
sumption on probable innovation or other future profit as value even for a present understanding of 
possible futures. (Fisher 1930, 63–64) What follows, though, is the need to address this hierarchy 
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a random selection of the past but a distinctive calculation of the past that 
seems to be eligible to tell us something about the time ahead (Grossman 
1981). Against the formation of efficient markets through costless infor-
mation, Stiglitz and Grossman (1980) brought forward the argument that com-
petitive markets only make sense ‘when information is costly’. Indeed, they 
go on, ‘whenever there are differences in beliefs that are not completely arbi-
traged, there is an incentive to create a market’ (404). 
 Hence beliefs here are used synonymously with information. The poli-
tics of such a view of information, i.e. that it is related to value7 and that it is 
not homogeneously distributed, gives credence to the problem that infor-
mation has no firm ground but depends on availability and context. However, 
information is still seen as an entity that can be distributed, shared, gathered 
and included in calculative practices. What seems to be absent from the dis-
cussions in Financial Economics so far is that information generated within 
the markets is also under the condition of political and social relations, and it 
cannot be reduced to mechanical thinking in terms of models. In contrast, the 
models applied tend to substitute the socio-political contingency with meth-
odological consistency, i.e. seeking more data that support more realistic 
modelling. Hence, it is quite ironic when they state that ‘traders were left with 
differences in beliefs about the future price of the commodity. This led to the 
opening of a futures market’ (Grossman and Stiglitz 1980, 404). Whenever 
an information problem persists (the very reason why there are markets), a 
new market is generated as a solution to the information problem so as to put 
in place a more authoritative entity to account for the non-solvable problem 
of future (information) as uncertain. 
 In a similar direction, a politics of uncertainty also comes to light when 
following Eugene Fama (1970) and the connection he makes between infor-
mation and the efficiency of markets: ‘A market in which prices always ‘fully 
reflect’ available information is called ‘efficient’’ (383). Whereas ‘infor-
mation’ has been presented above as a central category for market organisa-
tion, the quote by Eugene Fama gives a further hunch regarding through 
which mode a market is governed. The notion of efficiency is used to describe 
and evaluate a market’s performance. A high level of efficiency indicates a 
                                                             
via techniques of maturity transformation (i.e. insurance, hedging, central banks, states or other 
forms of social formation). 
7 Indeed, the practice of valuation entails a notion of politics on its own as it configures social net-
works via financial rationales such as calculatory practices (Chiapello 2015). Beyond that, valuation 
provides also a more general account to study social relations by the ones of markets (Beckert and 
Aspers 2011; Muniesa 2011; Lamont 2012). In this respect the politics of regulation, as put forward 
here, complemts these perspectives, as it reconstructs how meaning thus value is denoted via regu-
latory concerns. 
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well-functioning market, whereas a low level denotes a rather poorly func-
tioning market. Thus, the degree of efficiency can be related, in turn, to how 
well available information is reflected in market prices. Fama provides three 
categories for information: weak, semi-strong and strong. Historical price data 
are denoted as weak, i.e. the most readily available; publicly available data on 
firms is denoted as semi-strong; and if only a few individuals have the poten-
tial to access certain information, this is regarded as strong.  
 Information is thus presented as a resource which can be mined, i.e. it 
has already been somewhere and can be discovered. The respective re-
strictions may generate a difference in price for information but the different 
constitutional forces are blanked out, notwithstanding their impact on how 
information is produced in the first place. Economics, in this sense, is re-
stricted to use available data without, on the one hand, questioning their origin 
and, on the other, be concerned about the dynamics of their origination. The 
following section indicates an alternative take by the French regulation school 
– also here, however, regulation has its limits. 
4. Limits of regulation 
The central distinction for understanding the alternative reading by the French 
regulation school is its concept of regulation as a normative endeavour 
through which distribution is governed. Financial regulation is thus not only 
a tool to enable financial flows but also a political device to establish social, 
political and economic hierarchies. By reconstructing the counterarguments 
especially by the French regulation school (Boyer 1990; Boyer and Saillard 
2005; Amable et al. 2010; Boyer 2010) the politics of two opposing concepts 
of regulation can be displayed and thus the continuum for its politics. Whereas 
for Financial Economics it is the markets and their efficient pricing mecha-
nisms, which trigger limited regulatory provisions (i.e. a functional view), for 
the French regulation school the kind of capitalist relations and thus market 
formation depends on the way how government wants to regulate markets 
with a view on their outcomes (i.e. a normative view). 
 In this way, the French regulation school stands out in its account of 
researching history, insertions and large scale crises of regimes of accumula-
tion. In contrast to the externalisation of disruptive forces as put forward by 
the rational expectation school, the French regulation school assumes that the 
origins of a crisis are a product of the respective regime of accumulation. This 
in turn means that the construction of institutions – the mode of regulation – 
plays a part not only in triggering a crisis, but is also useful for stabilisation 
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or the avoidance of critical economic events. Indeed, the historically contin-
gent and socially specific institutional form is very much part of the function-
ing of financial systems and conditions their relations (Jessop 1997, 504). 
 Between 1950 and 2000, institutional changes facilitated the consumer-
led post-Fordist mode of accumulation. This model of debt-led growth that 
predominantly relied on the availability of credit for housing (Krippner 2011). 
To analyse this new system of capital, credit and risk, Boyer points to the 
singularity of the French regulation school being able to accomplish a shift in 
perspective ‘from a micro-approach to regulation to a macro-analysis of the 
role of different financial systems in the dynamism and resilience of growth 
regimes, i.e. régulation in the French meaning’ (Boyer 2010, 546). This goes 
beyond a flat understanding of economic relations and is best exemplified by 
the efficient equilibrium assumption, it incorporates the historical condition-
ality of the present institutional configuration, which enables economic ex-
change in the first place. 
 Thus what matter is how the ‘coherence and quality [of institutional 
forms] contribute to macroeconomic short-term adjustment—i.e. the régula-
tion mode—but also to long-term trends, i.e. the growth regime’ (Boyer 2013, 
543). The operation and connectivities of the financial system, its associated 
forces and functionality are a systemic expression of the regulation mode en-
shrined in the texts of its actual regulation within a transnational jurisdictional 
setting. To facilitate such a network, a shared understanding of how financial 
flows should be organised can be traced back to economic concepts, such as 
information and efficiency. These two notions allow for a normative frame-
work for institutional operation and provide clues as to how and what to op-
erate. Via a pricing mechanism, financial flows can operate efficiently and 
they are meant to represent the present state of (valid) information.  
 Whereas Financial Economics resembles a natural tool for analysing 
economic relations not embedded and conditioned in social relations (cf. 
Granovetter 1985), for the French regulation school, in contrast, it is of polit-
ical origin and cocnerns what kind of accumulation regime8 is installed and 
thus also what kind of distributional structure dominates (Hollingsworth and 
Boyer 1997). From a regulationist perspective efficiency is not the telos for 
market operation but an indicator of how power relations are organized within 
regimes of accumulation (Boyer 2000).  
 Petit (1999) gives an account of how the regulationist school analyses 
regulatory demands in relation to ongoing internal conflicts of the respective 
                                                             
8 Grahl and Teague (2000, 161) provide a neat definition: ‘The accumulation regime comprises the 
productive system, but views it in a dynamic context, as following a certain growth path linked to a 
given technological trajectory.’ 
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accumulation regime, specifically, the transition period after the Fordist re-
gime – during which the monetary institutional form changed from fixed to 
floating exchange rates. The respective institutional configuration is key to 
understanding and analysing how capitalist relations turn out without assum-
ing ‘a self-equilibrating process’. In contrast, to allow for capitalist relations 
to happen it ‘requires intermediation from external structures’. Thus to under-
stand economic relations as contingent and concrete social process via the 
‘configuration of institutional forms’, (Petit 1999, 239) points to how eco-
nomic relations turn out historically in their variegated form which cannot be 
understood via efficiency concerns (Boyer 2000, 303).  
 Whereas Fordism was institutionally characterised by the ‘wage-labour’ 
nexus (i.e. full-employment, social policy, job security within separated state 
economies) as the leading factor for economic growth (Lipietz 1997, 3), post-
Fordism returned to the centrality of forms of competition (i.e. international-
isation, floating exchange rates, ‘de’-regulation, new information technolo-
gies) as the central form for economic organisation – often denoted as the 
‘competition state’ (Cerny 1997; Cerny 2010) in the era of globalisation. 
 Following a regulationist reading, the fall of the Berlin Wall and the rise 
of globalisation enforced the latter context by putting even more emphasis on 
competition between different kinds of capitalism (Neilson and Stubbs 2016). 
Thereby nationally organized compromises between capital and labour but 
also democracy more generally (Hirsch 1995), were undermined by ‘market-
led régulation’ (Boyer 2000, 302). This specific ‘mode of régulation’9 not 
only stabilises a specific economics order but may also accentuate the internal 
contradictions of a respective accumulation regime. For instance, more recent 
studies regarding the post-Fordist debt-led growth regime show how debt-
based consumption undermines the viability of its own register in the form of 
defaults or lost trust in the ability to repay (Stockhammer and Wildauer 2016). 
To reach a state where repayment is questioned on a large scale the regulatory 
context had first to allow for the piling-up of consumer or mortgage credit 
(Stockhammer 2015). A central enabling factor points to the disintermedia-
tion process around the traditional banking sector via shadow banking, as it 
also assembled the risk dispersion strategies in the case of credit to people 
with low or no regular income (Poon 2009; Seabrooke 2010).  
 This latter evolution is often termed financialization to accentuate that 
profits and economic resources are increasingly located in the financial sector 
(Erturk et al. 2008; van der Zwan 2014). This research perspective accentuates 
the financial part of the economy contrast to production in the real economy 
                                                             
9 ‘The mode of régulation consists of an assembly of institutions (sometimes ‘structural forms’ or 
‘mediations’) which act to guide and stabilize the accumulation process.’ (Grahl and Teague 2000, 
161) 
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(Stockhammer 2012). This debate does indeed assemble a wide array of the-
oretical perspectives ranging from the French Regulation School to Marxist, 
Post-Keynesian and Minskyian inspired analyses (Grahl and Teague 2000; 
Stockhammer 2004; Lapavitsas 2011; Lavoie 2013). What these perspectives 
share is the assumption of the still growing importance of the financial sector 
for political and social matters on the micro- and the macro-levels. Whereas, 
from a French regulationist perspective, the respective mode of regulation and 
its internal contradictions explains quite well how the accumulation regime 
lost its viability in the face of crisis, this perspective has difficulties in under-
standing the persistence of the accumulation regime despite the failure of its 
regulatory framework. In a similar manner, the literature on financialization 
understands the fragility of respective growth regimes when relying on finan-
cial in contrast to other growth regimes. The stability of economic formation 
despite decisive interruptions of their respective rationales, is, however, little 
conceptualized.  
 Already Scherrer (1995) points to a problem, in that the regulationist 
tool box often assumes its own analytical categories as empirical observation. 
Thus, the evidence for internal contradictions expressed by crisis events 
should lead to a reformulation of the way in which the growth regime contin-
ues. Following the Laclau and Mauffe, Scherrer highlights the ‘hegemonic’ 
perseverance of the economic discourse that sustains the respective accumu-
lation mode, despite its apparent failure. What is needed instead is an analysis 
which also considers discursive formations that provide a rationale for eco-
nomic action. Thus, like Financial Economics, as outlined above, the finan-
cialization literature and the French regulation school follows economic 
rationales that seem to withstand analytical implications. What is proposed 
instead is a ‘radical contingency’ (Scherrer 1995, 463), and thus an openness 
regarding the empirical consequences of the analytical perspective.  
 Such a view is conceptualised in more detail in the theory part of this 
dissertation, along with Derrida’s notion of a ‘democracy to come’. Before 
that, however, the following section turns to a specific institutional formation 
that impacts on the way how the finance led growth regime is enabled and 
sustained via and despite of its regulation, i.e. the shadow banking system, 
and how it provides what is now often called ‘shadow money’ (Gabor and 
Vestergaard 2016) to the global financial system. 
5. Regulatory politics of shadow banking 
This section presents shadow banking as a new monetary institutional form, 
which is distinct from the system of bank-based financial exchange. Even 
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though the money market, a key market to understand shadow banking, is 
used by traditional banks, their workings are still remarkably different and 
they have different attitudes when facing crisis. Beyond that, the money mar-
ket has a quality of its own in connecting financial instruments and institutions 
in different ways which, via a restricted perspective on traditional banking, 
cannot be seen. The French regulation school (Guttmann 2008; Farhi and 
Macedo Cintra 2009; Aglietta and Scialom 2010; Boyer 2013) points to mon-
etary institutional forms as constraints on money provision and credit. The 
recent financial crisis showed how ‘other financial institutions’, apart from 
public and private banks or pension and insurance funds, are very much part 
of the broader monetary institutional form.  
 Shadow banking turned out to be a driving force for money provision 
and credit, and its collapse prompted central banks and governments to con-
sider new tools for monetary and fiscal policies to counter crisis dynamics. 
Even as banking and shadow banking turned out to be similar in its function-
ing, shadow banking’s implosion displayed how they are very different from 
a regulatory perspective. Indeed, shadow banking, like banking in general, 
relates money markets and capital markets. It does so, however, by disinter-
mediation in contrast to intermediation. Relating those two market forms 
comes with certain risks rooted in their respected contexts, specifically, in 
how they are related. On money markets, short-term securities with original 
maturities of less than one year are traded, whereas in capital markets, it is 
long-term debt instruments, i.e. original maturities of one year and more, that 
are traded. A central function of shadow banking is the maturity transfor-
mation though with different techniques for risk transformation. Shadow 
banking thus provides ‘money market funding of capital market lending’ 
(Mehrling et al. 2013; Pozsar 2014) by using derivatives as market-based in-
surance techniques against liquidity risk, and specific repackaging strategies 
and legal constructs against solvency risks (Mehrling 2012). Thus, whereas 
traditional banking facilitates this via its institutional capacities, i.e. capital 
buffers against solvency risk and deposit insurance schemes as well as their 
connection to central banks’ lending channels against liquidity risks, shadow 
banking enables its functioning via market-based mechanisms.  
 Despite its recent appearance in the political economic literature, 
shadow banking as a practice of exchange existed long before the Great Fi-
nancial Crisis, arguably even before institutionalized and publicly regulated 
banking. For instance, Walter Bagehot (1873) gave a first overview of the 
institutions and dynamics of the London money market from his experience 
gathered in Lombard Street. There, he depicted the central weaknesses of the 
payment system, when credit is demanded but limited and repayment is ques-
tioned. In such circumstances, he argues, the Bank of England is the only in-
stitution able to lend money, also via its relation to the political system of the 
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United Kingdom back then. In extraordinary times, the law which limited the 
money supply of Banks in addition to gold-backed paper money – the so-
called Peel’s Act – was broken. Bagehot points out three times of crisis – 
1847, 1857 and 1866 – when the available gold reserves were not sufficient 
to equal the money needed to support the money markets and their associated 
banks. 
 Without suspension of the law in extraordinary times, he argues, the cri-
ses would have been more severe. Thus, money markets underscored the im-
portance of a lender of last resort when the money supply within money 
markets tightens. In this way, the institutional configuration of a power a full 
market device to relate payments, credit and loans also impacted on the struc-
ture of its organization. It made it necessary to have a lender of last resort 
– the role of the modern central bank – but at the same time the interaction of 
money markets and their control mechanisms raises further controversies. 
 Hyman Minsky (1957) presents another early instance of how institu-
tional innovation in money markets counteracts the monetary policy of a cen-
tral bank. In much the same way as the shadow banking system provided low-
cost funding resources, besides the traditional monetary policy sphere, he ar-
gues, the competitive character of money markets may lead to ways to cir-
cumvent interest-rate policies in favour of private credit creation: ‘Once 
nonfinancial corporations are habituated to making "loans" with government 
debt as collateral, the possibility exists that collateralized loans using nongov-
ernment paper will develop’ (182). Following Minsky, ‘during a long pros-
perity’ (185), exactly when central banks try to curb inflation via their 
interest-rate policies, this shift is incentivised to progress. 
 As a result and in contrast to public credit, such private credit creation 
ends up being closely related to the market’s liquidity conditions and thus 
highly vulnerable in times of economic contraction or changing expectations. 
This hierarchy of credit (or money) is problematic for the sustainability of 
money markets. Whereas central banks can replace public money for public 
money via their funding channels to banking institutions, monetary policy 
cannot easily replace private credit with public credit when need in illiquid 
times. Beyond that, he concludes that central banks are indeed part of finan-
cial instability as via their monetary policies, on the one hand, they trigger, on 
the other, institutional innovations in money markets during times of prosper-
ity. So, while they might not be able to limit a dynamic economy, as a lender 
of last resort (and in the end also for money markets) central banks may pre-
vent deep depressions. 
 Going back to Bagehot, also in his day, the Bank of England set the 
leading discount rates. It meant that no other bank or financial institution 
could offer a cheaper way of discounting bills: People owning bills ‘seldom 
can get them discounted very much cheaper, for if they did everyone would 
17 
leave the Bank, and the outer market would have more bills than it could bear’ 
(Bagehot 1873, 12). Thus, the modus operandi of money markets is to find 
ways to employ money, not only in efficient ways but also under the condition 
that money is lent for a price which is to be recouped through its employment 
in the money market.  
 Modern money markets connect these forces via new forms of securiti-
zation, on the one hand; and by new forms of organization, on the other. In 
the money markets, instruments such as treasury bills, bank bills, certificates 
of deposit, commercial paper, interbank deposits, and repurchase agreements 
are used as forms of money to fund lending in the form of capital-market in-
struments, such as stocks, mortgages, corporate and government bonds 
(Mishkin et al. 2013, 28–29). Money market instruments provide the funding 
for longer-term, considered more risky though profitable, investments.  
 Short-term debt traded on the money market is considered to be a form 
of (private) money close to the non-insured deposit accounts of traditional 
banks (Ricks 2016, 37–42). Firms, so the argument goes, have an incentive to 
hold assets which, on the one hand, are close to money and liquid (as a means 
of payment) but, on the other, provide a higher return than cash deposits (i.e. 
to yield greater profits). Thus, the disadvantage of short-term financial instru-
ments is their lower returns when compared to long-term debt instruments. 
Hence, there is a demand for transforming long-term, non-liquid but high-
yielding assets into short-term, liquid, equally high-yielding assets. This set 
of interests is the basic mechanism which creates the demand for shadow 
banking. Indeed, ‘[h]olders of cash equivalents usually think of these instru-
ments, together with currency and checkable deposits, as precisely the re-
sources they are not investing’ (Ricks 2016, 45). 
 In this way, Pozsar (2014) distinguishes four forms of money: First, pure 
public money consists of sovereign bonds and currency reserves (public 
money). Second, private-public money relates to publicly-insured deposits or 
the related currency denominations backed by related central banks (insured 
money). Third, public-private money means that trading instruments are col-
lateralised by public forms of money, such as sovereign bonds (public shadow 
money). Fourth, purely private money consists of instruments collateralized 
by private bonds or non-insured deposits (private shadow money). He denotes 
the latter two instances as expressions of the shadow banking system, whereas 
the fourth instance functionally resembles the traditional banking system in 
providing not only maturity and liquidity but also credit transformation. Both 
latter contexts for money had, however, up until the Great Financial Crisis no 
sovereign backstop in place. Thus runs on this form of banking could occur, 
and did occur.  
 The system’s stability before the crisis relied on the belief that pricing 
in liquid markets foregoes efficiently and that risk can be calculated based on 
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past tendencies. Thus Financial Economics provided an epistemic frame work 
through which such a system may foster and left without regulatory con-
straints. Now, after the financial crisis, central banks can affect the prices 
mechanisms of shadow money by putting assets from the money markets onto 
their balance sheets. Thereby they can now set a floor for asset prices which 
previously was not considered to be part of the monetary policy toolbox. In 
this way, the evolution within money markets and their breakdown in times 
of stress changed the monetary system by also changing the function of the 
central bank. Increasingly, so the arguments by Pozsar (2016) and Mehrling 
(2012) go, central banks are not only liquidity providers in times of demand 
by specific institutions but also act as market makers in times when market-
pricing does not work.  
 Aglietta and Orléon (1984, 233) point to this by problematizing the 
quantitative approach regarding money, which hides differential forms of 
money and especially their hierarchical relation. Combining the money view 
à la Pozsar, Mehrling and others with perspectives of the French regulation 
school opens up a view on the institutional reconfiguration of the monetary 
institutional form and its disassociation from national boundaries as the mon-
etary institutional form ‘is closely related to the space governed by nations 
and those between them’ (Boyer 1990, 38). This complementary relation of 
shadow banking and the monetary institutional form thus provides a view on 
the socio-political relevance of the contemporary financial order in the con-
text of a transnational orchestration of monetary flows and new intersections 
of private and public financial and regulatory institutions: a ‘new normal’ of 
shadow money (see also Gabor and Vestergaard 2016; Murau 2017). 
6. Conclusion 
This ‘new normal’ of shadow money, as outlined above, works as a new form 
of monetary constraint, it thus affects the mode of regulation and therewith 
the reproduction of social relations and which kind of regime of accumulation 
is supported. Regulation in this sense is far broader in scope than only point-
ing to the dysfunctionalities of a certain system in place but via its reconstruc-
tion regulations also allows to account for the socio-political implications of 
its evolutionary force. Beyond that, it is not restricted to national borders as 
monetary flows related to the shadow banking system in place also affect the 
international sphere of politics in coordination with investment streams. 
Shadow money in this sense only works in part as a ‘national’ money-like 
form. A main driver for understanding the politics of shadow banking pro-
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vokes a deeper consideration of the regulatory matters governing contempo-
rary financial relations and their evolution, which is outlined further through-
out the respective papers of this dissertation. Politics, however, also deserves 
a more specific discussion when it comes to financial matters. Politics, in this 
context, is often restricted to actual decision-making regarding regulation but 
politics, and this is further specified in the second chapter, can also be con-
ceptualized as part of the textual construction of regulatory matters. Financial 
regulation restricts and allows future matters to happen – present regulation 
thus closes or opens up possible socio-political pathways, e.g. in (re)directing 
financial flows. 
 Again, the social embeddedness of financial markets comes to the fore 
(Granovetter 1985; Swedberg 1997). Shadow banking incorporates the socio-
political dynamics to account for productive forces beyond the standard con-
cepts in economics. However, shadow banking and financial regulation pro-
vide a productive relation for organizing the financial field which is hardly 
perceptual via interactionist accounts, e.g. as ‘global microstructures’ (Knorr 
Cetina and Bruegger 2002). To avoid the revelation of the Parsons’s Pact, i.e. 
the separation of economics and sociology (Stark, cited in MacKenzie 2003, 
350), also the productive quality of financial regulation and, in this case, its 
relation to shadow banking needs to be seen as a socio-political relation.  
 Such a co-constitutive relation is not only central for understanding the 
Great Financial Crisis and the role of shadow banking therein. Since the onset 
of the financial crisis of 2008/9, it is questionable if the relation of the two 
sides (regulation/finance) of the coin have become less complex. Finance and 
its regulation are still framed as neutral technologies that need fixes based on 
their own logics. The efficiency of financial markets, for instance, is thus ra-
ther an indicator of how insulated these markets are considered in their im-
portance for democratic decision-making or other societal concerns. Thus, 
also financial regulation should not only be conceptualised as a tool – be it in 
the end by Financial Economists or Regulationists – but itself as a productive 
socio-political relation. 
 This is the point of departure for the following articles. They show that 
regulatory texts offer a view on the productive socio-political relation ex-
pressed via financial regulation. The following theory paper provides a dis-
cussion of how to conceptualise politics to allow for a ‘radical contingency’ 
(according to Scherrer) – or in Derrida’s words ‘a democracy to come’ (B – 
The politics of text). The first of the four research papers outlined below cri-
tiques an economistic reading of finance and argues for a socio-political per-
spective on shadow banking (C – Heterodox economics and shadow banking). 
The second paper shows how, over time, regulatory texts reframe power con-
stellations based on the function of ‘member states’ of the European Union 
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(D – Politics in crisis). The third paper expands on the reflexivity of regula-
tion and shadow banking and their dynamic co-constitution (E – Reflexivity 
of shadow banking). Finally, the fourth paper gives better insights into the 
processes of establishing regulation, especially regarding the (hardly possible) 
politicisation of alternative ideas, concerning the organisation of the financial 
field (F – Limits of critique). Whereas the first paper provides the foundational 
problematic regarding the missing socio-political perspectives on financial 
regulation, the other three papers triangulate this endeavour via a genealogi-
cal, power-related and actor-network perspective on the production of finan-
cial regulation.  
 Taking these parts together, analysing the politics of financial regulation 
provides an empirical entrance point for a more specific analysis of the evo-
lution and present setting of political order and its social condition. Thus, the 
common node of this paper-based dissertation and the addressed gap in the 
literature concerns the production of regulation and how its production can be 
analysed as a socio-political relation. 
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B – The politics of text 
 
To rethink the notion of politics and its relation to text, this paper turns to a 
philosophical discussion on openness under the umbrella of the ambiguous 
notion of ‘perhaps’. Derrida, so it is shown, outlines layers of friendship 
which lead him through a history of thought – a history, however, which is 
not actually bounded to time. It is a piece of text through which he finds his 
way. Thereby, he reveals the traces which connect different texts, which in 
turn point to a specific succession of letters. It is ‘friendship’ that serves as 
the focal point from which he departs with the aim to return – it is the focal 
point around which he steadily circulates.  
 This contribution first gives an overview about how text and construc-
tivist thought are interlinked, Secondly, the text turns to Derrida’s analysis of 
text, as looking at its enabling condition, which is a continuous reference to 
other texts, and at how he reveals these references captured through the notion 
of the trace. Thirdly, and most centrally, this text analyses Derrida’s circular 
search for politics and how in so doing traces are shown and new traces are 
formed through the entanglement of different textual constructions, i.e. 
friendship and perhaps. Finally, this contribution turns to the question of 
whether and how politics can be understood as textual construction and what 
this means for further analysis. 
 
The paper is based on (Wilhelm 2014) 
 
Wilhelm, B. 2014. ‘Auf den Spuren Jacques Derridas: Politische Theorie als 
textuale Konstruktion’, in Spurensuche: Konstruktivistische Theorien 
der Politik, Martinsen, R. (ed), Wiesbaden: Springer VS, pp. 79–94. 
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1. Introduction: Politics as text 
In the end, financial regulation is a piece of text. Is there a specificity to its 
textual condition when it comes to politics? Jacques Derrida’s politics of 
friendship, so it is argued, provides an entrance point to understand the rele-
vancy of textual construction and how politics is interwoven into this practice. 
The relation of text and politics is the main motivation to look deeper into the 
making of financial regulation and how these textual constructions stabilise 
and reproduce social formation on a wide-ranging scale – be it in spatial or in 
temporal terms. Spatially, via regulatory texts, different jurisdictions get 
aligned; temporally, via common rhythms, political routines provide an un-
derstanding of how to cope with future uncertainties. This discussion on the 
relation between text and politics, however, seeks to focus on a specific read-
ing of the notion of ‘perhaps’, which is prominent in Derrida’s politics of 
friendship. This notion entails the problem of how the production of text as 
something, which is present, leaves space for interpretation and openness in 
contrast to clarity and distinctiveness. What is expected from (financial) reg-
ulation is mostly the latter pair, underscored by the continuous calls for more 
data, transparency or simplicity. What is thereby seemingly forgotten is how 
these calls restrict or even exclude a concept of politics which is directed to-
wards an unknown future, and which derives its meaning from this condition. 
Thus, political decisions are made in a context which cannot be known, oth-
erwise it seems to be rather an automatism, algorithm or a mechanical under-
standing, in general, of social relations. 
 Politics of financial regulation is usually associated with perspectives 
accentuating either agents or structures. Lobby groups or networks can be 
more or less powerful given a specific regulatory concern (Christophers 2016; 
Newman and Posner 2016; Pagliari and Young 2016); or the dominant mode 
of production prioritises certain societal fractions over others (Aglietta and 
Scialom 2010). A new political landscape and thus views on needed regula-
tory concerns may be seen as guiding for change (Bell and Hindmoor 2017); 
or the moral context within which regulatory measures are placed may be in-
dicative for regulatory outcomes (Orban 2016). New and often small organi-
sations are able to produce decisive knowledge to affect regulatory rationales 
(Ziegler and Woolley 2016); or the confrontation of specific kinds of capital-
ism empowers one regulatory context over the other (Howarth and Quaglia 
2016). The specific relations of powerful regulatory entities, for instance via 
the Bank for International Settlements and its associated central banks, may 
be key for policy diffusion (Andersson 2016); or technological innovation, 
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such as automated trading, establishes new regulatory spaces that, in turn, cre-
ate political struggles (Castelle et al. 2016). Specific elite networks and (Lall 
2015) or dominant ideas about the way to efficiently regulate financial matters 
(Baker and Underhill 2015) serve as explanation for the persistence of distri-
butional structures. 
 The regulatory text as itself a productive force is thus often disregarded. 
Even if the critical location, where regulatory texts are translated into action, 
is highlighted, it is human agency, e.g. the compliance officer (Lenglet 2012), 
which carries the situational power when confronted with ambiguity. Studies 
regarding financial practices which connect politics with openness remain a 
rare case as presented for instance along financial imaginaries (Brassett and 
Holmes 2016) or via foreclosing regulatory devises such as value-at-risk cal-
culations (Lockwood 2015). To rethink the notion of politics and its relation 
to text, this paper turns to a philosophical discussion on openness under the 
umbrella of the ambiguous notion of ‘perhaps’. Derrida, so it is shown, out-
lines layers of friendship which lead him through a history of thought – a 
history, however, which is not actually bounded to time. It is a piece of text 
through which he finds his way. Thereby, he reveals the traces which connect 
different texts, which in turn point to a specific succession of letters. It is 
‘friendship’ that serves as the focal point from which he departs with the aim 
to return – it is the focal point around which he steadily circulates. To enable 
this movement, Derrida looks for traces in texts. Traces in turn inhabit a spe-
cific temporality, as they had been created beforehand. The trace holds on to 
this understanding until the tracks become covered in the present, which re-
starts the temporal relation as the practice of covering is in turn adding a new 
layer to the original trace. Traces in this sense are thus only meaningful in 
their distorted conservation of something which had been but which cannot 
fully be brought into the present. Hence, traces hold together what has passed 
and what is present. In a word, they ‘exist’ in suspension.  
 This contribution first gives an overview about how text and construc-
tivist thought are interlinked (Watzlawick 1985, 10). The question is how it is 
possible to put text at the centre of analysis. It is argued that although practices 
like writing, speaking or thinking occur prior to the constitution of text, text 
has its own quality in building up a very specific network of signification. 
Secondly, the text turns to Derrida’s analysis of text, as looking at its enabling 
condition, which is a continuous reference to other texts, and at how he reveals 
these references captured through the notion of the trace. This revelation shall 
be denoted as textual construction. Thirdly, and most centrally, this text anal-
yses Derrida’s circular search for politics and how in so doing traces are 
shown and new traces are formed through the entanglement of different tex-
tual constructions, i.e. friendship and perhaps. Finally, this contribution turns 
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to the question of wether and how politics can be understood as textual con-
struction and what this means for further analysis. 
2. Constructing politics 
The history of political thought is also a conceptual history that struggles with 
its constitutive concept of the political. Insofar as looking at the concept of 
the political within political thought is a self-reflexive as well as a self-con-
stitutive endeavour: The political makes the political. This is, however, not a 
static but a dynamic process, meaning a temporal relation which might be 
understood as continuous circulation of political signification and thereby sta-
bilisation. It is what, in the following, will be related to as an openness. But 
for now, it is about an overview of how the political can be thought about 
from a constructivist perspective which is twofold. On the one hand, this can 
point to questioning the foundations of the concept of the political; on the 
other, this can also point to the procedural development of the political. Thus, 
a constructivist understanding enables two different methodological pathways 
to understand the concept of the political as well as the practice of its consti-
tution. In the following, both analytical possibilities will be discussed in more 
detail to prepare the ground for a discussion on the politics of textual con-
struction. 
2.1 Constructivist possibilities  
One basic methodological distinction which is drawn in the literature is that 
between constructivism and empiricism. It is a distinction between the as-
sumption that the world can be independently observed and evaluated from 
outside the system and, contrarily, that the world is always observed from 
within the system and thereby creating a constitutive interdependence of ob-
ject and observing subject. This is a first reflexive layer within a constructivist 
understanding. The observer not only influences what can be seen and how 
an object is approached, but observation is also an observation of a self which 
is part of observational practice (cf. Schmidt 1990, 20). Through the observa-
tion, not only is the object constituted but through the relation between object 
and observer it is also the observing subject (e.g. observing the economy con-
stitutes the economist). Therefore, from a constructivist perspective, observa-
tion is never a simple relation but always a co-constitutive practice of the 
difference between object and subject. The consequence for a constructivist 
analysis is therefore never to see stability but always to experience a perma-
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nent practice of (co)constitution and resolution. Even an ‘epistemic solip-
sism’, as it had been proposed (Glasersfeld 1990, 404), tends to strengthen the 
assumption of an independent capable observer, rather than to account for the 
actual dynamic at play when it comes to the practice of observation. 
 Derrida’s understanding of text helps to find an analytical practice that 
not only seriously takes this dynamic interplay but also helps to go beyond (or 
precede) an assumption of dual observational systems, as his textual analysis 
points to an iterative process of deferral of the authentic but deforming text. 
This performative game also evokes the critique by Derrida on the Austinian 
(1962) performative: there is no performative that has to be actually realised 
beyond text in order to constitute itself. For Derrida, the performative motion 
remains a textual theory that does not rely on an actualisation beyond text to 
be successful in constituting itself. A performative relation is, therefore, not 
one of success or failure, and thereby assigned to functionality (cf. Searle 
1975, 306–308), but relevant in its procedural formation (cf. Kripke 2006, 
74). And so language games are therefore not functional relations but contin-
gent processes steadily put forward via practices of signification. From this, a 
logic of difference or, in Derridaean terms, of différance is obtained. Steady 
differences of speech acts can be observed, observation itself, however, re-
mains part of this formative (interpretative) practice. 
 Discussion of the political does not exclude the social, i.e. the relation 
of observation. One possibility to include sociality into the analysis of textual 
relations is proposed via the concept of translation (cf. Munday 2008, 170–
172). This does not mean overcoming linguistic boundaries but rather under-
standing text as a steady relation of translation through observation, i.e. per-
ceiving text. Thereby, the social is always inscribed into the textual relation.10 
The possibilities of textual structure – described in more detail below – in-
clude contingent projections (contingency meant as being within a distinctive 
scope in contrast to pure randomness). The translation of the social in the form 
of text is marked by a cutting point at which different fields of textual con-
struction may overlap. It is exactly this situation that calls for a principle of 
text that has to be clarified before we can continue to follow the traces of the 
political. 
2.2 A principle of text  
As aforementioned above, it seems that text has a different quality to spoken 
language. The difference in quality points to their relation. A principle of text 
                                                             
10 See how Wiechens (2002) presents the debate between Bourdieu and Derrida as well as their 
essays to think beyond text in different ways. 
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may assume that there is no hierarchical relation, i.e. that spoken language is 
logically prior to written text.11 In the case of text, it is constitutive that text 
can relate to other texts, which relates in turn to the concept of traces as inter-
textual reference marking a trace that redirects to other texts, but which is 
never be present at the very time when they leave their marks, get erased or 
are overwritten (cf. Bennington/Derrida 1994, 83). In that sense, text is only 
insofar as it can possibly remain. Text is not contained within itself – every 
word, every succession of signs refers beyond a single text to other text(s). 
Also, the non-reference can only be thought of in relation to other text(s). 
Thus, what is absent is included in the present text as something absent and 
thus there is the presence of the absent. 
 This is what has been called the double and contradicting movement of 
différance, which enables us to think about the absent together with the pre-
sent (cf. Derrida 2004, 120–121). The actual defers into a state of potentiality 
and what (analytically) remains is a trace. As far as potentiality remains – i.e. 
to recognise the trace as a trace, i.e. the ability to be read – that is as far as the 
trace declines in its actuality. This means that by reading the trace the trace 
gets covered, which in turn marks a new trace which is, though, still connected 
to the trace ‘underneath’. The trace becomes absent through its presence being 
covered. It becomes a continuous presence: 
To the extent that every trace is the trace of a trace, no text is· "itself" 
enough to do without a context; but by the same token no context can 
really be closed, and we will read indefinitely a sentence such as "I 
forgot my umbrella" without ever getting to the end of it. (Benning-
ton/Derrida 1993, 90–91) 
 In retracing a trace, a new trace is laid out. For a text, this means that by 
reading it it does not stay as it is but defers its meaning with each reading. 
Text exists in its own continuous. It is never in its own actual state but always 
presents a state of potential. It exists in its own impossibility (cf. Hoy 2000, 
44). It stays in its continuous reference system and it is not able to constitute 
itself as present. Access to the text (through text) as well as its context (again 
text) is hence closed, as it is always thrown back into its condition of potenti-
ality. Indeed, the more effort is made to see the traces, the more they vanish. 
Effort only contributes to the continuous reformation of the reference system. 
Bennington describes such a way of deconstruction as follows: It is not only 
about…   
                                                             
11 Heidegger provides this distinction via positioning primal hearing, i.e. listening or silence as the 
condition of possibility for speaking (Heidegger 2001, 206–207). Text hence waits to be spoken out. 
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…a "deconstructive" strategy, but a condition of thought in general. 
The fact that an analysis of language obliges us to treat the verb "to 
be" in such a way, that language thus exceeds its own resources, and 
especially the question "what is… ?," which grounds philosophy, im-
plies a fold or twist in which the totality of entities is delimited, and 
we are no longer simply "in" language. (Bennington/Derrida 1993, 
76–77) 
 We are within language – not in a trivial but in a fundamental sense: 
Language is not an eventual by-product of our speaking but is unlimited 
though framed in a non-actual state. For our endeavour, here this means to 
look at the practice of the coverage of the traces and not searching for their 
actual meaning. Hence, to look for the concept of the political cannot mean to 
perceive text as an external and silent object but as a textual construction, i.e. 
a self-referential and primal moment of the genesis of the political. 
2.3 Contexts of friendship 
Too much of evidence, as is noted in Derrida’s postcard,12 means to forget 
this relation of past and presence and hence that there are traces, and that only 
that which has left traces can still be noticed. Forgetting about their origin in 
turn lets us persist in the present, where everything is up front and nothing is 
left behind – i.e. the cards are on the table and nothing is hidden from the view 
of the players around it. This explicitness covers the practice of becoming. 
From now on, this paper follows Derrida’s politics of friendship and its central 
quote assigned to Aristotle – ‘Oh friends, there are no friends’ – to rediscover 
the space explicitly hidden for politics. 
 The construction of this quote contains an openness in two ways. On the 
one hand, it is not clear if it stems from Aristotle; on the other, it has a para-
doxical meaning, as it is directed towards friends but at the same time it is 
saying that there are none. To track the political this contribution concentrates 
on Derrida’s discussion of the latter ambivalence with the goal to demarcate 
a location of the political. This location, it is anticipated, is about a moment 
of openness, which is assumed to be primal to the possibility of deconstruction 
and therefore primal to the state of final determination. This is reflected in the 
relation of potentiality and actuality. Politics is at play when it comes to this 
relation and how the transition from one to the other occurs. This space in-
between is where politics can be at work before an eventual determination is 
reached. It is the construction of a political realm because of its possibility, 
i.e. a continuous potentiality and therefore a steady state to be in the realm of 
                                                             
12 ‘Not a single trace, an absolute camouflaging by means of too much evidence: cards on the table, 
they won't see anything else.’ (Derrida 1987, 175) 
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politics. Derrida describes this as a simultaneous double movement of de-po-
liticisation and hyper-politicisation at the same time (cf. Derrida 1996, 85). 
 This understanding of the political can be related to the aforementioned 
concept of traces. They are the practice of politics neither is based on solid 
ground but precisely on their own practice: traces constitute traces as politics 
constitutes politics. The state prior to this is the possibility to leave traces and 
to be in indeterminacy. For both, fundamental openness might be the enabling 
condition. Such an approach provides the ground for a constructivist perspec-
tive which addresses Derrida’s moment of the political. This moment is 
marked through the condition of indeterminacy, and therefore by continuous 
instability. This instability, as will be shown, is expressed by the notion of 
perhaps. This textual figure focuses not on the moment of change but tries to 
see an event within steadiness. The quest for a textual construction related to 
a concept of the political is therefore about how stability is possible under a 
basic condition of openness: Which institutionalised collocations and contexts 
can be stabilised through iteration and which figures expire in a normal cha-
otic distribution? Derrida (1996, 83–84) describes this as follows:  
It becomes necessary to stabilise precisely because stability is not nat-
ural; it is because there is instability that stabilisation becomes neces-
sary; it is because there is chaos that there is a need for stability. 
 This is not to refer to a continuous state of exceptions (as for example 
discussed by Agamben 1998). This contribution, rather, tries to read Derrida’s 
politics of friendship from a constructivist point of view, which means to un-
derline the state of openness, its relation to politics and how it might be ad-
dressed. Therefore, no signification can be assumed prior to the state of 
politics, be it understood as normal or exceptional – this in turn points to Der-
rida’s notion of perhaps. Hence, the focus of this contribution points to the 
location of politics and not to the conception of politics,13 which would mean 
to question existing political orders or their constitution. Such a context would 
already imply an assumption about, for instance, justice, as it is deeply in-
scribed into the different dimensions of the political realm. Deconstruction, in 
contrast, tries not to base its analyisis on a prior assumption of the political 
but to look at the motion, e.g. how justice originates (Zellinger 2003, 73). The 
textual construction of perhaps in Derrida’s politics of friendship contains 
such a structuration of possible politics, which can then, in turn, be decon-
structed. 
                                                             
13 Contributions in this regard rather focus on practices within the political space in contrast discuss-
ing the notion of the political itself. Examples have been collected by Stocker (2007); Kern and 
Menke (2002) and Beardsworth (1996). In addition, Schönherr-Mann (1997) contributes to a dis-
cussion of the concept of the ethical. 
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3. A textual construction of the political  
The central movement of this text – as laid out – focuses on a search for pol-
itics: What kind of textual construction is at hand if it can be identified as 
political? This relates to the circular movement by Derrida around the notion 
of friendship, which in turn perhaps allows for approximation. The notion of 
perhaps mentioned above is the decisive twist, when it comes to the relation 
of friendship, which can be marked as political. A textual construction of the 
political therefore concerns the positioning of friendship and how it is con-
fronted with the notion of perhaps. Thus, the hypothesis of this section 
emerges as follows: The handling of the perhaps, which the trace of friendship 
allows, opens up a function within which the political can be placed. 
 To look at this more closely, three steps are presented. First, a closer 
look at the notion of perhaps is undertaken; second its relation to friendship 
is displayed; and finally, it is shown how a textual construction of the political 
thus comes about. 
3.1 The construction of perhaps  
Derrida warns us. He says or writes that ‘one should not believe that our per-
haps belongs to a regime of opinion’ (Derrida 1997, 43). What kind of per-
haps might this be? Initially, he lets us conclude that there are different 
spheres within which text may work. He wants us to consider a sphere which 
is not one of mere opinion. In his comment on Derrida’s postcard, Rorty 
(1992, Ch. 6) points to the characteristics of a steady deferral as well as Der-
rida’s paradoxical thinking. Rorty describes how one written work by Derrida 
cannot be exactly classified, or perhaps beyond that, how Derrida (or ‘Der-
rida’ as textual signification) cannot be classified; and how irony might be a 
way to approach Derrida. What Rorty is decisively not doing is to define this 
textual figure of irony. Here, Derrida works differently: Derrida shows open-
ness by remaining open through the double movement of the interplay of per-
haps. 
 The notion of perhaps which Derrida wants to speak about is anticipa-
tory, it is the ‘condition of decision’ (Derrida 2005, 219). It is a basic potential 
which has to stay in its potentiality and cannot be resolved through decision. 
One might think – perhaps – of Heidegger’s notion of openness as the condi-
tion of truth (Heidegger 1962, 355). The decision has to be constitutively a 
posteriori if truth – and this might be seen as ‘dangerous perhaps’ (Derrida 
2005, 174) – has no fixation in presence, if it is exposed to historical condi-
tions (cf. Castoriadis 2009, 239) or cannot be concluded. So:  
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If there is some truth in the perhaps, it can only be that of which the 
friends are the friends. Only friends. The friends of truth are without 
the truth, even if friends cannot function without truth. The truth – that 
of the thinkers to come – it is impossible to be it, to be there, to have 
it; one must only be its friend. (Derrida 2005, 43) 
3.2 The analogy of friendship 
Derrida connects further relations in the quote above, thereby he provides a 
new trace and for this paper it provides the next argumentative step. Friends 
(in the plural) have a connection to truth, they need truth. Without truth friends 
cannot be paradoxically though they are without the truth – but why friends 
are friends with the truth? How does perhaps relate to friendship? 
 We have seen that the perhaps is primal to decision as well as to truth. 
Friendship however still lies in the dark and – at least at this point – we might 
not be able to fully enlighten this concept. But to anticipate the following dis-
cussion: friendship staying in its indistinctness is very closely related to the 
primal openness of the notion of perhaps. Friendship is initially a functional 
guide, when Derrida tries to fathom the political further. At the centre of this 
discussion remains the paradoxical structure of the quote attributed to Aristo-
tle ‘Oh friends, there are no friends’.14 Or – to get more to the point – it is 
about to speak directly to the paradoxical itself. What Derrida finds when he 
tries to identify the ambiguity of the quote is the paradoxes that place them-
selves around the friend as a textual construction. 
 Aristotle, Carl Schmitt and finally Heidegger are questioned about their 
concept of friendship:15 What is it – friendship? And it seems that in each of 
their arguments the designation of friendship is accompanied by a distinct 
paradoxical notion. There is the friend, who – with Aristotle – becomes some-
one close to a god and is thereby rather excluded from the present world. The 
difference between friend and enemy collapses in their co-constitutive move-
ment, as provided by Carl Schmitt. Even though Heidegger seems to be a hard 
case, Derrida sees the conception of the friend as fragile when it is, on the one 
                                                             
14 One could argue that Derrida formulates this assertion (Oh friends, there are no friends) as a 
performative close to a prayer: ‘You, my friends, be my friends. You already are, since that is what 
I am calling you. Moreover, how could I be your friend, how could I declare my friendship (and it 
consists in loving rather than in being loved), if friendship were not still to come, to be desired, to 
be promised? How could I give you my friendship there where friendship would not be in default, 
if there already were such a thing? More precisely, if the friend were not in default? If I give you 
friendship, it is because there is friendship (perhaps); it does not exist, presently. In any case, it is 
not at my disposal.’ (Derrida 2005, 235) 
15 Others who were consulted were Plato, Cicero, Montaigne, Kant and Nietzsche. However, this 
very quick overview is only to indicate how the reconstructive manner applied by Derrida turns out. 
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hand, related to the community and, on the other, closely related to the indi-
viduation of being there, i.e. being with. 
 Hence, friendship is perhaps also an undecidedness, an openness, which 
is prior to the self, the own or the I? To put it more precisely: perhaps ‘is’ 
friendship? The text pieces we have gathered up to now shall be related to 
each other more decisively before we bring them closer to the political. A 
textual construction points to how texts relate to each other, which positions 
they occupy, how they do so as well as what kind of traces they allow to de-
tect. In this sense, we have followed perhaps as well as friendship and we are 
now at the conjunction of these traces at which we can confront them. The 
notions of perhaps as well as of friendship share a primal openness. Both no-
tions share that they inhabit the primal condition of decision before any deci-
sion. Friendship seems to be possible, its actualisation however is not brought 
about through a decision but through primal openness. Friendship cannot be 
demanded, it is not a condition, it is what may come. In the same manner, 
perhaps in a fundamental manner is what may come. Both textual construc-
tions remain in their undecidedness.16 This analogy might be addressed when 
Derrida asks:  
…is it possible to think and to implement democracy, that which 
would keep the old name 'democracy', while uprooting from it all 
these figures of friendship (philosophical and religious) which pre-
scribe fraternity: the family and the androcentric ethnic group? (Der-
rida 2005, 306) 
 It is a double movement of giving away and occupying signification re-
lated to friendship. The notion of friendship can hold this position due to the 
traces left behind by friendship as textual construction. 
3.3 The location of politics 
But we are not yet at the final stage of the argument and so the last question 
or demand from Derrida regarding democracy has to wait. Until know we 
have not found a closer identification of the political. The hypothesis offered 
beforehand has only been partly elaborated (the handling of the perhaps, 
which the trace of friendship allows… ): The textual construction of friend-
ship is entwined with the notion of perhaps. One could say the trace of friend-
ship is thrown into perhaps. Now we still need to elaborate how this 
                                                             
16 For this, Derrida proposes the term “telepoiesis” which combines the meaning of ‘far off’ (i.e. 
tele) with ‘imaginative making’ (i.e. poiesis). It is about what may come, i.e. distancing the present 
imaginary of the present as actuality (bare evidence) from the continuous and present state of po-
tentiality but never put into presence and thereby far off (Derrida 2002, S. 234). 
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entwinement ‘ …opens up the function within which the political can be 
placed’. 
 In contrast to the construction of the political by Carl Schmitt, the polit-
ical as understood by Derrida is not related to an entity which is constituted 
through and within the friend/enemy dichotomy where, according to Schmitt, 
the political is situated (cf. Derrida 2002, 84–85). Derrida understands the po-
litical, on the one hand, as a more abstract concept; on the other, however, he 
understands it in very concrete terms. The abstraction performed by Derrida 
goes beyond a community and beyond space and time. In this respect, the 
concept of the political from Derrida represents a doubling of the Schmittian 
potential of the political.17 The potential of the political lies in the possibility 
of being with, i.e. being always and already with others. The potential of the 
political is not a permanent horizon of an entity as a unity but the potential of 
the potential. The dynamis is deferred into spatial and temporal infinity: 
How is this responsibility to be exercised in the best possible way? 
How will we know if there is philia or homonoia between us, if we 
are getting on well, at what moment and to what degree? How are we 
to distinguish between ourselves, between each of us who compose 
this as yet so undetermined 'we'? (Derrida 2005, 231). 
 The concretion, on the other hand, is the most immediate. The political 
does not only begin with an entity as unity but already with being and being 
with as individuation – within individuation itself, and hence it is more sub-
stantive than merely linked to an already present subject. The private and the 
public are not abstractions, which lead to an entity as unity like states, nations 
or people. Their difference is the innermost of the political and the innermost, 
or better, the aus-einander-setzung 18  of individuation. Derrida poses this 
question to Schmitt: 
                                                             
17 For Schmitt, the potential for the political lies in the real possibility (‘reale Möglichkeit’) (Schmitt 
2002, 32–33) of the friend/enemy distinction. For Derrida, it lies in an openness expressed via his 
conception of the perhaps. This enables the Derridaean understanding to be primal in relation to the 
Schmittian notion of the political. The political for Derrida, as has already been shown, points to a 
tension of undecidedness, and thus to the potential of the potential of possible differentiation. 
18 A common translation of the daily usage of this expression might be ‘to consider a subject’. To 
look into something, it has to be opened up and differentiated along with its pieces which make the 
whole. This is also what is implied by the German expression ‘auseinandersetzen’. This meaning in 
German is, in turn, very helpful for understanding something which cannot be taken apart any further 
but is still present in some form and can be considered. Adding the hyphens to the expression (aus-
einander-setzen) performs a double movement. At the same time, the hyphens show how the differ-
ent parts of the word (which have also their individual signification) are connected and separated, 
i.e. they can be perceived individually as well as in their agglomeration. This specific expression 
regarding individuation thematises the practice of putting together and taking to pieces at the same 
time, whereby the practice of making (in contrast to experiencing or observing) comes to light (i.e. 
the practice of a ‘Setzung’, which means that something has been set). 
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“Why does Schmitt take no account of the fact that the police and spy 
network – precisely, the police qua spy network […] points to what, 
precisely in the service of the State, ruins in advance and from within 
the possibility of the political, the distinction between private and 
public?” (Derrida 2005, 144). 
 The structural conditions of a difference that can become political, turns 
into an entity as unity as a political practice that dominates any aspect of po-
litical life. To preserve an undetermined difference, it is about retracing the 
movement through which perhaps friendship provides an opening for the po-
litical within which it can be placed. Going back to the notion of friendship 
and Heidegger, he states that… 
…philia [friendship] is the granting of favour. Favour gives some-
thing, which, fundamentally it does not possess but it has still to war-
rant so that the other being can stay within one’s own.19 (Heidegger 
2001, 129)  
 What Heidegger expresses is the non-relationship as the relationship be-
tween friends. Friendship can thus never be fully actualised, though it has to 
be practised continuously as it is expected to be realised at any time – a con-
tinuous absence as presence. This notion of friendship (philia) is very close to 
that of Derrida when he calls for a cleaned version of friendship, i.e. its para-
doxical absence as presence. Perhaps here Derrida is too close to Heidegger’s 
thinking and it might therefore be that the ‘Auseinandersetzung’ with 
Heidegger’s notion of listening (‘Horchen’) is part of the politics of friend-
ship. Heidegger’s notion of listening tries to formulate something primal that 
is prior to language, or which persists in simultaneousness. It is not meant as 
an antagonist to mishearing, rather it constitutes the paradoxical relation of 
not-yet-and-ever-since.20 The entanglement of the perhaps of friendship with 
the political lies in the giving of the not-yet-and-ever-since. 
 The openness of a performative and theoretical contradiction leaves it 
open to the question of friendship, to point at the same time to something that 
cannot be created as it had been ever since being present, and to demand 
something that shall never come. The location of politics is the interplay – the 
                                                             
19 The original German would be: ‘Die φιλíα ist das Gönnen der Gunst, die etwas schenkt, was ihr 
im Grunde nicht gehört und die doch Gewähr geben muß, damit des anderen Wesen im eigenen 
bleiben kann.’ The translation above is my own as there is no English version of this text available 
yet. 
20 Heidegger positions mishearing (Verhören) in a similar position to Derrida and his notion of per-
haps. 
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upholding of this tension (cf. Stäheli 2000, 242). Bennington encapsulates it 
as follows: 
This implies that politics is now, not projected into a utopian future, 
but in the event of the tension which is not to be resolved.21 (Benning-
ton/Derrida 1999, 257). 
 The commonality of perhaps and mishearing (failure to hear) lies in 
their unconditioned (‘existential’) openness of the textual construction. The 
discussion about the relation of perhaps and mishearing certainly needs 
greater attention; here, however, only the following quote may bring about 
further clarity: 
If in each case the caller and he to whom the appeal is made are at the 
same time one's own Dasein themselves, then in any failure to hear 
the call or any incorrect hearing of oneself, there lies a definite kind 
of Dasein's Being. A free-floating call from which 'nothing ensues' is 
an impossible fiction when seen existentially. With regard to Dasein, 
'that nothing ensues' signifies something positive.22 (Heidegger 1962, 
324) 
 The handling of perhaps, which the trace of friendship allows for, hence 
opens up a function within which the political can be placed. This conjunction 
results from the analogy of the conditions of possibility by both textual con-
structions. The political can inhabit the tension that persists and shall persist 
between openness and relatedness. Derrida’s concluding demand is thus not 
only consequent but connects again (in a deconstructive fashion) with Aristo-
tle and his conception of moderation:  
When will we be ready for an experience of freedom and equality that 
is 
capable of respectfully experiencing that friendship, which would at 
last be just, just beyond the law, and measured up against its measure-
lessness? (Derrida 2005, 306) 
                                                             
21 And it goes on: ‘Deconstruction is not a thought of the absolute also in that one cannot absolve 
oneself from this tension, nor therefore acquit oneself of the indebtedness it implies.’ (Benning-
ton/Derrida 1999, 257–258). 
22 The original German original: ‘Wenn der Rufer und der Angerufene je das eigene Dasein zumal 
selbst ist, dann liegt in jedem überhören des Rufes, in jedem Sich-verhören eine bestimmte Seinsart 
des Daseins. Ein freischwebender Ruf, auf den ‚nichts erfolgt‘, ist, existenzial gesehen, eine unmög-
liche Fiktion. ‚Daß nichts erfolgt‘, bedeutet daseinsmäßig etwas Positives.’ 
 
48 
4. Conclusion: Textual politics 
Finally, how does the path sketched out lead to political theory: What is it – 
political theory as textual construction?23 The focus on the relation between a 
politics of friendship and perhaps points to how political theory is identified 
with the concept of a textual construction. In this respect, the following ques-
tion evolves: How can textual construction be political theory? The preceding 
argument to substantialise the proposed hypothesis (that the handling of per-
haps, which the trace of friendship allows, opens up the function within which 
the political can be placed) has tried to highlight precisely how a textual con-
struction performs. The contribution has tried to copy Derrida into its text. 
Since what is the politics of friendship? 
 It is an essay to repeat, to deform, to multiply, to continuously touch 
upon a textual construction, i.e. the exclamation: Oh friends, there are no 
friends. In this sense, it is no longer a history which is told (the chronology of 
an idea) but an intersection of textual constructions, of pieces of text, whose 
presence cannot be fixed. They are not just simply picked up as a conglomer-
ation of text pieces, rather each gets constructed, assembled, correlated and 
thereby deferred. This contribution has tried to follow this movement in order 
to show how Derrida entangles, constructs and composes his text pieces. 
Thereby, the border between reproduction and construction is emphasised to 
lay out a trace by following one and to construct signification by doing so. Or 
to say it in Derrida’s words: 
The truth – that of the thinkers to come – it is impossible to be it, to 
be there, to have it; one must only be its friend. This also means one 
must be solitary – and jealous of one's retreat. This is the anchoritic 
truth of this truth. But it is far from abstaining from afar from the po-
litical – and even if the anchorite plays the scarecrow, such a person 
overpoliticizes the space of the city. (Derrida 2005, 43) 
 This notion of the political is thereby the precondition for another con-
struction by Derrida: “For democracy remains to come; this is its essence in 
so far as it remains” (Derrida 2005, 306). It is the democracy to come, which 
can be found at the end of the politics of friendship. This construction in turn 
entails the textual construction of the political; it refers to a present practice 
which is in itself never present (yet) (cf. Derrida 1996, 82–83). Acting on the 
                                                             
23 The problem of the concept of theory (i.e. the question about the ontology of theory) cannot be 
discussed in this context. However, this paper entails some consequences for such a discussion as it 
brings up the problem of how a theory of democracy can be conceived if the ontological status of 
democracy and theory is at the same level. This directs us to the general problem of separating 
theory and empirics, subject and object. The proposition discussed, analysing textual construction, 
takes on the continuous performativity of these relations as shown via the concept of a trace. 
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basis of perhaps in the form of a primal openness, a foundation without a 
ground, a simultaneity of different times of presence and futurity – this opens 
up a democratic realm.  
 In this way, the political is bound to an immanent form, which it already 
contains as a primal condition. The political in the form of undecidedness (the 
basis for something that in its deconstruction cannot be deconstructed further) 
refers to the form of the democratic. The democracy to come refers to itself 
and is left to steadily reiterate itself through a practice of undecidedness, in-
sofar as the political as openness is understood through the primal perhaps. 
From the perspective of finance, it is of interest that concepts like automated 
regulation or the construction of risk-free assets ‘overcrowd’ (cf. Nesvetai-
lova 2014) and over-determinate the time to come, and hence limit the possi-
bilities for democracy from a Derridaean perspective. This critique is less 
directed towards the framing of financial policies; rather, or so it seems, it is 
a diagnosis of normality to reduce uncertainty by determining the time to 
come and hence defer the notion of politics into a presentist technocracy in 
contrast to a political community able to confront what cannot (or in a way 
should not) be known. 
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C – Heterodox economics and shadow 
banking 
 
This paper positions shadow banking as a main representation of today’s or-
chestration of financial flows not visible on the regulated balance sheets of 
traditional banking. Thereby, it accentuates the limitations of mainstream eco-
nomics in grasping what is at play via institutional mechanisms on a global 
scale. Heterodox economics, in contrast, though accounting for the legal and 
institutional underpinnings of shadow banking’s fabric, it misses the socio-
political relevance of financial regulation. Theoretically, this chapter posi-
tions shadow banking as a social practice. This means that financial relations 
are a powerful social fabric that is, however, often evaluated based on its own 
terms and thus restricted from other interventions, considering for instance 
the social effects and origins of such a powerful and globally active financial 
network.  
 Methodologically, the chapter brings together the main regulatory and 
analytical approaches regarding shadow banking to show the so far limited 
concern of shadow banking’s socio-political relevance. To pursue this argu-
ment, the first section of this paper points to the institutional qualities of 
shadow banking as a fundamental part of the broader financial system. The 
second section provides a view of the inner workings of shadow banking, 
which are better understood from a legal-institutionalist perspective than from 
a mere economic one. The papers’s third section lays out the present regula-
tory adaptations and how they affect the current state of shadow banking. It 
concludes, therefore, that to understand the shadow banking system, a more 
fine-tuned institutional perspective must be supplemented by a perspective on 
the social and political contexts which condition (and are also conditioned by) 
the practices of shadow banking.  
 
This paper is based on (Wilhelm 2018). 
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1. Introduction 
The shadow banking system offers at least two insights into the legal under-
pinnings of the financial system. On the one hand, shadow banking operates 
on a global or transnational scale, which makes it difficult to relate it to a 
single national legal framework. On the other hand, shadow banking displays 
the effects of an ineffective legal framework when ‘adverse’ economic con-
ditions arise. The Financial Stability Board defined shadow banking “as the 
system of credit intermediation that involves entities and activities outside the 
regular banking system” (FSB 2011a: 3) and it has been described as being 
“at the heart of the credit crisis” (Pozsar 2008: 17). The systemic importance 
of shadow banking for global finance came to light during the financial crisis 
of 2007-08. Paul McCulley, who first coined the term shadow banking in 
2007, refers to the balance of private and public forces that were distorted 
before and during this financial crisis. Since then, regulators have endeav-
oured to rebalance the banking system (IOSCO 2009; BCBS 2011; Bakk-Si-
mon et al. 2012; IMF 2014; ESRB 2015; FSB 2015a). 
 Economically, shadow banking performs banking-like practices; le-
gally, however, it holds a privileged accounting position that comes with 
lower or no capital requirements compared to the traditional banking sector 
(Ordoñez 2013; Plantin 2014; Ferrante 2015). Hence, a purely economic anal-
ysis is limited if seeking to understand the role of shadow banking. Instead, 
exploring the interplay of financial regulation and shadow banking activities 
will paint a more comprehensive picture of the institutional evolution of the 
financial practices that stabilise and destabilise the financial system.  
 After the so-called run on the shadow banking system in 2008, the inte-
gration of shadow banking practices into the regulatory frameworks has been 
much discussed (Joint Forum 2008; IOSCO 2008; BCBS 2009; FSB 2011b). 
While the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and others support “non-bank fi-
nancing” as it “provides a valuable alternative to bank funding and helps sup-
port real economic activity” (FSB 2015b: 1). However, the question of what 
this actually means for rebalancing the financial system is still debatable; as 
highlighted by McCulley, the question is one of if, and how, shadow banking 
can function in its tamed version.  
 This chapter illuminates the practices and regulatory aspects of the 
workings of the shadow banking system. The first section of the chapter points 
to the institutional qualities of shadow banking as a fundamental part of the 
broader financial system. The second section provides a view on the inner 
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workings of shadow banking which are better understood from a legal per-
spective than from an economic one. The chapter’s third section lays out the 
present regulatory adaptations and how they affect the current state of shadow 
banking. The chapter argues that, in order to understand the shadow banking 
system, a more fine-tuned institutional perspective must be supplemented 
with a perspective on the social and political contexts that condition (and are 
also conditioned by) the practices of shadow banking. 
2. Institutionalising shadow banking 
The inclusion of shadow banking in regulatory regimes impacts on how inter-
vention in economic systems is practiced (Bundesbank 2014; Pozsar 2015). 
This, in turn, creates a new mode for governing international financial markets 
that further increases the homogeneity of financial practices and the intercon-
nectivity of risks (Shin 2009). The crisis of 2007-08 further underlines the 
importance of shadow banking for the functioning of the internationalised 
capitalist system. Its collapse, starting with the Lehman Brothers’ failure in 
2008, indicates the interconnectedness of financial institutions and thereby the 
systemic vulnerability of the international financial architecture. 
 Mainstream economics has retained its unquestioned explanations of the 
present position of shadow banking—greed, moral hazard, asymmetric infor-
mation, lack of transparency, and false regulation. Hodgson (2015), however, 
suggests that in terms of the broader working of capitalism, it is the institu-
tional environment of shadow banking that affects the very practice of finan-
cial exchange. Beyond the financial sector, shadow banking influences 
political and social relations. Shadow banking had not only enforced a ‘home-
owner society’ via the repackaging of mortgages into saleable assets but also 
further integration of financial institutions at the global level. Consequently, 
shadow banking introduces additional systemic risk (embedded in new forms 
of credit and in collateral provision across state borders) that calls for new 
regulatory measures if such risk is to be contained. 
 Heterodox economists generally do not limit their analyses to only eco-
nomic phenomena. Heterodox economic analyses of finance are situated 
within the social and institutional context, including social norms and sanc-
tions. The legitimacy of these institutions is represented through regulatory 
regimes as the basis for financial interaction. Financial interactions are in-
creasingly less contained within national boundaries; hence they must be gov-
erned by complex international regulatory mechanisms. Thus, to understand 
financial interaction within and beyond state-based legal frameworks, one has 
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to understand the international regulatory relations, which have recently been 
broadened and, consequently, created new forms of ‘financial innovation.’1 
 Especially post-crisis regulatory measures show a tendency to enhance 
resilience to crises, rather than to focus on specific risk characteristics and 
hedging strategies. Their focus places greater emphasis on bank equity than 
on external ratings, and more reliance on trading through third parties (that is, 
clearing counter parties) than on bilateral inter-bank markets (that is, over-
the-counter transactions). This emphasis on resilience indicates that crises are 
increasingly recognised as a common phenomenon. Such recognition is con-
siderably different from the widely-accepted view represented by the applied 
risk models that dominanted before the recent global financial crisis. Thus, 
the rediscovery of the ‘Minsky moment’ (BIS 2008; Nesvetailova 2014; Or-
doñez & Gorton 2014) reconfigured the way in which possible futures can be 
conjectured in an economic and regulatory sense.  
 In addition, the ‘Bagehot moment’ (Mehrling 2012) marks the decisive 
position of the central banks during the collapse of the shadow banking sys-
tem. The new state of financial affairs created through regulatory reform 
places pressure on the normal business behaviour not only of banks (and the 
configuration of their financial assets in line with the new regulatory de-
mands), but also of central banks (CGFS 2015). Especially for central banks 
in the face of a low interest rate environment, financial regulation seems to be 
a key instrument to adjust the lending behaviour of banks and the economy at 
large.  
 This new dynamic components of regulatory control provide, amongst 
other mechanisms, new tools to govern financial affairs from a regulatory per-
spective. From this point of view, the new role of the European Central Bank 
as the main agency for European banking supervision appears to be a logical 
step towards adopting the ‘new normal’ in economic governance from a dis-
tance (Mehrling 2012, 2014). The new configuration and transmission of cen-
tral bank policies have thereby expanded and become more complicated. 
These new policies might thus more closely resemble adjustable tools vis-à-
vis the developments of a future shadow banking system.2 
 In the past few years, some heterodox economic perspectives have de-
veloped ways to analyse the financial system based on Schumpeterian (Ülgen 
2014), Kaleckian/Minskian (Wray 2009; Ryoo 2013; Fisher & Bernardo 
                                                             
1 Financial innovation can not be reduced to individual financial products; rather, it is the way in 
which financial flows are reconfigured and thereby create new connections between financial prod-
ucts and new organizational nodes (i.e. financial institutions organizing exchanges). For a more 
detailed explanation see Guttmann (2016: ch. 5). 
2 One should not overlook the increasing involvement of central banks in financial exchanges as a 
counterparty connected to a greater number of financial institutions; and also via their balance sheets 
and the assets covering a more extensive spectrum of involvement. 
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2014), or more general Post Keynesian (Guttmann 2012; Lavoie 2013) mod-
els. Ülgen (2014), for instance, places an emphasis on the self-reflexivity of 
the financial system (‘finance to finance’ versus ‘finance to production’), 
which disputes the unquestioned role of banking as a functional step to finance 
Schumpeterian innovation. A Minskian perspective of unstable capitalism, he 
argues, allows a better perspective on the destructive capacities of finance.  
 Wray (2009), draws on Veblen to explicate the transition from commer-
cial to financial capitalism (Minsky’s money manager capitalism). He argues 
that, in the present system, private debt plays the leading role for economic 
growth, and securitisation becomes central to the mode of accumulation. Post 
Keynesians present a more systemic perspective on the present accumulation 
regime denoted as ‘financialisation’ (Lavoie 2013). Since the 1980s, neolib-
eral policies, such as deregulation, privatisation, the intensification of compe-
tition, labor market flexibility, have restructured the economic system in favor 
of money managers.  
 One point of commonality between these heterodox perspectives is the 
rejection of the market efficiency theory formalized by Fama (1970, 1991). 
Moreover, heterodox analyses of the crisis demonstrate that even a broader 
understanding of economics might be insufficient to understand the setting of 
shadow banking in the contemporary mode of accumulation with an increas-
ingly homogenous global regulatory setting becoming evident. Complement-
ing an economic perspective, the question that arises from a socio-political 
viewpoint revolves around the way certain financial orders flourish and others 
do not, independently of a posteriori rational explanations, and how political 
decisions regarding regulation trigger further evolution of the financial sys-
tem.  
 Shadow banking is not only an impediment to better economic govern-
ance or regulatory systems. Both aspects suggest the need for interdisciplinary 
research by heterodox economists, financial lawyers, sociologists, historians, 
and political scientists. In this way, shadow banking can be understood as an 
effect of a socio-political system, demonstrating how a value system trans-
cends national boundaries and how its institutions provide for financial flows 
accordingly. In the present low interest rate environment, the ‘search for 
yield’ does not only challenge the current regulatory space but also resets such 
socio-political ‘normality.’ It provides a new regulatory context for banks as 
well as for the insurance market or syndicated leveraged loan market (Lysan-
drou & Nesvetailova 2014; Joint Forum 2015). Financial investors have to 
adjust their balance sheets and product portfolios. Such an adjustment changes 
not only credit availability for the ‘real’ sector of the economy but also finan-
cial flows of large institutional investors. 
 The changes in international regulatory frameworks for banks are well 
represented by the transition from Basel II to Basel III. Basel II provision only 
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cover counter-party risk and accentuate the internal governance of financial 
institutions. Basel III focuses on ‘credit value adjustment’ and encompasses 
broader market fluctuations such as consumption, industrial production, and 
foreign exchange. As demonstrated by the recent financial crisis, value ad-
justments for whole asset categories (for valuation dominantly performed in 
the shadow banking sector) can cause even more systemic interruption than 
the actual defaults of specific assets. The crisis effects of mark-to-market val-
uation3 may increase due to the growing need for interest bearing assets and 
hence new forms of collateral. This also reflected in that securitisation re-
mains the dominant form of market based credit provision (BCBS & IOSCO 
2015).  
 ‘Efficiency’ in regulatory terms denotes the need to pursue maturity 
transformation off-balance sheet in order not to be subject to higher regulatory 
capital ratios. Banks can outsource an established cash flow and free their 
balance sheet for further investment (Gorton & Souleles 2005). The inter-
linking of special purpose vehicles solved this problem. They also allowed for 
an expansion of seemingly secure assets backed by seemingly reliable hedg-
ing strategies based on ‘normal’ probability distributions of future events 
(Merton 1974; BCBS 2005). The bankruptcy prone off-balance sheet con-
struction of the shadow banking system failed when the banks rescued their 
sponsored special purpose vehicles (SPVs), more out of fear of losing further 
credibility within a tumbling financial market than because of contractual ob-
ligation. Exposures to special investment vehicles (a type of SPV) shrank 
from $297 billion in 2007 to $45 billion in 2008 (Joint Forum 2009). 
 The image of shadow banking as a ‘money market funding of capital 
market lending’ (Mehrling et al. 2015) suggests an abstract understanding of 
the cash flow across traditional and shadow banking institutions. Indeed, 
shadow banking is often presented as the other side of banking, although it is 
the largest (investment) banks that make broad use of arbitrage opportunities 
via the cash flow structure of the shadow banking system (Joint Forum 2009, 
2015).  
 Mehrling’s (2012) inclusive vision of a functioning market-based credit 
system misses the reality of a global regulatory structure not backed by a sov-
ereign entity such as a self-contained nation state during the post-Second 
World War period of the last century. The next section sheds more light on 
                                                             
3 Mark-to-market accounting is an asset value measurement method based on current market prices 
that directly link market volatility to balance sheet exposures, such as securities for trading purposes. 
This means that capital ratios have to adapt to current market conditions, and there has to be a market 
for such financial products in order to generate a market price—both aspects are critical for the 
soundness of financial institutions in the contexts of market turmoil or crisis. 
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how shadow banking can be explained and understood in a different way, fo-
cusing on the legal structures that enable and restrict certain cash flows or 
privilege particular financial products. 
3. A legal view of shadow banking  
After the global financial crisis, the G-20 (2010) called for a tighter regulation 
of the shadow banking system, as it was marked as a primary source for the 
global spread of financial turmoil. The Financial Stability Board (FSB 2011b) 
is the main forum for setting the regulatory agenda for a more stable interna-
tional financial architecture. Together with the Basle Committee on Banking 
Supervision (BCBS 2011) and the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions (IOSCO 2009), the FSB is to provide the means to rebalance 
and thus stabilize the architecture of the international financial system. 
 Even though the FSB took up the new notion of shadow banking as 
brought forward by the G-20, issues such as securitization (Plantin 2011), 
special purpose vehicles (Gorton & Souleles 2005), off-balance sheet activi-
ties by banks (BCBS 1986) and the associated systemic risk (Hellwig 1995), 
and macro prudential regulation (Borio 2005) had long been discussed before 
the crisis. The new notion of shadow banking—non-bank intermediation 
chains for market based credit provision—served as a node for a widespread 
regulatory agenda (FSB 2013). Research on re-intermediation practices (Ra-
jan 2005), mark-to-market accounting (Plantin et al. 2005, 2007), and credit 
ratings thorugh value-at-risk calculations (Fender & Kiff 2004) has high-
lighted in detail the systemic challenges posed by what is now called shadow 
banking. 
 Shadow banking is commonly defined as non-bank intermediation4 
(FSB 2011b). What distinguishes banks from these non-banking entities is 
that they have no direct access to central bank liquidity; nor are they secured 
through a deposit insurance scheme. Hence, the run on the shadow banking 
system, which came to its height around the Lehman failure in September 
2008, was fostered by the knowledge about the lack institutional resources in 
times of crisis. It is thus commonly acknowledged that the trigger for the fi-
nancial crisis was very similar to those associated with traditional banking 
crises, in the light of which deposit insurance and the lender of last resort 
                                                             
4 Often this practice is also understood as dis-intermediation or a market-based credit system, as the 
main intermediaries between creditors and debtors (banks) are not directly involved. For the purpose 
of creating products suitable for a market-based credit system, such as Mortgage Backed Securities, 
the original mortgage contract has to pass thorough several legal entities that actually extend the 
intermediation chain. 
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function (meaning modern central banks) were put in place (Brunnermeier 
2009; Moe 2012). 
 The shadow banking system relies on mainstream financial economics 
offering mathematical models to transfer the risk, for instance, of maturity or 
liquidity transformation (Bouvard et al. 2015). Maturity transformation prac-
ticed by banks means providing long-term loans and financing them through 
short-term debt. The shadow banking system performs a similar function alt-
hough in reverse order and without the regulatory cushion. In order to reverse 
the maturity order, debt is transformed into a standardised category backed by 
risk calculations, credit insurance, collateral pools, and credit ratings. 
Thereby, long-term credit like mortgages can be transformed into well-trada-
ble assets. Such a market-based credit system transfers (at least in theory) the 
attached risks directly to the holders of these assets (often banks themselves), 
without the traditional banking sector as an intermediary. 
 Legal entities, sometimes called SPVs or Other Financial Entities 
(OFEs), form a chain of different functions through which investors and cred-
itors can be linked to the traditional banking system and thus to the traditional 
back-up systems and regulatory obligations. Investments in the shadow bank-
ing system hence do not work in the ‘boring finance’ way—whereby banks 
hold low interest-bearing deposits or government bonds through which they 
leverage their investments in higher interest-bearing longer term credit port-
folios. Rather, shadow banking can be understood as an off-balance sheet ar-
rangement, which fosters and promotes new practices of securitization. 
 Thus, the ‘shadowy’ part of banking stems from directing financial 
flows through non-bank financial institutions, where the whole setting is 
mainly created by banks that charge for its use but have no legal responsibility 
for its sustainability.5 It is the legal structure which enables (or does not for-
bid) what can actually be originated, sold and then included in the respective 
capital structures. Here, Hodgson’s legal institutionalism therefore directs us 
to ‘a disaggregated view.’ In this respect, Lysandrou & Nesvetailova’s (2015) 
recent study provides a better understanding of the practice of shadow bank-
ing than the aggregation of monetary amounts that arguably represent the 
shadow banking system. As evidenced by Pozsar et al.’s (2010) mapping ex-
ercise, shadow banking is a way to legally enable certain financial products, 
which in turn interconnect the financial system in critical ways. These cannot 
be understood by looking purely at the size of monetary aggregates. 
 As such, the institutional financial structure allows the shadow banking 
system to create highly rated short-term products with interest rates above 
                                                             
5 Money Market Mutual Funds, for instance, had been main drivers for repackaging mortgage loans 
into differentiated securities, as they provide an alternative to government bonds in terms of the 
probability of default assumptions though promising higher returns. 
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those of government bonds and significantly above the interbank rates, which 
is of interest especially to money market mutual funds (Bengtsson 2013; 
Chernenko & Sunderam 2014). The shadow banking system is able to absorb 
long-term or lower-rated products that increased demand for debt to be secu-
ritised; in fact, it established a fee-based originate-to-distribute arrangement 
through which earnings can be realised via transferring, for instance, default 
risks to investors (Brunnermeier 2009).6 Consequently, the system enables 
banks to manage their balance sheet in a way that makes it more ‘attractive’ 
for their shareholders (FSF 2008). This arrangement can also abate the high-
risk appetite of other institutional investors through its ability to differentiate 
risk exposures. The main way to achieve this is through a mixture of risk mit-
igation strategies such as liquidity facilities, credit default swaps or cash-flow 
waterfalls, which resulted in ‘pseudo-risk-less’ (Stein 2010) securities being 
safe in the good times but very risky in the bad ones. 
 Securities—collateral backed financial instruments—function as a form 
of money within the shadow banking system through which one is able to gain 
income in the form of interest payments correlated to the risk one is willing 
to take. Standard securities enabled the pooling of multiple loans; this strategy 
has the benefit not to be exposed to total failure if a specific credit cannot be 
serviced. The second layer of securitization, the securitization of securities or 
so-called collateralised debt obligations (CDOs), provides risk stratification 
through trenching—that is, the creation of a so-called waterfall of cash flow 
from the upper tranches to the lower ones from which the calculated propor-
tion of creditors can service its payment obligations. In the case of losses, this 
means that cash flows related to the securities will first serve the upper 
tranches (super senior or senior), before trickling down to the intermediate 
(the mezzanine tranche) and finally to the lowest positioned tranches (called 
junior or equity). In addition, and in order to further reduce risk exposures, 
financial innovation provides credit insurance for special investment vehicles 
and security tranches in the form of credit default swaps. In this way, insured 
upper tranches could receive the highest (triple A) ratings, whereas other 
tranches could satisfy the hunger for higher returns (mezzanine tranches with 
B ratings, or unrated junior or equity tranches). Though usually only very se-
cure assets are assigned the lowest default probability, based on such financial 
                                                             
6 The move from an originate-to-hold to an originate-to-distribute business model also marks the 
changing incentive structure for risk evaluations. There might be a greater incentive to look at the 
underlying collateral if banks want to hold a credit they originated and hold to maturity than when 
they never hold the asset but only orchestrate its legal manufacture. In the latter case, profit does not 
arise from interest but from fees, which encourage an expansion of the financial manufacturing 
industry, that is, shadow banking. 
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engineering, securities based on subprime mortgages can receive the highest 
triple A credit rating by the dominant rating agencies.7 
 This ‘entanglement’ points to the need for comprehensive regulation 
that does not predominantly rely on credit ratings. In the context of systemic 
disruptions, a change in credit ratings has effects similar to those of mark-to-
market accounting, creating a high demand for liquidity in non-liquid times. 
What has actually been created is an enlargement of the capital basis for banks 
along with opaque legal entities involved in creating financial products in or-
der to hide their financial relations to banking institutions. The next section 
turns to the regulatory debate about shadow banking. 
4. Regulatory reform and its consequences 
As outlined above, shadow banking provides a new way to create debt in a 
seemingly very profitable and, at the same time, low-risk way, at least as long 
as most parts of the financial system remain intact. However, as indicated by 
the Asian Financial Crisis and the failure of Long Term Capital Management, 
an emergence of ‘super portfolios’ disrupts the effectiveness of hedging strat-
egies (see MacKenzie 2003), especially if a seemingly highly improbable 
event challenges the financial order systematically. CDOs, for instance, can 
be highly efficient if the financial system complies with the projected risk 
trajectory, assuming that systemic events might happen once in a 1000 years 
(implying that a financial system would last that long and that the single event 
could be imagined at a similar distance from present times). The watering 
down of eligibility criteria for individual creditors and financial product has 
been long ignored. The systemic success of shadow banking produced new 
risk configurations through massive supply and demand for private debt—a 
self-reinforcing effect that should have been prevented already by the pre 
global financial crisis regulatory framework.  
 Considering that activities pertaining to the shadow banking system “of-
ten generate benefits for the financial system and real economy, for example 
by providing alternative financing to the economy and by creating competi-
tion in financial markets that may lead to innovation, efficient credit alloca-
tion and cost reduction” (FSB 2012: 3), ex-post regulatory proposal can also 
be read as a blueprint to enable such intermediation chains and risk mitigation 
strategies.  
                                                             
7 The role of credit rating agencies in misrepresenting the actual risk of structured financial products 
should not be understated, though there is a broad discussion about their role in generating the crisis 
dynamics through their conflicts of interest in the rating of financial products by the institutions that 
profits from higher rating results. This chapter however discusses more specifically the internal 
function of shadow banking. 
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 The Basel framework for banking regulation interconnected the interna-
tional banking system more closely by providing common standards, espe-
cially for capital requirements and capital transactions. Consequently, 
securitization can be pursued within an internationalised market through a 
common understanding of risk, allowing for the decreased hindrance of finan-
cial exchange by national borders. The different jurisdictional provisions con-
cerning banking enabled a practice of cherry picking the most suitable legal 
framework for enhancing and modifying the respective business strategies of 
financial firms. 
 As the Joint Forum (2009: 18) highlights, “because the Basel II frame-
work is more risk sensitive, it is likely to have a material effect on bank in-
vestors in terms of their interest in various types of securities.” The heightened 
sensitivity of financial regulation compared to the Basel I framework for fi-
nancial practices created incentives for the increased compliance of asset port-
folios with the risk hierarchies implemented via Basel II. What looked like a 
success for the regulatory process, however, turned out to be a trigger for de-
mands for tailored investment products suitable for the respective risk portfo-
lios of banks and provided by shadow banking, which thus became an 
incremental part of global financial intermediation (Plantin 2014). 
 One driver of this change was the inclusion of a portfolio invariant risk 
conception into regulatory standards. This established a singular understand-
ing of risk, meaning that risk could be calculated and compared independently 
of its spatial, temporal or institutional origin (Kessler & Wilhelm 2013). Thus, 
“diversification effects would depend on how well a new loan fits into an ex-
isting portfolio” (BCBS 2005: 4). The portfolio in question is made up of risk-
weighted assets, which undergo a mark-to-market valuation. In this way, 
banks are asked to manage their balance sheets according to market variations 
in a shared governance system in order to keep up with regulatory demands 
concerning their respective capital requirements.  
 Credit ratings for financial institutions and products functions as a wide-
spread standard according to which the risk structure of a bank’s balance sheet 
can be calculated. When market developments are retained in the projected 
range of risk frames, credit ratings provide the ‘facts’ that “suffice to deter-
mine the capital charges of credit instruments” (BCBS 2005: 4). The under-
lying formulae to calculate the needed regulatory capital contain, however, 
several assumptions about the functioning of markets (for example, differen-
tiated risk weights for sovereign bonds and car loans). After a crisis, however, 
these assumptions seem to apply only if ratings had not been built into finan-
cial instruments, thus aligning the balance sheets of banks to regulatory re-
quirements and potentially providing for a shared crisis trigger when ratings 
for product categories change. 
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 One assumption intuition built into capital requirements calculations is 
that capital charges for long-term obligations should be higher than for short-
term exposure. Lower capital charges for short-term investments and similar 
investment strategies create investment incentives and, thereby, demand for 
such products not only from money market funds. The business model of 
shadow banking is exactly to provide an ‘efficient’ maturity transformation, 
This, in turn, stimulates the need for (seemingly less risky) short-term debt 
leading to an increase in the roll-over of long term investments through the 
issuance of short-term securitized debt. To do so, the shadow banking system 
makes use of collateralised liabilities which could be produced more ‘effi-
ciently’ off the traditional and regulated banking sector’s balance sheets 
(Plantin 2014).  
 Still needed to create such money-like securities is a high degree of 
standardization, that is, a high degree of information insensitivity paired with 
broadly accepted standards of transparency. Both aspects are achieved 
through the regulation of risk weights according to securitization categories 
(especially asset classes such as securities backed by prime mortgages), as 
well as external ratings as provided by credit agencies. This combination cre-
ates an ‘opaque’ and, at the same time, clear basis for investment decisions in 
favour of asset backed securities and securities thereof (Gorton 2015). 
 There is a sense of there being enough information about abstract cate-
gories like a senior tranche of a mortgage portfolio, as well as a sense that the 
construction of structured investment products is immune to detailed disclo-
sures of the performance of singular mortgages. Thus, the rollover risk created 
through the transformation of single mortgages with long-term maturity into 
short-term securities could be eliminated, especially via the use of ‘risk neu-
tral’ special investment vehicles. Only through such a legal structure can the 
exchange of collateralized financial products function in a money-like fash-
ion. 
 Although trust in, and the liquidity of, shadow banking practices has 
vanished, regulators across the globe still try to refine the legal structure to 
make market-based banking more resilient (ECB & BoE 2014; ESRB 2014; 
FSB 2015a; BCBS & IOSCO 2015; IMF 2015). These efforts commonly 
agree in the provision of more granular data about distinctive investment 
products, as well as the need to better understand how financial institutions 
are linked. Therefore, the importance of central clearing counterparties has 
risen due to further adjustment of the Basel scheme (BCBS 2011). The calcu-
lation of risk is now related to how banks interact (‘inter-connectedness’), to 
their lending along economic cycles (‘pro-cyclicality’), and to their indebted-
ness (‘leverage ratio’), as well as to the size of banking institutions (‘too-big-
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to-fail’). Each source of risk has now been counterbalanced by increased cap-
ital buffers (higher risk weights) or lending and borrowing limits (a leverage 
ratio) to be fully implemented by 2019. 
 The regulatory net within the European Union (EU), for instance, has 
been fundamentally transformed since 2008 in response to the global financial 
crisis. The European Commission proposed new or reformed directives and 
regulations that change the modes of financial interaction. Institutions like the 
European Banking Authority, the European Insurance and Occupational Pen-
sion Authority, the European Securities and Markets Authority or the Euro-
pean Systemic Risk Board provide further insights into market operations. 
Together, these developments impact on a more general conception of finan-
cial markets in the EU.  
 The systemic inter-connectedness of the credit system via shadow bank-
ing and across jurisdictions has been enabled by common regulatory construc-
tions and complementary cash flows across the Atlantic. Regulatory agencies, 
private associations, individual, national and regional actors are all accounta-
ble for triggering the build-up of systemic risk and its consequences, although, 
as separate entities, perhaps unaware of creating an unprotected credit system 
inherently prone to runs. The systemic disruption of the financial system after 
the Lehman Brothers’ failure highlighted the need for further integration of 
the international financial order for credit and debt. This paradoxical situa-
tion—that is, regulating inter-connectedness via a broader common regulatory 
framework—may not be resolved without understanding the socio-political 
underpinnings of the financial system. Further regulation might thus defer but 
not avoid systemic sensitivity in the times to come. 
5. Conclusion: Heterodox economics and shadow banking 
Shadow banking reflects the increasing homogeneity of the global financial 
rules that have been pushed in the direction of globally-shared categories for 
financial regulation and practices. This shift is accompanied by not only an 
unprecedented compatibility of the varieties of international financial capital-
ism, but also a synchronicity of reactions and consequences in times of crisis. 
Thereby, financial regulation becomes part of the production of global cate-
gories for risk, resilience and even safety. These aspects, however, are not 
restricted to the economic domain; nor can they be separated from the socio-
cultural production of purposes or value systems for financial relations. Het-
erodox economics, in contrast with the mainstream view, provides several 
pathways to understand the present regime of accumulation. Heterodox eco-
nomics not only allows for an abstract analysis of certain value regimes like 
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currencies, government bonds, or other debt securities, but also for an evalu-
ation of the conjunction of financial and societal relations. The orchestration 
of shadow and traditional banking does not work within clear-cut regulatory 
(global) space, but shadow banking makes exactly use of the variegation of 
juridical fields also of matters beyond financial relations. The socio-political 
aspect of finance and the financial aspect of politics and society have far 
reaching implications for the reasoning of one value system against another. 
In this context, finance is one analytical entrance point to understand variega-
tion and its associated socio-political hierarchies.  
 In this regard, the balance of public and private forces points to an on-
going struggle that is not restricted to the field of finance. The preference for 
private over public debt, debt over taxes, or growth over sustainability struc-
tures the financial world; finance, however, enables specific relations over 
others when conducted within the social world. This points to a rather old 
concept in institutional economics, that is, how to value the time to come, 
expressed in the notion of futurity by John R. Commons at a time when eco-
nomics had been closer to sociology, history, and other social science disci-
plines. 
 The notion of futurity allows for the analysis of conceptions of the future 
rooted in the present and for the structuring of financial flows. In this way, a 
broader understanding of the socio-political production for imaginary think-
ing is needed that considers the institutionalizations of future imaginations in 
the present. Possibly one of the most prominent accounts may be represented 
by pension schemes; one of the most popular can be seen in science fiction 
movies as guidance for technological innovation. 
 The problem of shadow banking shows the ‘plumbing’ of such imagi-
naries, as it directs monetary resources accordingly. The recent global finan-
cial crisis and its widespread consequences raised questions not only about 
economic theory but also about the political system governing global rela-
tions. After its seemingly local origin, the market interruption challenged 
longstanding procedures of central banks, transnational banking, and interna-
tional financial regulation. The crisis intervened into economic and political 
procedures previously perceived as the norm for financial interactions. Sys-
temic interruptions, hence, provide a context within which not only the failure 
of rules comes to light but also the assumptions about the normal perception 
of a time to come. 
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D – Politics in crisis: Capital 
requirements as strategies of 
governance 
 
To highlight the politics of meaning over time, this paper reconstructs the 
evolution of regulatory texts which were revised or merged and led to the 
present capital requirements for banks in the European Union. Thus, it shows 
how distinctive discursive strategies were inscribed into regulation, which in 
turn arranges the political context. This political context delimits how actor-
hood can be articulated, what kinds of properties can be attached to it and how 
different entities relate to each other within European financial regulation. 
This analysis led to three interrelated narratives. The first starts with the in-
creasing need for jurisdictional alignment between European member states 
especially between 1972 and 1992. The second proceeds with the insertion of 
risk into regulatory reasoning between 1992 and 2006. And the third displays 
the enlarged role for supranational agency vis-à-vis national jurisdictions be-
tween 2006 and 2013.  
 Over time, regulatory texts increasingly used the concept of risk to make 
sense of the European field of banking regulation. Theoretically, the paper 
follows Foucault’s notion of strategies within the architecture of knowledge 
in showing how discourses situate themselves and thereby open up reconfig-
ured power relations. Methodologically, the paper is based on a thick reading 
of regulatory text, thereby extracting decisive evolutions and changes in dis-
course organising concepts, such as member states in their dual role of sub-
jectivities and objects of regulatory measures. This change relates especially 
to strategies for risk management. All in all, this paper points to the present 
subordination of democratic decision-making to a management metaphor 
with the goal to enable a well-functioning market system. 
 
This paper is based on (Wilhelm 2017) 
 
Wilhelm, B. 2017. ‘Regieren durch Risiko. Staatlichkeit im europäischen 
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1. Introduction: Strategies in crises 
Madam President, the series of events we have 
witnessed in financial markets during the last 
year, and in particular during the last few days, 
are of a magnitude that exceeds anything we have 
seen in our lifetime […] Work is progressing at 
the Commission, and the Commission will soon 
come forward with proposals on a revision to the 
Capital Requirements Directive. (Almunia 2008) 
In his speech to the European Parliament on 24th September 2008, Joaquín 
Almunia, then European Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs 
and the Euro, marked the exceptional quality of the recent financial crisis 
2008-9. He highlighted how the European Union is going to deal with these 
exceptional circumstances; namely, by means of further developing the regu-
latory framework across Europe and by coordinating with other global actors. 
This rather conventional answer to extraordinary crisis had been made possi-
ble over decades. As exceptional the crisis may have been in its depth and 
reach, the reaction went quite along previously known routines. This paper 
considers regulatory techniques and mechanisms which made these routines 
possible in the first place and it asks what kind of political change can be 
observed behind this rather routine confrontation of crisis over the last 40 or 
so years. Specifically, this article reconstructs the regulation of capital re-
quirements for banks, i.e. how the so-called CRR/CRD IV package, a main 
response to the recent financial crisis, came about. The CRR/CRD IV package 
is concerned with the capital structure of financial institutions and how it af-
fects their strategy to apply leverage through credit provision and investment. 
In general, regulatory reform demands higher capital buffers for individual 
financial institutions across the European Union which is meant to make the 
overall system more stable. This goes hand in hand with defining new invest-
ment categories and thereby hierarchies of different investment strategies, for 
instance, when it comes to investments in mortgage securities in contrast to 
securities based on car financing schemes. 
 More recent analyses in International Political Economy about Euro-
pean financial regulation focused on actors and interests and how they were 
involved in negotiations, commenting and formulating the emerging regula-
tory setting (Posner and Veron 2010; Tsingou 2010; Mügge 2011; Pagliari 
and Young 2014; Quaglia 2014). A more structural perspective is concerned 
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with conditions of global governance which may limit possible regulatory 
proposals (Helleiner 2011; Cohen 2012; Germain 2012; Schwartz 2012). 
What seems to be rather absent from this discussion, however, is how the ar-
ticulation of financial regulation constitutes and restricts the dynamic of fi-
nance and politics in certain ways (exceptions are Aitken 2010; Hansen and 
Porter 2012; Langley 2013). Analyses in the latter sense, though less focusing 
on the matter of financial regulation, were carried out under the umbrella of 
the Social Studies of Finance (for a similar critique see Riles 2011). They look 
at what finance does to a social understanding of the world and what the social 
understanding of finance does to the world (MacKenzie and Millo 2003; Cal-
lon 2007; Pryke and du Gay 2007; Armstrong et al. 2012). In this way, such 
studies are concerned with understandings of technicity (Preda 2006), actor-
hood (Hardie and MacKenzie 2007), social practices (Fourcade 2006), the 
production of knowledge (MacKenzie 2012) or the power of ideas (Baker 
2013) to understand how finance is in the making. Against this background, 
this article proposes that regulatory texts provide a different empirical angel 
to study the social and political implications of finance. This approach is to 
look at constitutive processes for and of financial regulation by avoiding the 
structure/agency divide and, at the same time, by not exclusively focusing on 
micro-practices of finance either. Hence, using financial regulatory texts as 
an analytical site enables us to look at the politics of financial regulation as an 
evolution of distinctive formations, i.e. which types of strategies are resorted 
to govern the financial system over time. 
 In Foucault’s terms, he refers to ‘systems of formation’ differentiated 
via a specific ‘regularity of a practice’ which he expressed in his earlier work. 
Following his Archaeology of knowledge (Foucault 2002: 71–85) allows to 
reconstruct distinctive regularities entailing different strategies referring to 
the, in this case, financial system as an object of governance. Such strategies 
in a Foucauldian sense express how ‘options and thematic choices’ are con-
fronted with when they appear. In a specific ‘field of stabilization’ specific 
strategies can be repeated and at the same time this field creates the limitations 
for their expression. It produces a ‘threshold beyond which there can be no 
further equivalence’ between strategies and their implied objectives. This is 
when a new field of stabilisation can be encountered though still ‘authorized 
by anterior levels’. In this sense, the following reconstruction is based on a 
Foucauldian reading of the regulatory texts that in their revised or merged 
form have led to the present CRR/CRD IV package in the EU. Hence, the 
article shows how distinctive formations were inscribed into regulation and 
how they provide for regulatory strategies which, in turn, arrange a political 
context to come. Confronted with options and choices, already present sets of 
strategies condition the way on how actor-hood can be articulated, what kind 
of properties can be attached to it and how different entities relate to each 
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other, here exemplary within the European financial context but also with im-
plication for governance through standardisation more broadly. 
 This analysis led to narratives which, as ‘field of stabalisation’ or ‘sys-
tem of formation’, can be arranged as three episodes, each representing a dis-
tinctive set of strategies, i.e. how financial interaction on a European scale is 
reasoned and regulated as well as how they prepare the next steps to come. 
The narration begins with the increasing need for jurisdictional alignment be-
tween European Member States, especially between 1972 and 1992. It con-
tinues with the insertion of risk into regulatory reasoning between 1992 and 
2006. And it ends with an increased role of supranational agency vis-à-vis 
national jurisdictions between 2006 and 2013. Over time, the regulatory texts 
increasingly centre on the concept of risk and its epistemic context to relate 
to and thus govern the European Union’s financial system.31 In response to 
recent crisis dynamics and to provide for a stable financial system, the notions 
of systemic and macro-prudential risks, risk profiles as well as risk manage-
ment produce a distinctive hierarchy between market actors, Member States 
and the European Union. This is accompanied by the reconfiguration of the 
institutional setting of the European Union by creating mechanisms articu-
lated through risk, which are meant to situate its Member States vis-à-vis the 
needs of functional financial markets. The new regulatory context of risk in 
financial governance provides a further outlook to a new understanding of 
state agency as entities to be managed in contrast to self-determined actors as, 
for example, represented by the former regulatory texts. This, in turn, points 
to a better understanding of the politics at play along European financial inte-
gration and how distinctive regulatory strategies condition how future politics 
of finance can be articulated. The following first episode highlights the in-
scription of risk into regulatory texts between the early 1970s and early 1990s 
and how this stabilised a field for governance within the European Union. An 
integral part of this was the increased focus on expertise inscribed into strate-
gies of financial governance which in turn develop and prepare for strategies 
of governance to come. 
2. The way to risk (1972–1992) 
This first episode provides the first context within which the regulation of 
financial institutions in Europe shows the premise for an alignment of the dif-
ferent Member States. This evolution then leads to the inclusion of risk into 
regulatory texts. Based on this, risk became part of regulation and the way it 
                                                             
31 For discussions of the politics of risk more specifically see for instance de Goede 2004; Holzer 
and Millo 2005; Kessler 2007; Beckert and Berghoff 2013. 
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required new institutions, calculatory capacities and common standards. This 
first episode shows the strategies for governance shifting from the coordina-
tion of capital flows to the governance of financial institutions from 1973 until 
1992. In 1973, the European Community established one of the first agree-
ments ‘on the abolition of restrictions on freedom of establishment and free-
dom to provide services’ for the financial sector (EC 1973). It is a ten-page 
document that is primarily concerned with outlining exceptions for individual 
countries or country-related specificities of the respective financial sectors. 
The 1973 directive was meant to enable free capital movement across Euro-
pean jurisdictions whereas, in 1992, the first inclusion of risk into the Euro-
pean governance of financial institutions was adopted (EC 1993a) 
 The 1973 directive reflected an agreement to interlink different jurisdic-
tions to enable financial interactions across borders. The consequences of 
these first aspirations already necessitated a certain coordination between 
Member States and the European level. However, the construction of the sub-
jectivities within this document, as we will see, deviates widely from the pre-
sent understanding of a Member State of the European Union. Then, it was 
one article of the regulatory document – i.e. Article 7 – which was responsible 
for organising potential requirements for cooperation across national bound-
aries. It prescribed regular meetings to prepare for difficulties related to the 
regulatory implementation as well as further development to enable desired 
cooperation. 
The Commission and the representatives of the authorities responsible 
in the Member States for the supervision of banks and other financial 
institutions shall meet regularly so that they may facilitate, for the 
purpose of implementing the Directive, the solution of problems 
which the authorities might face regarding supervision of the activi-
ties covered by this Directive, and shall ensure all appropriate coop-
eration among themselves within the limits of their respective powers. 
(EC 1973) 
 This quote also offers an impression of how Member States were ad-
dressed by European regulation four decades ago. For a better understanding 
of the evolution of the changing contextual meaning of Member States, two 
more examples might provide an insight into the, by then, normal notion of 
membership. Firstly, the entities addressed in this legislative act are financial 
institutions and their ability to situate themselves within different jurisdic-
tions. The objects of concern are ‘the natural persons and companies or firms’ 
which is in stark contrast to previous considerations around ‘the widest and 
most speedy liberalisation of capital movements’ (EC 1960). Secondly and 
already in 1963, the notion of transactions between Member States was com-
plemented by the notion of services to ‘ensure the satisfactory establishment 
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and functioning of a common market’ (EC 1963) which then led to the regu-
lation of ‘banks and other financial institutions’ in 1973.  
 Both instances show how the governance coordination between Member 
States produces shared categories of financial institutions and practices and, 
therefore, a common understanding of regulatory objects of concern. Five 
years on, in 1977, the way in which Member States connect to each other was 
refined along the problems of free capital movements, provision of infor-
mation by financial institutions as well as coordinated supervisory structures. 
In this regard, the following quote highlights three regulatory techniques ap-
plied at that time, i.e. ‘closely’, ‘all’ as well as ‘likely’. Each expression ren-
ders it necessary to specify the structure of cooperation and the differentiation 
as well as the quality of information.  
The competent authorities of the Member States concerned shall col-
laborate closely in order to supervise the activities of credit institu-
tions operating, in particular by having established branches there, in 
one or more Member State other than that in which their head offices 
are situated. They shall supply one another with all information con-
cerning the management and ownership of such credit institutions that 
is likely to facilitate their supervision and the examination of the con-
ditions for their authorisation and all information likely to facilitate 
the monitoring of their liquidity and solvency. (EC 1977, my high-
lights) 
In contrast to prior versions of the regulatory setting, the need to exchange 
information in very specific ways comes up as the main concern. In this case, 
it means that there is not only an increased flow of information between the 
supervisory institutions, but also, that certain standards are to be established 
to create the conditions for a reciprocal and homogenous exchange of infor-
mation. Information regarding management and ownership had to be catego-
rised, adopted and translated beyond the then present jurisdictional confines. 
Member States are considered as having a common and reciprocal obligation, 
i.e. at this stage, to specify at least ‘certain minimum requirements to be im-
posed by all Member States’ (EC 1977). Member states are no longer re-
stricted to their individual differences; they also have common obligations to 
deal with credit institutions. A newly established common forum further dis-
plays this regulatory evolution. This so-called ‘Advisory Committee’ was not 
only a specific forum where Member States’ as well as Commission repre-
sentatives could come together, it also constructed the preconditions needed 
to include expert knowledge in the consultation process leading to financial 
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regulation and supervisory structures, as the committee ‘may be accompanied 
by advisers from time and subject to the prior agreement’ (EC 1977).32 
 When the forum was asked to provide information on the supranational 
level, Member States could be confronted with this information. Such a re-
configuration of positions of Member States and of the European level points 
to some strategies used to relate state agency with need for information and 
expertise as well as the resulting institutional setting. This, in turn, allows to 
demark a more general field of stabilisation. Knowledge production could be 
used as a strategy to relate and assimilate national, legal, economic or bureau-
cratic routines. Prior to this development, Member States could provide ex-
pertise through their national bureaucracies and confront each other with this 
‘unilateral’ knowledge. Their regulatory needs were based on distinct pro-
cesses of knowledge production. Though transnational, financial markets 
could be regarded as free of a pre-defined European institutional prism 
through which pre-specified categories select and hierarchize the information 
needed. 
 Later, in 1983, a directive was brought under way, explicitly providing 
a common supervisory structure, i.e. that ‘controls and supervisory practices 
applicable to credit institutions operating within the Community must be 
broadly similar from one Member State to another’ (EC 1983). Minimum 
standards in all Member States were meant to ‘eliminate the most obstructive 
differences between the laws of the Member States’ (EC 1983). Thus, this 
directive predominantly focused on the legal structure of the Member States 
which had to be aligned according to the conditions set by the transnational 
financial system and promoted beforehand. This supervision under a consoli-
dated basis formulates the shared duties of supervisory agencies in different 
countries to make information about financial institutions reciprocally acces-
sible.33 The remarkable shift of the 1983 setting, in contrast to its comple-
menting 1992 directive, was that the latter for the first time specified an 
understanding of risk. Indeed, reading the following quote, the use of risk 
seems to be twofold: On the one hand, risk is associated with the market in 
general, i.e. ‘market risks’; on the other hand, there is a reference to the par-
ticular nature of risks, i.e. an understanding of risk which can be differentiated 
along its potential to affect financial institutions within a market. What is also 
indicated is how risks can be approached, namely through ‘methods deter-
mined by those authorities in the light of the particular nature of the risks 
                                                             
32 Later-on, this development was further institutionalised by the Lamfalussy procedure. 
33 Not discussed at this point are the directives concerning balance sheet layout (EC 1986) and the 
monitoring and controlling of large exposures (EC 1987). Both directives are interesting places to 
find early minimum harmonisation of different jurisdictional traditions regarding, on the one hand, 
accounting rules for different financial products and, on the other hand, the discussion on what kind 
of leverage ratios as well as their differentiation are seen to be acceptable. 
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involved’ (EC 1992). This, in turn, highlights the technical context (as a field 
of stabilisation) which had been prepared beforehand and within which the 
notion of risk could then be placed via changing strategies for governance. 
 By articulating risk, this directive allows to differentiate the field to be 
covered. The Directive allows to represent market mechanisms as something 
that is outside of the Directive and it implies different categories of risks to be 
considered. Risk is able to generate the entities to be governed and, at the 
same time, it stabilises an overreaching field for knowledge formation regard-
ing these entities. Risk is, thus, formulated as something independent of the 
regulatory matters. The risk setting can be classed by the ‘nature’ of risk and 
it provides the basis for the decision on which kinds of risks do affect financial 
institutions and which kinds of risks do not.34 What is not yet laid out is the 
form of ‘regulation as risk’ in terms of presupposed understandings of how 
risk is to be handled by regulated entities. 
 Looking at the European regulation of financial institutions, this first 
period between 1972 and 1992 provides the basic parameters of transnational 
capital movements. Financial regulation in this regard allowed for an align-
ment of different national jurisdictions, through multinational coordination, 
by specifying entities, products as well as information procedures and, to su-
pervise these activities, new institutions and entrance points for expertise had 
been created. This first episode, outlined above, ends with the first inscription 
of risk within European financial regulation, which can be understood as a 
strategy to control and supervise transnational practices of financial institu-
tions. 
3. From risk to management (1993–2006) 
The first episode ended in 1992 by stating that new tools, institutions and cat-
egories had been developed to supervise financial institutions in a transna-
tional market. In the aftermath, and here this second episode starts, the notion 
of capital adequacy was introduced through the so-called Capital Adequacy 
Directive (CAD) in 1993 (EC 1993b). The differentiation of risk, discussed 
above, opened-up the notion of market risks and allowed for the insertion of 
further risk categories, e.g. counter-party risk, foreign-exchange risk, risk of 
loss, risk of price change, position risk and many others (EC 1993b). Thereby, 
this episode shows how the field of stabilization changed and further evolved 
the leading determinants in organising financial governance. Whereas the first 
                                                             
34 The notion of risk referred to in Council Directive 92/121/EEC focuses on acceptable hedging 
strategies (EC 1993). It therefore provides a basis for a discussion on the processes structuring the 
market within the European Union along static prescripts for hedging practices. 
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episode highlighted the need for alignment of different jurisdictions through 
a shared understanding of financial institutions and practices, this second ep-
isode concentrates on the increased use of the notion of risk in its multifaceted 
form.  
 This shift allowed governance to turn to an abstraction of financial enti-
ties and practices as they had been categorised through risk calculation. This, 
in turn, allowed for a management of finance through regulation in the sense 
that it could be governed by an adjustment of numbers (i.e. of capital ade-
quacy), based on the alignment of categories across jurisdictions. Due to the 
CAD measures mentioned above, capital adequacy was not only a tool to in-
crease the mutual recognition of financial institutions by the different Member 
States, it was also the starting point to find a common logic of financial gov-
ernance, even though, at this point in time, the directive explicitly states that 
it does neither ‘establish common standards’ nor ‘establish the amounts of the 
initial capital’. It solely concentrates on the ‘essential harmonization that is 
necessary and sufficient to secure the mutual recognition of authorization and 
of prudential supervision systems’ (EC 1993b).  
 This second episode revolves around the year 2000 when most of the 
directives mentioned so far were combined under one legislation. This con-
solidation, however, did not mean that the regulatory environment stayed the 
same (the new directive being only the sum of its former parts). The directive 
‘relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions’ (EC 
2000) was, especially compared to the previous documents, highly technical, 
detailed and presented a rich description of financial practices and how they 
relate to each other. In 2000, the arguments for common regulation high-
lighted the need for homogeneity as ‘credit institutions are engaged in direct 
competition with one another and monitoring requirements throughout the 
Community should therefore be equivalent.’ (EC 2000) 
 In a first step, regulation is no longer seen as an enabling force that al-
lows for transnational capital flows. Quite to the contrary, regulatory variation 
is now seen as a hindrance to fair competition. Secondly and based on the 
condition of direct competition between financial institutions across Europe, 
the governance structure does not only have to be aligned but regulatory ho-
mogeneity also generates the increasing importance of the European policy 
making level. By positioning the Community as the level of measurement for 
fair competition, the regulatory discourse of financial standards can only be 
meaningfully situated at the very same level. The governance throughout the 
Community as well as the specific regulatory field are thereby interlinked and 
jurisdictional differences are solved using the new hierarchy of governance. 
This means that it is now the structure of the markets which renders it neces-
sary to change the regulation in contrast to a political interest to create a com-
mon market across borders. The text continues: ‘To that end, the criteria 
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applied to determining the concentration of exposures must be the subject of 
legally binding rules at Community level and cannot be left entirely to the 
discretion of the Member States.’ (EC 2000) 
 Member States are considered as only partially in charge of legislative 
procedures. The functioning of the market within a legislative context is no 
longer in accordance with the prerogative potential of the Member States. The 
level playing field (for fair competition as well as the strengthening of the 
internal banking system) provides the field of stabilisation for the argument 
to place the Community’s interest above that of the individual Member States. 
To establish control over the common market, the notion of risk is further 
developed within the regulatory text. Using this notion, regulation allows to 
specify the set-up of financial institutions and financial practices via measure-
ments connective to risk categories. 
 For instance, using risk weightings, a different kind of strategy to govern 
finance becomes central. Before, the supervisory agencies within Member 
States had their prerogative in assessing different institutions and their expo-
sure to credit or other risks. Matters to be defined on the European level then 
focused on practices indicating the workings of information exchange and the 
different forms and levels of cooperation between national agencies and other, 
nationally rooted, supervisory agencies. Now in contrast, the incentives to 
structure the capital within banks is governed on the European level using an 
adjustment of numbers as risk weightings – the logic of control is thus not to 
monitor different institutions in the same way but to establish a common field 
for capital hierarchies. The field of stabilisation now concerns financial prod-
ucts and their properties when assembled on banks’ balance sheets whereas 
before it was about the trading entities. 
 Based on the structure provided by different registers of risk, supervisors 
are now able to evaluate the financial institutions based on their risk weighted 
capital structure and to provide minimum capital requirements for financial 
institutions. Financial institutions, in turn, can then be evaluated on a daily 
basis using the ‘mark to market‘ value of their capital provisions and hence 
their varying leverage ratios. The 2006 directives (EU 2006a; 2006b) there-
fore not only institute capital requirements as a representation for further in-
scription of risk into financial regulation, they also provide for an expansion 
of supervisory techniques able to harmonise different Member States’ provi-
sions and to reach beyond the nationally confined supervisory techniques and 
instruments. 
Minimum capital requirements play a central role in the supervision 
of credit institutions and in the mutual recognition of supervisory 
techniques. In that respect, the provisions on minimum capital re-
quirements should be considered in conjunction with other specific 
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instruments also harmonising the fundamental techniques for the su-
pervision of credit institutions. (EU 2006a) 
 Taken together, common capital requirements derive from the distinc-
tive contingency which relates to the free movement of capital, a distinctive 
notion of risk, and institutional abilities of control. A common scheme for 
capital requirements then ‘prevent distortions of competition’, they 
‘strengthen the banking system’ and ensure ‘adequate solvency’. ‘[D]ifferent 
levels of risk-sensitivity’ allow addressing very different forms of financial 
institutions. This expansion is made possible by new techniques applied in 
finance ‘as external ratings and credit institutions’ own estimates of individual 
credit risk parameters represents a significant enhancement in the risk-sensi-
tivity and prudential soundness of the credit risk rules’. (EU 2006a) 
 In this context, especially the notion of ‘risk-sensitivity’ stands out for 
understanding how the financial system is in the making. The emergence of 
the notion of risk-sensitivity indicates that financial markets cannot provide 
an adequate valuation of financial products, as risk can be calculated inde-
pendently from prices through risk models or external ratings. Considering 
the at that time ever increasing practices of over-the-counter deals, this means 
that ratings and models attached to certain categories of financial products 
create a quasi-market not concerned with valuation and prices but with eval-
uation and risk. Such a market is then able to provide information about cate-
gorical risks (e.g. for RMBSs) instead of prices (e.g. for Facebook shares). In 
this respect, the notion of risk-sensitivity relates to systemic control of finan-
cial interactions via its ability to establish categorical entrance points regard-
ing financial flows. 
 This new conceptual constellation changes the focal point of regulation 
away from concrete requirements and turns it to a broader reference i.e. the 
structure of markets and how to treat them properly. The revised rules for 
financial institutions based on risk-sensitivity open-up the space for a man-
agement of the markets in contrast to regulating market participants or Mem-
ber States’ interactions, that is if ‘minimum capital requirements […] have 
significant effects on the economic cycle’ (EU 2006a). The object to be regu-
lated then becomes more of a ‘conduct of conduct’35 as opposed to a reference 
to concrete interactions between market participants. The capital require-
ments/risk conjunction appears here as a central mechanism for controlling 
the financial field in contrast to controlling the financial agents active within. 
The notion of risk thereby enables systemic references (e.g. to connect to the 
economic cycle) as a more general indicator of economic performance and 
                                                             
35 A ‘conduct of conduct’ is the Foucauldian understanding of government as ‘a form of activity 
aiming to shape, guide or affect the conduct of some person or persons’. (Gordon, 1991: 2) 
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thus the management of the economic context for financial institutions. This 
implies that the prerogative to govern the financial field goes hand in hand 
with a reduced relevance of the individual financial institution. 
 Such a strategy entails that, when the playing field is controlled in the 
right way, the players are able to compete independently by realising the pre-
determined scope of possible financial activities.36 Such a rationale can even 
be connected to a more global perspective on the functioning of financial mar-
kets, as it was the internationally relevant Basel II agreement by the Basel 
Committee for Banking Supervision which had been the predecessor of the 
recently established CRR/CRD IV package (EU 2013a; 2013b). The third ep-
isode continues by showing how the enabling conditions for the management 
of the financial field presented above expands to include not only financial 
but also political institutions, namely the institutional structure of the EU’s 
Member States. Below, this will be further illustrated along the continued 
evolution of the rules for capital requirements along the recent crisis experi-
ence.  
4. From markets to states (2006–2013) 
The second episode already indicated how the strategic changes from a gov-
ernance of financial institutions to a governance of markets affected the reg-
ulatory description of Member States and the Community and thereby their 
position within financial regulation as the broader field of stabilisation. Mem-
ber States are no longer at the centre of concern; they are now part of the 
complex constellation of financial markets. This third episode suggests, that 
they are to be streamlined to allow for an effective running of the EU’s inter-
nal banking market. To understand this evolution, third episode considers the 
revision of capital adequacy requirements concerned with ‘the convergence 
of supervisory practices throughout the Community’ (EU 2006b). Whereas 
before it was an explicit call against an overreaching harmonisation and a re-
jection of the Community’s involvement into the standards of national super-
vision, it is now the regulatory goal to assimilate the different supervisory 
practices. The key aspects of this are prudential measures evolving in the post 
crisis context. 
 The insertion of expertise and the new role of community level financial 
governance developed in the prior episodes, converged into a regular ex-
                                                             
36 This is in line with the discussion on the different juridical forms of regulatory harmonisation (e.g. 
concerning European capital markets) and regulatory competition (e.g. in European company law), 
for a discussion see Zumbansen 2006 and Schammo 2011. 
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change between supervisory agencies as for instance the Committee of Euro-
pean Banking Supervisors ‘should report on a yearly basis to the Community 
Institutions on progress made’ (EU 2006b). Indeed, the direction of such reg-
ulatory matters had already been established in the pretext for further imple-
mentation of supervisory practices. It was the then financial crisis which 
triggered a request by the Commission in 2009 explicating the need to estab-
lish four additional institutions on the supranational level to create mecha-
nisms for supervision.37 Mechanisms and techniques already known could be 
put in place to adapt to the exceptional circumstances provided by the crisis’ 
dynamics. This was undertaken not only to confront the by then present crisis 
but also to prevent future disruptions. In 2012, the high-level group around 
Jacques de Larosière ‘concluded that the supervisory framework of the finan-
cial sector of the Union needed to be strengthened to reduce the risk and se-
verity of future financial crises and recommended far-reaching reforms to the 
structure of supervision of that sector’ (EU 2012). 
 These far-reaching reforms and the new institutional setting led to new 
strategies through which financial markets could be addressed by regulation. 
On the one hand, the European Union now considers not only internal differ-
ences of regulation and their consequences for further regulation but also how 
internal reforms affect the relation to other regulatory jurisdictions (i.e. third 
countries). On the other hand, the institutional setting now allows addressing 
specific financial products and their trading practices at the European level. 
There, concrete supervision is no longer left to the national level. An increas-
ing pursuit of over-the-counter practices across national jurisdiction and lack-
ing EU-wide regulatory efforts necessitate supranational coordination of 
European rules by further explicating how these practices are to be under-
taken. This evolution leads to the most recent rules for capital requirements, 
which are based on a directive as well as on a regulation on capital require-
ments (short CRD and CRR respectively).  
 This changing strategy implies a basic difference to prior documents, as 
the regulation is to be directly translated into national law without the range 
for manoeuvring provided in contrast by a directive. 38  Hence, categories 
within European financial regulation in this field are transmitted more directly 
into national law. The need for risk calculations related to these practices es-
tablishes the connection to the contextual regulatory framework beyond the 
banking sector or specific capital requirements. Here, the predominant prac-
                                                             
37 The European Banking Authority (EBA), European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), European In-
surance and European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) and European Se-
curity and Markets Authority (ESMA) 
38 For an extensive discussion about the consequences of the two regulatory techniques regarding 
finance see Howarth and Quaglia (2013). 
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tices for trading between financial institutions create a framework for Euro-
pean regulation. Concrete financial practices are increasingly inscribed into 
regulation which basically means moving away from politics based on state 
interests as it might had been the case before (see the first episode above) but 
to pursue regulatory needs along technical fixes provided and demanded by 
the financial field. Hence, financial regulation itself represents how concepts 
of finance (and thereby also of politics) are to be realised. 
 This can especially be illustrated when looking at how the changing field 
of stabilisation allowed for different means to address ‘Member States’ via 
financial regulation. The point that stands out here is not only (as already de-
scribed) the changing configuration of financial markets through the articula-
tion of risk, but now the way how the former agencies for making financial 
regulation are now seen as one of its means. The basic difference to the 1972 
documents is that the Member States were the main actors able to set the term 
of negotiation for international exchange. In contrast, after 2000 it is no longer 
about relating the differences between Member States but about the common 
and harmonised regulatory system which should be developed further. Over-
sight and supervision then is a European prerogative – Member States are 
simply meant to comply. The measures regarding upgrading and strengthen-
ing supervision point to the featured position of the community level in con-
trast to an undermined Member State’ prerogative. 
 Beyond the position of Member States so indicated, it is also about how 
financial knowledge and standards should be changed independently of na-
tional jurisdictions and related variations. It is not only the need for harmoni-
sation but also the tools to do so that are framed in a universalist way. 
Financial markets are to be provided with a level playing field which also 
means having common standards and a common supervisory agency (or net-
work of agencies). On the European level, this reasoning enables supervisory 
agencies to report on Member States. For regulation, it is now possible to ad-
dress Member States as objects of regulatory needs. Here, the CRR/CRD IV 
framework is just one example of how Member States are subject to supervi-
sory processes due to stabilisation or transparency needs set out and required 
on the European level. 
Having regard to work of the BCBS' Standards Implementation Group 
in monitoring and reviewing member countries' implementation of the 
Basel III framework, the Commission should provide update reports 
on an ongoing basis, and at least following the publication of each 
Progress Report by BCBS, on the implementation and domestic adop-
tion of the Basel III framework in other major jurisdictions, including 
an assessment of the consistency of other countries' legislation or reg-
ulations with the international minimum standards, in order to identify 
differences that could raise level playing field concerns. (EU 2013a) 
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 The quote shows how Member States are situated in a new governance 
structure to build up routines of which they are part of. Reviews and assess-
ments are directed to the Member States whereas the community level is in 
the position to decide what is of concern along the inter-jurisdictional pre-
sumption of homogeneity, i.e. along the need for a level playing field. This 
revised hierarchical relation functions by a different set of strategies than what 
could be observed in the previous episodes. Now, the level playing field no-
tion considers internal market categories which were promoted by the regula-
tory evolution. This means that, whereas previously regulation was produced 
along enabling conditions (transnational capital flows, fair competition), it is 
now reasoned along a market perspective only created beforehand. The finan-
cial market understanding of what is meant to be a level playing field is now 
taken as a basis of what can be discussed to be effective financial regulation. 
This confined field of stabilization at the conjunction of finance and financial 
regulation, in turn, restricts the regulatory position of Member States and 
broader formations of interest. 
 Beginning in 2000, initial expressions like ‘Member States should be 
allowed to’ (EC 2000) or ‘Member States should be encouraged’, ‘Member 
States should be able to’, (EU 2004) give another impression of how a supe-
rior order is presumed to be able to affect Member States’ actions. A pre-set 
regulatory environment is constituted within which action is to a higher or 
lesser degree incentivised measured determined along the regulatory frame-
work itself. This stands in contrast to a discussion about what the actual pur-
pose of the ‘thing’ to be regulated might be for other fields. Potential actions 
are thereby already presumed by the contingent evolution of financial regula-
tion displayed above. In this way, the regulatory strategy reconstructed in this 
section indicates how regulation moved from addressing markets to managing 
states which in turn become from strategical point of view inferior to the reg-
ulatory framework in place. The notion of risk enabled categories to articulate 
markets as existing social formations. The market sphere thereby established 
rendered it necessary to demand further consistencies by further addressing 
the regulatory structure within Member States in order to put up a consistent 
level playing field at the European level.  
5. Conclusion: Politics in crisis 
In this paper, I showed three sets of strategies which allow for different pos-
sibilities of governance via financial regulation. The central mechanism used 
to do so surrounds the concept of risk and the discursive position of agencies, 
89 
objects or strategies related to the notion of Member States. The new dynam-
ics along the financial crisis 2008-9 created new relations between regulatory 
bodies, financial institutions, governments and parliaments at the European as 
well as at the national level. Hence, European regulation alters the meaning 
and possibilities of Member States and thus the representation of state sover-
eignty. The overall development of financial regulation represents the chang-
ing fields of stabilization, how they entail different strategies and how this 
allows for or hinders political intervention, i.e. how each episode represents a 
distinctive set of strategies, which are used to render things governable. 
 The present regulatory context of risk in financial governance gives a 
further outlook on a new understanding of state agencies as entities to be man-
aged in contrast to self-determined actors, as for example, represented within 
the former regulatory texts of the early 1970s. Looking at this evolution al-
lows for a better understanding of the present formation and role of the Euro-
pean Union. Within this discourse, it is up to the states which found 
themselves in this situation to re-calibrate their financial position vis-á-vis fi-
nancial institutions. Capital requirements, in this case, allow for a specific 
standard able to intervene from afar on the very immediate level of individual 
financial institutions and their balance sheets. At the same time, the level on 
which the information is gathered goes beyond the states’ (traditional) agency, 
i.e. financial regulation requires Member States to adjust to the categories of 
supervision.  
 Now there are two pathways. What this article indeed does not want is 
to argue for a break-up of the European Union to allow states to regain ‘their’ 
sovereignty. Quite to the contrary, the politics of self-interest may rather be a 
major driving force along which the marketization of the European Union 
could be facilitated especially via avoiding constructing a political union in 
addition to the commercial union. What can be distilled from this article is 
thus when to market logic will proceed to be the guiding rational for organiz-
ing social relations disintegration with the widely discussed adverse effects 
might be the nearest consequence. 
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E – Reflexivity of shadow banking 
 
The reflexive relations of finance and regulation point to the importance of 
shadow banking and its significance for global financial hierarchies. Pierre 
Bourdieu, discussing the production of the economic field, accentuated the 
power struggles involved when it comes to processes of (economic) integra-
tion. Thus, this paper highlights the role of shadow banking and its regulation 
for integrating the global financial field. Following Bourdieu, the paper ar-
gues that the homogenisation of the standard setting discourse, i.e. interna-
tional financial regulation, after the recent financial crisis, further 
concentrates the resources for domination on a global scale via the reflexive 
processes of finance and its regulation, visible via the problem of shadow 
banking.  
 The paper proceeds in two parts. First, it positions reflexivity on the field 
level and points to the central position of shadow banking for further homog-
enisation within finance. Second, the article provides a more granular recon-
struction of the present regulatory discussion regarding the reflexivity of 
shadow banking as a central node for the further integration of the global fi-
nancial field. The article concludes with the political and social implications 
of recent financial governance, i.e. the increasing dominance of an ‘econo-
mistic’ as against a political-democratic rationale. Subsequently, also the 
shadow banking comes to rely on a fragile and hidden framework for financial 
exchange generating profits in the present and deferring possible systemic 
failure, and hence widespread losses, into a precarious future.  
 Thus, the further evolution of shadow banking provides a wide opening 
for research into the reflexive interaction of financial innovation and regula-
tion, not as separate forces but as an intersection that indicates how financial 
markets express contemporary hierarchies of domination, apart from demo-
cratic decision-making. The article thus clarifies the socio-political location 
for international (shadow) banking. 
 
This paper is based on (Wilhelm 2017). 
 
Wilhelm, B. 2017. ‘Reflexivity of Shadow Banking’, in The Routledge 
Companion to Banking Regulation and Reform, Ertürk, I. & Gabor, D. 
(eds), Abingdon: Routledge, pp. 74–83.
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1. Introduction 
Reflexive relations of finance and regulation point to the importance of 
shadow banking and its role for global financial hierarchies. Pierre Bourdieu 
discussing the production of the economic field accentuated the power strug-
gle involved when it comes to processes of (economic) integration. Thus, this 
article highlights the role of shadow banking and its regulation for integrating 
the global financial field. Following Bourdieu, it argues that the homogenisa-
tion of the standard setting discourse, i.e. international financial regulation, 
after the recent financial crisis further concentrates the resources for domina-
tion on a global scale via the reflexive process of finance and its regulation 
along the problem of shadow banking. 
 Shadow banking is understood as a focal point for the performance of 
finance and its regulation. The chapter shows how these two fields interact 
and, indeed, how they constitute each other. The co-constitutive forces shape 
and make (shadow) banking, its bubbles, crises and they perpetuate domi-
nance in the present, increasingly integrated ‘global economic field’ (Bour-
dieu, 2005). Globally shared standards and therefore an integrated financial 
and economic system provide for a synchronic experience of financial prac-
tices and crises (Nesvetailova, 2014; Kalemli-Ozcan, Papaioannou and 
Peydro, 2013; Frankel and Rose, 1998). Standards for such integration, how-
ever, put further emphasis on regulators as co-drivers for the perpetuation of 
dominance throughout the financial field. 
 The so-called run on the shadow banking system in 2008 had been fol-
lowed by a reform agenda which is now at the point to integrate shadow bank-
ing practices into international regulatory frameworks, in particular via 
‘simple, transparent and standardised (STS) securitisation’ (EC, 2015; BCBS 
and IOSCO, 2015). Whereas the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and others 
support ‘non-bank credit intermediation’ as it ‘provides a valuable alternative 
to bank funding which supports real economic activity’ (FSB, 2014b), it is 
still open for discussion what this actually means for the financial field and 
for relations of political dominance therein and beyond.  
 The chapter proceeds in two steps. First, it positions reflexivity on a field 
level and points to the central position of shadow banking for further homog-
enisation in finance. Second, the chapter provides a more granular reconstruc-
tion of the present regulatory discussion regarding the reflexivity of shadow 
banking which marks a central node for the further integration of the global 
financial field. The chapter concludes then with the central political and social 
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implications of recent financial governance, i.e. an increasing dominance of 
an ‘economistic’ against a political-democratic rational. 
2. Politics of reflexivity 
The use of reflexivity in social science broadly understood relates to the sub-
ject/object distinction and to their co-constitutive performance often applied 
to the researcher and her reflexive relation with the (social) world she studies 
(Hamati-Ataya, 2013; Leander, 2002; Lynch, 2000; Woolgar, 1988). Here, 
Pierre Bourdieu fosters the self-awareness of the sociologist in analysing the 
sociality around her. Reflexivity in this way seems to be bound to individual 
(human) capacities to see the world and their part in the making of the (social) 
world. In economic sociology, such an anthropological style of research con-
tributed to a better understanding of practices and conditions of social ex-
change within the financial field (e.g. Zaloom, 2006; Riles, 2011; Abolafia, 
1996). 
 Complementary, this section highlights a further style of reasoning when 
it comes to reflexive relations, i.e. to observe how homogenisation of the fi-
nancial field has spread after the post-crisis reform agenda through the rela-
tion between financial practices and financial regulation. Not just in times of 
crisis, researchers may question their own stand to describe a reality not yet 
in place. However, an experience of crisis usually interferes with a taken for 
granted logic of how ‘things’ happen and such an experience therefore calls 
for more foundational adjustments. These may happen through a basic recon-
figuration of categories within a theory in order to adapt to new series of 
events and hence to change the normal behaviour of doing research. 
2.1 Reflexivity and its subject 
A reflexive understanding problematises standard positivist assumptions like 
objectification, generalisation or causation. Events of crises indeed may ques-
tion the very definition of what such categories may refer to. Such events 
might question theoretical and methodological underpinnings (as well as de-
lineation) of disciplines. Reflexivity in this sense is not only bound to the re-
lation of a researcher and her object but also related to the performance of a 
social context which makes her a researcher, for instance a sociologist, and 
her object an object of study, for instance, perceived as being a (or in) crisis. 
Object and subject gain their specific role thereby not from an outer (empirical 
or scientific) world but through a specific compatibility of (or conflict within) 
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social fields (Bourdieu, 1985). Events are thus not already present but are 
continuously constituted via compatible references regarding their presence. 
 The event of a financial crisis is thereby made obvious through how dif-
ferent observations relate to each other. For the present crisis two forms of 
observation seem indicative to understand its roots, consequences and how it 
is to be overcome: innovations in financial practices and their regulation. Both 
aspects share a considerable focus on the ‘problem’ of shadow banking. In-
deed, the notion of shadow banking itself is a by-product of a crisis experience 
represented in a recent and widely shared regulatory discourse. Such reflexive 
perspectives on the discursive conditions of crisis and finance had rather not 
been centre stage (for an indicative exception see Dorn, 2011). 
 Understandably, a probably larger social fraction demanded for ways to 
compensate their losses or increase their profits within and after the financial 
turmoil. An investor’s opinion on reflexivity might have been more useful 
than the one of a passed away sociologist. What Bourdieu, and indeed already 
quite a while ago, argued however was that an increasing homogenisation of 
economic fields in the context of fast information technology goes along with 
the perpetuation and strengthening of relations of dominance already present: 
‘We know that, as a general rule, formal equality in a situation of real inequal-
ity favours the dominant’ (Bourdieu, 2005, p. 225). 
 Frequently, the notion of reflexivity seems to be reserved for the inter-
action of the researcher with her field. In contrast to this perception, more 
systemic approaches à la Parson or Luhmann account for the interactions of 
different fields (to stay with the Bourdieusian parlance) that contain and pro-
duce research subjectivities and their objects. The observation of such a re-
flexive interplay brings to light how second order observations (now to stick 
with a Luhmannian grammar) constitute and indeed are able to perform each 
other. 
 The regulatory discussion concerning shadow banking serves as an ex-
emplar to show how the reflexive relation of the regulatory discourse interacts 
with the practice of banking and how this interaction performs systemic 
(in)stability. Whereas broader (economic) discussions understand this as a 
kind of feedback loop of regulation and innovation (sometimes referred to as 
‘reflexive governance,’ Voß, Bauknecht and Kemp, 2006), the point being 
made here is that the present state of the international financial architecture 
hardly allows for the distinction between the ‘fields’ of practice and prescrip-
tion and thus for the assumption of pre-set entities (be it institutions or events) 
triggering each other. 
 Positivist approaches try to overcome this problematique of resem-
blance through an extension of ‘surveillance’ capacities, thereby gaining a 
higher degree of granularity regarding the field and thus being able to frame 
hypotheses accordingly (Fligstein and McAdam, 2012, p. 188). Consequently, 
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a problem of explanation points to a problem of data availability and thereby 
forgetting about methodologically and theoretically rooted limitations of per-
spective. The constitutive practice of information computing however already 
and reflexively pre-sets the range of possible understandings in accordance 
with methodological/theoretical needs for explanation and surveillance tech-
niques set in place. Thus, data generation is closely related to the structure of 
dominant modes of research that, in turn, points to the reflexive politics of an 
object/subject distinction. 
 In the case of financial regulation and financial practices respectively, 
the empirical fixation of the problem of shadow banking associated with data 
generation, the need for transparency, standardisation and complexity reduc-
tion, as useful as such enterprises may be, rather points to the already present 
structure of dominance which may hardly be separated from the form of 
knowledge production. The reflexivity of the financial field can thereby be 
traced along the making of the financial architecture concerning the ‘problem’ 
of shadow banking briefly outlined below. 
2.2 Reflexive financial architecture 
The new financial architecture after the crisis – and thus the practice of 
shadow banking – points to the plea for an economic sociology of law in re-
sent years (Ashiagbor, Kotiswaran and Perry-Kessaris, 2013; Swedberg, 
2003), as the transnational legal structure of finance highlights the conver-
gence of different disciplinary perspectives. Indeed, what has already and of-
ten been shown is how the distinction of an economic, political, legal or social 
sphere rather resembles a modernist/positivist ideology of clear-cut categories 
to be found ‘out there’. This is further accentuated via the performativity lit-
erature, which provides one entrance point to counter such macro causation 
short cuts via a focus on how (financial) things unfold (Callon, 2010; Aspers, 
2007; MacKenzie, 2003). In this way, the ‘problem’ of shadow banking indi-
cates the construction of certain perspectival categories and hence how such 
categories and their relations very much depend on reflexive relations. 
 International exchanges are not immediately visible on the banks’ bal-
ance sheets though they are backed by shared legal understandings be it for 
appropriate collateral, haircuts or price-formations more generally. In this 
way, shadow banking provides a contemporary representation of how the 
global economic field is sustained and enlarged through rapid financial flows 
seemingly disconnected from national jurisdictions or other social formations. 
In contrast to a sovereign prerogative to contain markets, financial engineer-
ing not only synchronises financial categories like capital, profitability or the 
scope for transactions but this practice also functions as a constitutive driver 
for transnational harmonisation of financial standards. 
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 Even though practices of shadow banking enable to circumvent balance 
sheet restrictions, these practices are adaptive to international capital flows 
increasingly defined via international financial rules. Capital requirements in 
this respect are a central node to understand this evolution as they define the 
profitability of the bright as well as the gravity of the shady side of finance. 
This shared horizon for (shadow) banking activities defines and differentiates 
the notion of capital on a global scale and increasingly harmonises the strate-
gies also for shadow banking activities. Indeed, the present regulatory agenda 
along the Basel III reforms put further emphasis on responsive capital stand-
ards based on respective financial or economic conditions. Legal, financial or 
economic rationales are thereby intertwined and create the space for shadow 
banking practices. 
 The problem of shadow banking for financial stability triggers a more 
responsive regulatory framework especially regarding the structure of banks’ 
balance sheets. This concerns, on the one hand, more transparent ‘look 
through’ capacities for regulators in order to see how banks relate to the 
shadow banking system via special purpose vehicles or the like (as a micro 
perspective); and, on the other hand, the new regulatory environment points 
to an automatic adaptation to more general economic conditions, for instance 
related to investment regions (bringing in a macro-prudential regulatory per-
spective). Both aspects further increase the reciprocity of different legal, fi-
nancial and economic fields and provide for a deeper integration of global 
financial exchange. 
 Leading indicators such as GDP growth, main calculatory practices re-
garding risk or an inbuilt feedback loop to increase the sensitivity of regula-
tory practices point to the mechanistic understanding of a closely 
interconnected financial machinery. Thereby, the political role of regulatory 
institutions or, more broadly, the reflexivity of social relations and financial 
exchanges are hidden behind a functional logic that excludes a more contested 
perspective besides efficiency, transparency or data mining. In the following 
section, tow aspects (risk calculation and intermediation chains) of present 
financial practice are exemplary to show how harmonisation is enhanced via 
the reference to the shadow banking system and by leaving peripheral alter-
natives aside. 
3. Reflexivity of shadow banking 
Confronted with the global implications of shadow banking contraction, the 
G20 put up a regulatory agenda focusing on stabilising the financial system 
and thereby also the shadow banking sector. Even though the notion of 
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shadow banking created a new epistemic basin for the present financial sys-
tem as it brought together legal, economic and also political discussions re-
garding modern finance – its indicated fallacies had already been discussed 
some time before. The implications of complex securitisation (Plantin, 2011), 
the use of special purpose vehicles (Gorton and Souleles, 2005), problems of 
off balance sheet activities (BCBS, 1986) or the problem of systemic risk 
(Hellwig, 1995) and the need of macro-prudential regulation (Borio, 2005) 
had been on the table already before the notion of shadow banking came up 
though it further aligned these debates (FSB, 2013). 
 Considering that the shadow banking system generates ‘benefits for the 
financial system and real economy, for example by providing alternative fi-
nancing to the economy and by creating competition in financial markets that 
may lead to innovation, efficient credit allocation and cost reduction’ (FSB, 
2014b), ex post regulatory proposals can also be read as a blue print to nor-
malise such intermediation chains and risk mitigation strategies. The different 
Basel frameworks for banking regulation connected the international banking 
system more closely by providing common standards especially for capital 
and capital transactions. Thereby, securitisation could be pursued within an 
internationalised market and via a common understanding of risk leading to 
financial exchanges decreasingly hindered through jurisdictional diversity. 
 Most recently, the problem of shadow banking provided for a focus on 
responsive instruments of international financial regulation. Regulatory 
standards for capital should be related to contextual conditions and they 
should account for new information about present and future developments of 
markets. These changes in turn affect the solidity of the capital basis of bank-
ing institutions. Such a new paradigm for regulatory standards sets the stage 
for a marketisation of regulatory adjustments. Shadow banking thus provides 
a central link for financial and ‘regulatory markets’. Two discursive nodes are 
discussed below as they exemplarily show how, first, off-balance sheet activ-
ities produce and sustain (shadow) banking and, secondly, how balance sheets 
are managed via calculatory practices of risk. 
3.1 Off-balance credit intermediation 
The sensitivity of financial regulation increased compared to the Basel I 
framework. Financial innovations structure asset portfolios in order to benefit 
from the more complex risk hierarchies implemented via Basel II. However, 
what appears in the first place as a success of the regulatory process turns out 
to trigger demand in tailored investment products off the banks’ balance 
sheets. Shadow banking could produce such products and gained importance 
for (global) financial intermediation (Plantin, 2014). Or as the Joint Forum 
states: ‘[b]ecause the Basel II framework is more risk sensitive, it is likely to 
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have a material effect on bank investors in terms of their interest in various 
types of securities’ (Joint Forum, 2009, p. 18). 
 Such reflexive dynamisms display how the problem of shadow banking 
sustains the regulatory discourse with regard to the notion of risk. First, it 
positions the term as a central node for regulatory organisation and second it 
inscribes its implication into daily regulatory and bank governance. A further 
perspective points to how the transmission of credit through chains for inter-
mediation further shifts the power from regulatory to bank governance, 
whereby the problem of shadow banking provides a catalyser for the enlarged 
authority of financial rationales in contrast to societal functions such as credit 
provision, financial stability or social security. 
 Most comprehensively, shadow banking is defined as non-bank inter-
mediation (FSB, 2011). This points to the critical moment after the Lehman 
failure in 2008 triggering a run on the shadow banking system. What seem-
ingly made traditional bank runs old fashioned did not apply for modern 
shadow banking as for this sector there was no deposit insurance scheme in 
place or an intervention routine by central banks. Hence, the collapse of the 
shadow banking sector and its opaque interconnectedness to the traditional 
banking sector is still a main target of the regulatory agenda (IMF, 2014; FSB, 
2014a). 
 What was and still is needed to manufacture money-like securities is a 
high degree of standardisation, i.e. a high degree of information insensitivity 
pared with broadly accepted standards for transparency. Both had been deliv-
ered through the standardisation of asset classes (like securities backed by 
prime mortgages) and external ratings provided by credit rating agencies. To-
gether these aspects define the regulatory capital needed in order to back up 
investments into such products. This combination created an ‘opaque’ and at 
the same time clear investment incentive in favour of asset backed securities 
and securities thereof (Gorton, 2015). 
 The expansion of the shadow banking system reflected a shared feeling 
of having enough information about abstract categories like a senior tranche 
of a mortgage portfolio. Further, risk calculations regarding the construction 
of the structured investment products made them appear to be immune to de-
tailed disclosures of the performance of individual mortgages. Thereby the 
role-over risk produced via the transformation of single mortgages with long-
term maturity into short-term securities could be put aside not only to spaces 
off the balance sheets but also to a gullibility towards financial engineering. 
The construction of risk neutral special investment vehicles or entities had 
been central to facilitate the packaging and repackaging of such debt in the 
shadow banking system. 
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 The calculation of risk relates to how banks interact (interconnected-
ness), their lending along economic circles (pro-cyclicality), their indebted-
ness (leverage ratio) and the size of banking institutions (too-big-too-fail 
problematique). Each source of risk has now been counterbalanced via in-
creased capital buffers or lending and borrowing limits to be fully imple-
mented by 2019. Even though shadow banking has often been presented as 
the other side of banking, the largest (investment) banks made broad usage of 
the arbitrage opportunities via the cash flow structure of the shadow banking 
system (Joint Forum, 2015; 2009). 
 Within the new regulatory environment and via dynamic capital require-
ments for banks, shadow banking practices are increasingly connected to the 
traditional banking sector. Via more comprehensive transparency standards 
for banking, their trading books and an overall leverage limit, banks’ balance 
sheets are now more reactive to developments in financial markets. This 
heightened reflexivity between regulation and the day-to-day practice of 
banking had been brought forward via the centrality of shadow banking for 
modern finance. The purpose of the new regulatory environment was hence 
rather directed to integrate the environment of complex securitisation into 
common international standards than to abandon these practices all together. 
 The shadow banking system enables banks to manage their balance 
sheet in a more attractive way for their shareholders when profitability in-
creased (FSF, 2008). It creates financial products to still high and low risk 
appetite through its ability to differentiate risk exposures. It combines risk 
mitigation strategies through liquidity facilities, credit default swaps and cash 
flow water falls to produce what turned out as ‘pseudo-risk-less’ (Stein, 2010) 
securities being safe in good times and highly risky in bad ones. 
 Indeed, securities (i.e. collateral backed financial instruments) can func-
tion as a form of money within and beyond the shadow banking system 
through which interconnections of the traditional and shadowy banking sector 
are sustained. Similar to government bonds, highly rate collateral backed se-
curities serve as collateral for repurchase transaction as a highly liquid means 
for exchange of value. Thus, shadow banking opens-up a way to create debt 
in a seemingly very profitable and at the same time low risk way as long as 
the most parts of the financial system remain intact. 
 Though despite of the recent crisis, the failure of the shadow banking 
system showed the contemporary transformation of the credit system that is 
sustained via the post crisis approaches to make the financial architecture 
more resilient. The reflexivity of the shadow banking sector, in this sense, 
inscribes the exception of off balance sheet activities into the normality rep-
resented by the regulatory body. The implication of the present transformation 
of the financial system is thereby hardly one of reform regarding social and 
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political challenges but rather one of the mechanistic necessity to keep finance 
functional in and of itself. 
3.2 Calculating risk 
A further force for the increasing integration of the financial field goes along 
with the evolution of the concept of risk. Via the modern understanding of 
risk as an almost reified parameter, its calculability merged different aspects 
of the financial field and enabled connectivities to other social realms (Beck-
ert and Berghoff, 2013; Kessler, 2007; de Goede, 2004). The following anal-
ysis turns to the role of risk within the context of shadow banking and its 
regulation. The discourse on the problem of the shadow banking sector high-
lights the limits of risk calculations during times of systemic changes. 
 Such events seemingly could not be translated into appropriate risk cat-
egories by rating agencies and associated losses could not adequately dis-
persed via financial innovation. The ‘black swan’ became a sudden symbol 
for the limits of inductive reasoning in finance and thus of the modelling tool-
box on which the shadow banking system relied. Contrary to the traditional 
banking sector, where central bank liquidity and regulatory capital provide 
certain resilience in times of unforeseen stress, shadow banking could operate 
in a (non)legal space of the balance sheets and hence besides regulatory con-
straints on leverage (Ferrante, 2015; Plantin, 2014; Ordonez, 2013). 
 A central driver for this evolution was the inclusion of a portfolio invar-
iant risk conception into regulatory standards. This established a singular un-
derstanding of risk, meaning that risk can be calculated and compared 
independent from its locality, temporality or associated agency (Kessler and 
Wilhelm, 2013). Thus, ‘diversification effects would depend on how well a 
new loan fits into an existing portfolio’ (BCBS, 2005, p. 4). The respective 
portfolio is made up of risk-weighted assets that undergo a mark-to-market 
valuation. In this way, banks are asked to manage their balance sheets accord-
ing to market variations in a shared governance system to keep up with the 
regulatory demands concerning their respective capital requirements (and 
profitability). 
 The inscription of credit ratings for financial institutions and products 
produced a widespread standard along which the risk structure of a bank’s 
balance sheet could be calculated. When market developments stay within the 
projected range of risk analyses, credit ratings provided the ‘facts’, which 
‘suffice to determine the capital charges of credit instruments’ (BCBS, 2005, 
p. 4). The underlying formulas to calculate the needed capital contain however 
intuitions about how markets should function. Though, looking at them after 
an event of crisis, these intuitions seem to apply only if they had not widely 
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been built into the financial instruments aligning the banks’ balance sheets to 
each other via regulatory ‘incentives’. 
 One intuition in-built into capital requirements calculation is that capital 
charges for long-term obligations should be higher than for short term expo-
sure. Lower capital charges for short term investments and alike investment 
strategies used for instance by money market funds created demand and 
thereby an investment incentive for an ‘efficient’ maturity transformation, i.e. 
to role-over long term investment via the issuance of short term debt by off 
balance sheet entities. To do so, the shadow banking system made use of col-
lateralised debt securities which thereby were increasingly assumed to be 
money-like liabilities which in turn could be produced more efficiently be-
sides the traditional and regulated banking sector (Plantin, 2014). 
 The notion of risk, also brought forward by joint regulatory standards, 
could thereby, on the one hand side, align the demand for financial products 
and, on the other, sustain the institutional structure able to provide tailored 
investment products fitting the requirements of investors and thus of interna-
tionally shared understandings of financial regulation. Shadow banking in this 
sense is closely related to the specific understanding of risk sustained via reg-
ulatory demands. The notion of ‘enhanced risk sensitivity’ provides a further 
perspective into the dynamism of how a shared understanding of risk enables 
and limits possible practices in the shadow banking sector via increasing sen-
sitivity to the calculatory standards of risk. 
 The European Banking Authority points ‘to “qualifying” securitisations 
across the hierarchy of approaches, aimed at further increasing the risk-sensi-
tivity of the bank capital treatment of securitisations’ (EBA, 2015, p. 8). Thus, 
the practices of securitisation shall be further included into the regulatory 
body assuming that thereby banks follow the product structure to be set by the 
regulatory authorities. This indeed affects the business model of banking and 
therefore also the capital flows accordingly. The statement gives further in-
sight into the understanding of risk. It is being seen as distinct from financial 
products. Risk could affect them but they are themselves not understood as 
part of risk creation. In this sense, the sensitivity approach becomes circular 
if risk is itself a very product of financial markets and not an external effect. 
 The Bank for International Settlements complements the view on the 
perception of risk rather as an external effect by arguing that some financial 
products are inherently to little sensitive to risk pointing especially to sover-
eign exposures. Their preferential treatment indeed ‘weakens the risk sensi-
tivity of regulatory requirements’ (BIS, 2015, p. 113). The implication of this 
statement seems to be rather close to the Bourdieusian argument that an in-
creasing homogeneity of the financial field strengthens the structure of dom-
inance already in place. The consequence of the argument above could be read 
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as a differentiation of sovereign risk according to the compliance to the ra-
tional of the financial architecture and hence financial dominance already in 
place. 
 The European Systemic Risk Board provides a further example of how 
the structure of dominance is not only sustained but how it could also be more 
effectively inscribed into regulatory demands. In a context of differentiated 
sovereign risk, banks are incentivised to widen their capital basis in order to 
provide a more resilient balance sheet (ESRB, 2015, p. 20). Thereby the hier-
archy of sovereign risk indicated before gets institutionalised via the capital 
structure of banks. It increases demand for ‘jurisdictional safe havens’ again 
supporting the mechanisms of dominance in place and weakening or rather 
excluding alternatives for financial governance. 
4. Conclusion 
This snapshot of the regulatory context regarding the practice of shadow 
banking provides an indicative example of the reflexive drivers in favour of 
increasing homogenisation. Following Bourdieu, the standard setting dis-
course of international financial regulation after the recent financial crisis fur-
ther concentrates the resources for domination on a global scale, especially as 
indicated via the perpetuation of shadow banking into international capital 
flows. It thereby fixates the prerogative of financial rationales and excludes 
political contestation, which might possibly be able to question the structure 
of dominance in place. Indeed, the post-crisis discourse on shadow banking 
vividly shows how financial practice and regulation further install the pre-
crisis disciplinary and political hierarchy. 
 The notion of risk and the institutional structure in place provide for 
compatibility for financial exchanges, their profitability and their regulation. 
The focus on new rules for securitisation sets the stage for the shadow banking 
system to come impregnated by the present distribution of dominance in fi-
nancial markets. Policy prescriptions promoting heterogeneity to standards 
for financial activities are rather exceptional whereas the intentional insertion 
of inefficiencies as provisions for higher resilience of financial entities (i.e. 
higher capital ratios) seems to be exactly what is omitted by the further evo-
lution of market-based credit intermediation. 
 A new contextual phenomenon in contrast to prior histories of financial 
turmoil is that innovation now concentrates on time rather than on space. For 
instance, space related offshore settings to avoid taxes seem rather echoes 
from the past international order even though the recent ‘discovery’ of the so-
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called panama papers provide an excellent view into past and present possi-
bilities for ‘efficiency gains’. 
 Regarding time, we can observe at least two new forces, which expand 
(high frequency trading, Lenglet, 2011) and compress (risk calculation, de 
Goede, 2004) temporal horizons. The former tendency triggered a fragmenta-
tion of markets to the advantage of market operators and high frequency trad-
ing firms whereas supervisory entities are hardly able to actually understand 
let alone to prevent failure. The latter tendency uses accelerated computing 
capacity in order to run more complex risk modelling and thereby compress-
ing more data about possible futures and open up ever more possibilities for 
financial innovation. 
 These two dynamics are complementing each other in a way, which 
makes more and more difficult to grasp not only the economic but also the 
political consequences of present financial markets. Subsequently also the 
new shadow banking relies on a fragile and hidden framework for financial 
exchange generating profits in the present and deferring possible systemic 
failure and hence widespread losses into a precarious future. The further evo-
lution of shadow banking provides thus a wide opening for research into the 
reflexive interaction of financial innovation and regulation not as separate 
forces but as an intersection which indicates how financial markets express 
contemporary hierarchies of domination seemingly very much apart from 
democratic decision making about the societal location for international 
(shadow) banking. 
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F – Limits of critique: Civil society 
politicising financial regulation 
 
The final paper points to the conditions for how financial regulation can be 
politicised. It argues that formalised movements of contestation align their 
language to that originated by the triggers for contestation. Thus, succes-
sively, they lose their critical potential. In this way, this paper has two inter-
related goals. First, it reconstructs the practices of technocratisation of the 
European governance regime from a civil-society perspective. It thereby re-
lates to the debate on the de-politicisation of European decision-making and 
connects to the literature on the (missing) democratisation of the European 
Union by focusing on the role of transnational civil-society movements. Sec-
ond, the article highlights how the potential for critique is transformed via the 
present institutional structure of the European Union. Thus, critique is subject 
to a practice of translation, by which the potential for politicisation alters. In 
this way, this paper contributes to sociological discussions on translation and 
to the literature on the politics of expertise.  
 Theoretically and heuristically, it follows Callon’s notion of translation 
conceptualised via four analytical steps: problematisation, interessment, en-
rolment and mobilisation. Methodologically, it draws on semi-structured in-
terviews with representatives from civil society, trade unions and members of 
parliament on the German and European Union levels. Together, this paper 
reconstructs the changing conditions for critique regarding regulatory 
measures after the financial crisis and it shows how this not only impacted on 
the critique thereby expressed but also how this process impacted on the or-
ganisational potential and structure of movements in favour of tighter regula-
tory measures. 
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1. Introduction 
All information is transformation, an emergency 
operation on and in the Leviathan’s body. (Callon 
and Latour 1981, 300) 
This paper explores the conditions that enable or restrict the politicisation of 
financial regulation. It thereby argues that formalised protest movements 
align to the language used in the context of concern. Thus, such movements 
successively lose their potential for irritation and increasingly turn to their 
role in aligning with the dominant subject matter. In this way, this paper as-
sociates with two interrelated debates. First, it speaks to practices of technoc-
racy within European governance structures and the de-politicisation of 
policy-making in the European Union (Radaelli 1999; Seabrooke and Wigan 
2016) related to the role of transnationally organised civil society movements 
(della Porta and Caiani 2007; Saurugger 2008; Borzel and Buzogany 2010; 
Mahoney and Beckstrand 2011; Dur and Mateo 2012). Second, it reconstructs 
how the potential for critique changes within the institutional structure of the 
European Union via formalised channels (Elgstrom and Jonsson 2000; 
Lahusen 2016). Thus protest undergoes a translational practice which changes 
its potential for politicisation (Callon 1986; Lenglet and Mol 2016) and re-
configures how knowledge is produced (Seabrooke and Tsingou 2014; 
Tsingou 2014; Adler-Nissen and Kropp 2015; Sending 2015). Spontaneous 
movements – often associated with specific events (Tremayne 2013) – instan-
tiate broad relevance for their respective concerns; however, they also display 
a rather short endurance of existence (Calhoun 2013). Finance Watch repre-
sents such an organization that was founded in a politicised environment 
around the financial crisis of 2008/9, though it struggled to continue its work 
in a changing context, with a fluctuating internal structure and professionali-
zation of knowledge provision. This paper analyses this transition as a case of 
translation (Callon 1986; Barry 2013; Tyulenev 2014).  
 Not only the industrial side (McKeen-Edwards and Porter 2013; Pagliari 
and Young 2014; Young 2014) but also NGOs and trade unions (Fioramonti 
and Thümler 2013a; Kastner 2014; Pagliari and Young 2016) construct a net-
work that affects the regulatory process regarding finance. Even though the 
civil society network has broadened and institutionalised with the onset of the 
financial crisis of 2008/09 (Clark 2011; Fioramonti and Thümler 2013b; 
2013a; Ford and Philipponnat 2013; Scholte 2013), it still lags its industrial 
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counterparts, at least in terms of monetary recourses. Thus, civil society or-
ganisations established prior to the crisis did not really have any specific ex-
pertise vis-à-vis European financial regulation. Finance Watch represents this 
challenging context in various ways. Studies regarding civil society organisa-
tion of financial market interests show the distinguished position of this newly 
founded organisation especially in comparison to established non-govern-
mental ones (Ford and Philipponnat 2013). They arrived at their expertise on 
Finance rather indirectly via ecological or inequality matters, and thus only 
had restricted knowledge about financial markets and their regulation. Fi-
nance Watch, on the contrary, specialised in financial regulation. It was 
founded by a network of other civil society organisations to provide a tool to 
produce alternative knowledge for financial regulatory matters. 
 Methodologically, this article relies on semi-structured interviews with 
members of parliaments (6) and representatives of different NGOs (6) and 
trade unions (4) concerned with financial regulation. One half worked on the 
European level the other in the German context. About half of the interview-
ees were active in their roles when the recent financial crisis occurred, the 
other half started their employment afterwards. In total 16 semi-structured in-
terviews produced about 17 hours of interview material. Desk research about 
the main regulatory proposals (especially on the capital requirements for 
banks) produced contextual information. Thus, the article highlights the 
spaces between European law making, the actual practice of finance and their 
relation to societal sets of interests. To show the productive aspects of these 
spaces, the reconstruction follows the translationary heuristic developed by 
Callon (1986). The increasing concern of civil society groups regarding fi-
nancial regulatory matters reflect a special case of emergent concerned groups 
(Callon 2007; Callon and Rabeharisoa 2008). Finance Watch not only em-
ploys instrumental knowledge and advocacy tools but it is organizationally 
also affected by it which in turn changes its activity and contextual field. Thus, 
Finance Watch presents an exemplar to research the ‘formation of social 
groups and their reproduction’ as its core purpose and capacity is a product of 
its performance and thus it is more of ‘an achievement than a starting point’ 
(Callon and Rabeharisoa 2008, 232). To display the performance of Finance 
Watch, the following section of the article introduces Callon’s take on the 
sociology of translation and how it relates to knowledge production and ex-
pertise. Then, the article reconstructs the reconfiguration of Finance Watch as 
a network process according to Callon’s four translationary phases: problem-
atisation, interessment, enrolment and mobilisation. The final section con-
cludes by highlighting the condition of critique, which it is always associated 
with its point of reference, and hence inherently limited. 
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2. Translating expertise 
The recent financial crisis opened-up a perspective on kinds of politicisation 
and protest, both of which are directed against technocratic regulatory mech-
anisms. This dynamic could only partly relate to previously existing move-
ments as a main part though they had to establish new ways to create alertness 
over general news media and also to ‘translate’ the importance of finance to 
further societal realms (Scholte 2013). For this, civil society organisations 
hold a special position in providing an alternative expertise, especially in the 
EU legislative procedure (Kutay 2012; Bee and Guerrina 2014). The literature 
on ‘Europeanisation’ discusses in particular their function in political social-
isation for generating a European public (Warleigh 2001; Featherstone and 
Radaelli 2003; Della Porta and Caiani 2009). At least implicitly, it seems 
though that there is already a presumption of success as a condition that is 
inbuilt into the work of civil societies: That is the creation of a transnational 
political realm for a democratic alignment within the European Union. Hence 
this literature fails to explain how Europeanisation itself is a force which man-
ufactures the inclusion and exclusion patterns of expert knowledge 
(Greenwood and Roederer-Rynning 2015; Sending 2015). A perspective 
which focuses on such selective practices of power related knowledge pro-
duction refers to ‘bricolage’ to underline the situational overlay of different 
forms of knowledge (Engelen et al. 2010; Carstensen 2011; MacKenzie and 
Pardo-Guerra 2014). This means that knowledge develops historically in a 
specific way, though each singular event is underlined by a contingently con-
structed ‘anomaly’. 
 Hierarchies of knowledge formations in international contexts have 
been associated with ‘epistemic communities’ (Adler and Haas 1992; Zito 
2001) and thus the diffusion of expert knowledge in political arenas (Dobbin 
et al. 2007; Newman and Bach 2014; Dunlop and Radaelli 2016; McPhilemy 
2016). For financial regulation, the politics of diffusion concerns transnational 
networks that draft and prepare regulatory measures (Bach and Newman 
2010; Maggetti and Gilardi 2011; Moschella and Tsingou 2013; Seabrooke 
2014; Seabrooke and Tsingou 2014; Ban et al. 2016; Seabrooke and Wigan 
2016). This indicates the political aspect of knowledge and thus the produc-
tion of authority within the policy fields affected. From a Bourdieusian per-
spective, Sending (2015, 126) shows how a field constituted out of power 
relations generates distinctive forms of knowledge, how they are institution-
alised and finally how then political authority is sedimented. The problem of 
translation in the context of sociology of knowledge complements this politics 
of knowledge by opening up the view on the contingency of knowledge pro-
duction. The sociology of translation thus allows detection of how expertise 
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and its associated knowledge claims emerge spontaneously though condi-
tioned by contextual power relations (Best and Walters 2013). 
 It is the mediating aspect between different levels of abstraction for 
which Michel Callon’s sociology of translation offers a conceptual entrance 
point (Waeraas and Nielsen 2016). Then, regulatory approaches are an ex-
pression of ‘structuring power relationships’ (Callon 1986, 196). In contrast 
to institutional or cognitive readings of translation, Callon points to societal 
formations that can be analysed via the concept of translation. Hereby, Callon 
refers to a problematic relation of societal and natural events and modes of 
articulation. It is ‘a complex web of interrelations in which Society and Nature 
are intertwined’ (Callon 1986, 200). Thus, such an understanding of transla-
tion can focus on hybrid over-lappings of different forms of knowledge whose 
implications for political constellations initially rest in abeyance (Buzelin 
2013, 194). One route for developing the Actor-Network perspective further 
points to analysing a ‘broker’ between different political contexts (Büttner et 
al. 2016). However, and in contrast to traditional analyses of civil society or-
ganisations, ‘sender’ and ‘recipient’ cannot be clearly distinguished based on 
successful or failed communication, though the concept of translation points 
to the conditional impossibility of unambiguous transmission. Indeed, it is the 
contingent transformation of transmission which, in the first place, allows for 
translation. The Actor-Network-Theory (ANT) debates how the settlement of 
the respective contexts of meaning becomes relevant. Discourse, language or 
text are thus not reduced to traditional understandings of actors but actor-hood 
encloses the material component of respective contexts and shows the process 
of constitution. That means ‘creating convergences and homologies by relat-
ing things that were previously different’ (Callon and Latour 1981, 211); – or 
as Tyulenev (2014, 166) formulates: ‘Translation in ANT is recruiting actants 
into projects of building networks.’  
 Thus, the problem of politics is related to how expertise is constructed 
via networked processes of, in this case, civil-society formation. This discus-
sion shows that not only the depoliticising aspect of expertise in the form of 
technocracy (Radaelli 1999) but also the politicisation of expertise has conse-
quences for how power relations can be understood (Lombardi and Moschella 
2016). The first aspect defers decision-making in expert fora (Greenwood 
2007; Pianta 2013; McPhilemy 2016); the second aspect positions the author-
ity of scientific knowledge as guidance in decision-making (Brown 2009; 
Hirschman and Berman 2014). At this juncture, the problematisation of trans-
lational relations connects the Europeanisation literature with approaches to 
politics of expertise. By relating both aspects, this article contributes to a het-
erogeneous and contingent understanding of knowledge production (Davies 
and McGoey 2012; Reisenbichler 2015; Ban et al. 2016) and, consequently, 
it allows representation of the constellation of civil society movements active 
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in knowledge provision (Pianta 2013). To reconstruct this process of transla-
tion in detail, Callon provides four consecutive heuristical steps: problemati-
sation, interessment, enrolment and mobilisation. The following four sections 
consider each step to illustrate civil-society formation vis-à-vis financial reg-
ulation. Each respective step is further outlined in its respective section and 
together they tell the story of how critique is transformed and, consequently, 
limited via translation. 
3. Problematisation 
You can explain everything, though only rarely 
someone cares39 
After the consequences of the financial crisis of 2008/9 became apparent, the 
financial reform debate also came to the fore of public concern. What has led 
to the situation wherein the eventual bankruptcy of a single financial institu-
tion (Lehman Brothers) led to a situation where unprecedented sums of tax-
payers’ money could be mobilised to stabilise the financial system? If there 
are such systemic interrelations, how were these forces distributed across the 
financial system? Which construction failures of the regulatory architecture 
responsible for that series of reactions could be located? Even if, for some, 
the vulnerability of the international financial architecture was clear, that the 
policy reforms regarding financial institutions and products was a case of pub-
lic debate was rather unusual. The interruption of capital flows and thus the 
rapid losses in value and trust in financial markets affected not only bankers 
and traders but also the daily lives of a vast proportion of the population in 
developed and globally interconnected countries. Private and public institu-
tions experienced unprecedented pressure over their decision-making without 
a clear understanding of the reasons for this situation.40 The problem of lack-
ing information about the financial system and its daily practices relates to 
how information was generated. The previously accepted routines of supervi-
sion and transparency were called into question. Such a situation demanded 
or enabled a revision of the financial architecture then in place. At the same 
time, the need for justification within the political arena grew. Elected parlia-
mentarians now had the responsibility to explain the origins and triggers of 
                                                             
39 Interview, Member of the European Parliament, 20 November 2014 (#12). 
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the financial crisis to their electorate.41 They felt an urge to explain why pub-
lic money could be used for the banks and a financial system in crisis, though 
it had not been available beforehand to increase social security, improve edu-
cation or cutting taxes.42 Trade unions and other civil-society organisations 
were now interested in the details to support a more stable financial architec-
ture.43 Such political momentum was not directed towards financial regula-
tion before. Indeed, previously apparent crises were often associated with 
other regions and not the highly-industrialised society of Western states.44 
 Despite the broad media attention given to finance, it was still difficult 
to communicate technical details beyond expert circles. Exceptions to this 
were the bonus cap, the financial transaction tax or matters involving food 
speculation45. These aspects pointed, however, to either a general pejorative 
attitude towards bankers46 or were connected to more established critiques of 
inequality.47 For instance, only after the details of capital requirements for 
banks were agreed upon within international expert for a could the European 
Parliament decide on the results (not contents), which subsequently were im-
plemented in national law. The technical aspects (apart of the bonus cap which 
is not immediately related to capital requirement legislation), e.g. risk catego-
ries, transparency or systemic risk reduction, were not part of the public de-
bate. This was reasoned at the same time via the abstractness48 (as there were 
no immediate effects for the public) and the concreteness 49 (as politicians are 
not experts themselves on the respective policy matters) of financial regula-
tion. 
 Until the financial crisis, the main international bodies for regulatory 
issues had no public relations unit. Existing access points to information had 
been reserved for experts of the institutions to be regulated.50 The technicali-
ties of the discussion could not practically be politicised before the crisis, and 
hardly thereafter, because it was unclear how financial regulation related to 
other societal fields. There were no routines for ‘translation’ in place. Estab-
lished procedures allowed for the participation in hearings regarding regula-
tory issues and thus, potentially, for rather limited excess points for public 
discussion. Hence, on the one hand side, there were possibilities for a diverse 
discussion on central regulatory efforts; on the other hand, this openness had 
                                                             
41 Interview, Member of the German Parliament, 24 September 2014 (#04). 
42 Interview, Member of German Parliament, 16 July 2014 (#01). 
43 Interview, trade unionist, 12 November 2014 (#09). 
44 Interview, NGO representative, 23 September 2014 (#03). 
45 Interview, NGO representative, 23 September 2014 (#03). 
46 Interview, trade unionist, 12 November 2014 (#06). 
47 Interview, NGO representative, 23 September 2014 (#03). 
48 Interview, trade unionist, 13 November 2014 (#10). 
49 Interview, Member of European Parliament, 02 June 2015 (#16). 
50 Interview, NGO representative, 12 November 2014 (#08). 
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a structuring effect on the regulatory debate, as well as for the public more 
generally. Public hearings provide a very formalised format which limits the 
range of problems and issues for comments. Beyond that, the financial and 
scientific possibilities are unevenly distributed on the participants’ side. This 
means that the affected financial industries affected have qualitatively differ-
ent means at their disposal. This has been shown very clearly, especially for 
the financial sector (Pagliari and Young 2014). 
 There has been a heightened demand for professionalisation because of 
the interaction of regulatory agencies with civil-society organisations and the 
need to participate in the regulatory discourse.51 Such expertise, however, 
goes hand in hand with the problem that critique is increasingly to be inher-
ently formulated. This means that critique is related to the existing regulatory 
approaches and disentangled from broader political orientations. Then, prob-
lematisation thus focuses on the available access points for civil society actors 
and for the decision-makers in parliaments. Experts and their language thus 
represent an ‘obligatory passage point’ (Callon 1986) for the work of civil 
society regarding financial regulation. The political malposition, that expert 
knowledge is hardly available apart from financial industry efforts culminated 
in the creation of an organisation that made ‘making finance serve society’ its 
principal cause. This, however, raises a challenge to relate different societal 
groups via the topic of finance. The following section shows how the needed 
interessment turned out in the field. 
4. Interessment 
Finance Watch is an amazing help52 
Building on problematisation, as outlined above, we can now look at the cen-
tral restrictions on politicisation regarding financial regulation. The re-
strictions are there to translate argumentations across different policy arenas, 
though in a fundamental manner. It is not only that different jargon is used 
but also that how arguments make sense in respective fields differs. This epis-
temological divide between policy areas is a main obstacle, i.e. to render fi-
nancial knowledge relevant to other participants of the debate and, at the same 
time, to keep the line of argument intact. NGOs provide resources for analys-
ing financial markets and to find out about the mechanisms via which they 
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relate to their respective core themes (WEED 2010; Brot für die Welt 2014; 
DGB 2014). Exemplary for this is research funding, new staff positions or the 
creation of new forums for networking53. By looking back at original efforts, 
it is represented as difficult to make this organisational structure permanent 
as the crisis experience lies further in the past.54 The ‘obligatory passage 
point’, as highlighted by Callon, is thus to create a narrative which reasons 
the permanent need for knowledge regarding finance by respective NGOs, 
and thus for other societal realms. Finance Watch positioned itself as such a 
node which, on the one hand, provides specific knowledge and, on the other, 
tries to find concerns shared with other policy arenas. Indeed, members of the 
European Parliament initiated Finance Watch because of the need for alterna-
tive knowledge regarding the industry’s expertise. Other NGOs in turn under-
stood the need for more substantial information about how to intervene in the 
process of regulating financial markets. 
 Thus, Finance Watch served as a catalyst to relate the interests of differ-
ent civil society actors. This is what is termed as ‘a variety of techniques of 
getting the actants interested’ (Tyulenev 2014, 166). Such interessment found 
that a variety of different civil society bodies could formulate their respective 
interests in favour of a stable financial system. Only a few of these actors had 
the know-how to participate in the debates on regulatory proposals; and if so, 
only in restricted areas, e.g. workers’ rights or consumer protection. Trade 
unions, consumer groups and other NGOs indicated their need to have access 
to financial knowledge from a practitioner’s perspective. However, such 
knowledge should be opened up to a broader understanding to enrich the pub-
lic discussion regarding financial regulation. It was about how knowledge 
could be presented that was meant to interrelate between different actors in 
the field. Finance Watch thus serves as a particular epistemic device, which 
(akin to Callon et al. 2007, 2) ‘denotes material and discursive assemblages 
that intervene in the construction of’ not only markets, but also in the genera-
tion of knowledge. The main property of such a device was that it could relate 
to different policy languages of civil-society networks (and their respective 
core topics) of the financial sector, and their routines, as well as politicians 
and policy. In a sense, the regulatory debate, which was the main consequence 
of the financial crisis after the failure of Lehman Brothers, should not have 
been left to the experts deemed responsible for wrong regulations in the first 
place. For this, on the one hand, a distinctive juridical and economic 
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54 Interviews, Member of European Parliament, 20 November 2014 (#12); NGO representative, 19 
May 2015 (#15); NGO representative 12 November 2014 (#08). 
 
 123 
knowledge was to be mobilised;55 on the other hand, it was to be connected to 
core NGO work, e.g. regarding how to organise a campaign based on these 
critical interventions.56 
 In times of crisis, the European Commission as well as the European 
Parliament could be convinced to financially support an alternative body for 
generating knowledge about financial regulation. In addition, a European net-
work of civil-society groups supported the creation of Finance Watch, and 
also having access to such knowledge on an ad hoc basis. Especially in the 
first year after the Lehman bankruptcy, there was this special need with re-
spect to the very large number of regulatory proposals to be decided on – 
‘there had been so much’.57 Financial expertise after the inception of Finance 
Watch was only a call away. Regular meetings of Finance Watch’s stake-
holder group allowed for the inclusion of societal areas according to their re-
spective interests regarding finance as well as regulatory implications. Via a 
newsletter, a specific circle is kept informed about present challenges regard-
ing regulatory changes and this has effects beyond the financial sector. Be-
yond that, a network of experts working for NGOs with specific expertise in 
finance crystallised. These parts of the network inform, invite and amplify 
each other. Research-oriented institutions collaborate with Finance Watch to 
clarify the socio-economic implications of changing regulatory matters. Re-
search on Finance Watch contributes to its singularity in the field of financial 
regulation from a non-corporate perspective. Finance Watch also created an 
alternative space for practitioners during and after the financial crisis. People 
previously working in the financial sector accepted lower salaries to work for 
this NGO.58 The new reform agenda for the EU financial system allowed their 
often newly appointed staff the opportunity to take part in substantial regula-
tory reform. For this, public consultations provide an inclusive mechanism to 
comment on regulatory proposals and thus the formal eligibility to influence 
the policymaking process. This creates a common focal point for interest 
groups regarding when and how to intervene in specific regulatory reforms.  
 The founding moment related to the post crisis regulatory challenges 
created a common interest for NGOs and politicians to set up a new institu-
tional configuration called Finance Watch. It worked as an epistemic device 
that relates different strands of knowledge formation. Via its translatory ca-
pacities, it thus related different policy fields and formed a common node for 
influencing financial regulation from a non-corporate perspective. It was at 
the centre of interessment, which kept people together by demanding for and 
                                                             
55 Interviews, Member of the European Parliament, 02 June 2015 (#16); Member of the European 
Parliament, 20 November 2014 (#12). 
56 Interview, NGO representative, 23 September 2014 (#03). 
57 Interview, NGO representative, 13 November 2014 (#11). 
58 Interview, NGO representative, 12 November 2014 (#08). 
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delivering resources. The next section shows how this foundational moment 
is succeeded by enrolment, meaning the stage of creating a more institution-
alised framework which, in turn, allows the network to continue at times when 
immediate crisis dynamics lessen their prevalence. 
5. Enrolment 
…we are working on it because it was in the Com-
mission’s proposal.59 
Along with participation in the official procedures of financial reform, the 
space for available action is affected by how the regulatory problem is framed. 
The work of civil-society actors in financial regulation cannot always rely on 
public relevance due to crisis dynamics, but it also adapts to the procedural 
context within which critique and regulatory changes can be articulated.60 
Some aspects that represent the increasing consolidation of the institutional 
field can be observed via changing financial support for Finance Watch, or 
the increasing distance expressed by people involved from the start. The ex-
pression of ‘the last crazy year’61 indicates how the intensive phase of initial 
work is substituted by consolidation. In comparison to established routines, 
the initial phase of improvisation, a high work-load and excitement, is dis-
tinct. This change also applies to the new European Commission. Thereby, 
reactive measures to regulate the markets (via new capital requirements or the 
Banking Union) turn now to proactive measures (like the Capital Markets Un-
ion). The letter stance questions the measures regarding restrictive credit pro-
vision established for fear of building up further financial bubbles and it 
instead tries to reinstall a more expansive regulatory context for financial in-
stitutions and products. 
 Following the Lamfalussy procedure, a further contextual transfor-
mation is the different levels within which the initial reform endeavours are 
discussed. As the general rules are settled via directives and regulations (Level 
1), the post-crisis regulatory measures in Levels 2 and 3 discussions are far 
more technical and routinized than it was the case before. At this point the 
discourse is directed towards practitioners and firms in the financial sector as 
it is about how to make the general rules feasible for daily financial practice. 
This is where public consultations take place organised by the four main 
                                                             
59 Interview, NGO representative, 12 November 2014 (#07). 
60 Interview, NGO representative, 12 November 2014 (#07). 
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newly-created supervisory agencies for observing the re-regulation of finan-
cial markets in the European Union (European Systemic Risk Board, Euro-
pean Banking Agency, European Insurance and Occupational Pensions 
Agency and European Securities Markets Agency). In this context, it is about 
the application and implementation of the regulatory setting as well as a dis-
cussion of the revisions needed to make the broader regulatory measures 
work. When the European Parliament or Council discusses about the general 
setting of financial regulation, it is much easier to relate these issues to broader 
public concerns whereas the technical level of regulatory discussions is far 
more specific to the businesses involved. Nevertheless, changes on non-level 
1 also affect the broader reliability of the financial architecture.62 The argu-
ments required to make technical debates relevant to ‘real world’ experiences 
become more complex. Thus, the civil-society network for financial concerns 
also needs to adapt its workflow. The most general instantiation is the increas-
ing needs to be close to the respective debates by being present in Brussels.63 
More specifically related to Finance Watch, it involves its focus on employing 
practitioners and lobbyists from the financial sector to be able to relate to rel-
evant financial regulatory debates.64 
 Thus, Finance Watch – as a central hub for providing financial expertise 
– established itself in the Brussels NGO world. This, however, has two con-
sequences. On the one hand, Finance Watch gained knowledge about how to 
intervene efficiently in legislative procedures; on the other hand, and at the 
same time, this reduced its potential to influence the regulatory agenda. In-
deed, Finance Watch may function as a symbol, which then can also be used 
as an ‘alibi’,65 in the sense that if Finance Watch participates in consultations 
or debates, the interests of civil-society are considered to be heard and conse-
quently incorporated into the resulting regulatory outcomes. Callon (1986, 
205–206) terms this stage of translation enrolment. He understands it as the 
constitution and acceptance of a problematic field. The field is also known 
regarding the limitations for influencing procedures therein. What is also in-
dicative when looking at financial regulation is that the consolidation of rele-
vant actors leads to a different dynamic within the organization and regarding 
its external relations. To keep the quality of the staff or to sustain relations 
with donors and other NGOs, Finance Watch moved from being a project of 
NGO representatives and trade unionists to being an institution employing 
and serving people. Thus, the scope of its action is also affected. The crisis 
                                                             
62 Indeed, what can be observed recently is that the lobbying process is focussing more on Level 1 
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63 Interview, NGO representative, 13 November 2014 (#11). 
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mode made it easier to relate regulatory matters and broader societal perspec-
tives, whereas, without the grand narrative of unstable financial markets, con-
necting civil-society agents to critique regulatory changes becomes more 
difficult. Thus, this translatory stage highlights the problems of politicising 
financial regulation when routines are dominant again. Whereas the fine-tun-
ing of regulatory matters is of interest to industry representatives as it affects 
their business models, the economy of civil-society bodies depends on how 
the societal implications of their work are perceived. This in turn also depends 
on the economy of their topics and not only on their concern.66 
 In crisis mode, for instance, revision of the directive on markets in Fi-
nancial Instruments (MiFID II) could relate to food speculation or disclosure 
requirements related to retail markets. The case of the revision of the capital 
requirements directive and regulation (DRR/CRD IV package) showes how 
politicisation was made possible by adding a popular policy to it. The bonus 
cap was not foreseen as part of the capital requirements regulation, but the 
European Parliament could make a case to add policies to the pre-formulated 
Basel Agreement. However, if measures like capital-requirement calculations 
regarding risk categories for specific financial products cannot be related to 
broader societal interests, it becomes more difficult to sustain the supporting 
civil society network and thus to generate the resources needed for continuous 
regulatory work. Enrolment is the stage where network routines can be estab-
lished and which can be activated based on need within respective regulatory 
contexts – be it via spontaneous telephone calls, comprehensive reports re-
garding regulatory measures or regulatory meetings of the civil-society net-
work connected via Finance Watch. This stage also shows that there is an 
understanding of what kind of tools are needed, when there is a demand for 
them and how they can be provided. Thus, the effect was the strategic usabil-
ity of the network in different regulatory settings, to react to specific reform 
agendas and finally also to coordinate proactive measures. It is only at this 
stage, that this network can be mobilised, as outlined further in the section 
below. 
6. Mobilisation 
At some point, it will always crash again.67 
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After the high number of new regulations, the inception of new regulatory 
agencies and other revisionary measures, new resources as well as restrictions 
also structured the field for civil-society engagements. The new ‘mobility’ 
allowed for developing new positions, but it came with less pressing demands 
and thus diminished relevance in daily policymaking routines. Finance Watch 
as an organisation could move more independently; however, this came with 
more difficulties to sustain their funding resources. Such mobilisation may 
thus come with qualitative differences for the network structure (Tyulenev 
2014; Waeraas and Nielsen 2016). Thus, mobilisation for Callon (1986, 196) 
means ‘to ensure that supposed spokesmen for various relevant collectivities 
were properly able to represent those collectivities and not betrayed by the 
latter’. Finance Watch could take such a speaking position within a well-de-
fined problem area. This means that Finance Watch has an original position 
for addressing questions of financial regulation that are relevant to broader 
societal areas, and thus for a broader network of civil-society actors. An on-
going problem with such mobilisation, however, is the ‘stand-by’ mode that 
stands in contrast to the exceptional situations during crises, which come with 
continuously pressing needs. The quote by Callon (‘to ensure that… ’) can 
thus be read as a straightforward imperative for developing a sustainable net-
work architecture related to its specified function, if the network setting is not 
being lost. 
 The campaign in favour of the financial transaction tax and the discus-
sion about the restriction on bonus payments could relate to a variety of ex-
isting inequality discourses. Their actual point, to improve the general setting 
for financial regulation, might have only been a minor issue for the public 
relevance. For inequality issues, especially regarding the financial transaction 
tax, civil-society networks had long been in place and could be activated to 
support this policy proposal that had been discussed for a long time, but which 
gained a new momentum during the regulatory discussion with regards to the 
crisis dynamics.68 Also, the debate on the bonus cap did not come naturally 
out of the regulatory discussion. The major banking-reform measures in the 
form of the Basel III did not entail such policy recommendations. Such polit-
icisation could only be introduced literally in the last moments of the policy 
decision in the European Parliament.69 Politicisation was thus more an issue 
of ‘grafting’, in contrast to a confined evolution of regulatory measures. This 
experience very much questions how a mobilised and thus self-sustaining net-
work architecture of civil-society organisations explicitly relates to financial 
regulation that can be transferred into institutionalised contexts independent 
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of acute crisis dynamics. Thus, the question remains of whether specific ex-
pertise in technical details regarding financial regulation can be translated into 
a continuous institutional structure.  
 In this way, it is the focus on the regulatory process of financial regula-
tion that constitutes the main strength, but also a major weakness, for sustain-
able mobilisation. This direction makes such a network highly dependent on 
the ‘supply’ of regulatory problems, whereas the ‘demand side’, due to the 
restricted area, cannot be sufficiently developed. Such a context for politici-
sation opens up a paradoxical relation. On the one hand, there is the possibility 
that fluid protest movements could be developed during the recent financial 
crisis (such as the occupy movement), which also contributed to increased 
interest in financial and regulatory technicalities; on the other hand, however, 
such protest movements were not able to access regulatory procedures in an 
ad hoc manner, as ‘it is very complex to enter the financial regulation de-
bate’.70 Mobilised networks, which gained their position because of how they 
confronted societal problem areas and the way financial regulation is cali-
brated, are thus also dependent on routines which can hardly be translated into 
a language for mobilisation. Formalised organisations adapt their language to 
the object of resistance and thus lose the critical potential which comes with 
more fluid protest movements. The translation and transformation of interest 
constellations change the political body of the organization itself and thus es-
tablish new possibilities but also restrictions.  
 The production of specific knowledge to take part in the regulatory de-
bate should be complemented with knowledge about the access points to the 
policy-making process, as well as to relevant civil-society actors. It is exactly 
this more ambitious outlook which on the one hand has the potential for initi-
ating policy change but, on the other, points to the need self-transformation to 
reach such a position. Knowledge is thus not only a resource which can be 
harvested and nourish already present needs. Knowledge generation and its 
application go hand in hand with a changing institutional essence of involved 
and related agencies. Thus, even though knowledge is needed which not only 
allows for influencing the regulatory process but which also enables changing 
the playing field, this process of knowledge generation affects also underlying 
interests, policy goals and political relations. Mobilization serves these dy-
namic but it is also a representation of how the translation to reach this stage 
transformed the original body and its associations within a state body more 
broadly. Mobilization may thus allow creating a sustainable position within a 
post-exceptional environment, but ‘all information is transformation, an 
emergency operation on and in the Leviathan’s body’ (Callon and Latour 
1981, 300). 
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7. Conclusion: Limits of critique 
Following Callon’s heuristic for processes of translation, this article recon-
structed the establishment of a civil society network regarding questions of 
financial regulation. The first step, problematisation, gave an overview about 
challenges posed by the Great Financial Crises for civil-society networks. The 
second step, interessment, was especially triggered via the crisis mode and 
established strategies for impacting on the process of related financial reform. 
The third step, enrolment, indicates the forces which contributed to and chal-
lenged network relations within the civil-society movement. Relations seem-
ingly established, were disentangled again. In the fourth and final step, 
mobilisation, the network was disassociated from the prior operation mode of 
crisis. Now, the civil-society network is confronted with new demands to es-
tablish its own strategies for politicisation regarding financial regulation. 
Such efforts may indeed be useful to work proactively and influence regula-
tory decisions from the start; however, via this specialisation and association 
regarding the regulatory process, the critical potential decreases along with an 
increased adaptation of the language to its object of critique. Thereby, this 
contribution points to the preconditions that allow and restrain politicisation. 
Formalised protest movements, which take an active part in the policy-making 
process, also entangle themselves with the regulatory routines provided. Such 
mobilised counter-movements successively lose their prior critical potential, 
but they also establish functional tools to affect the regulatory process, which 
are not present in more spontaneous and fluid movements. Especially within 
the European Union, contestation regarding financial markets increasingly 
adapts to formalised measures to have an impact on policymaking. 
 Two aspects may be highlighted along with the analyses of interviews 
with trade unionists, civil society representatives and parliamentarians. First, 
the effectiveness of protest related to affecting respective political communi-
ties seems increasingly be directed to lobbying work in the process of policy-
making. The example of the financial transaction tax is an example of 
politicisation via already established civil-society networks. Second, there is 
an increasing relevance for civil society organizations to provide their ‘own’ 
expertise within the respective policy fields. For financial markets policies, 
Finance Watch has been established as a central producer of alternative, non-
corporate knowledge. The indicated example of civil-society organization ex-
presses the limits of effective politicisation. It shows how the articulation of 
protest within formalised policymaking procedures also changes the content 
of critique. Despite far-reaching preparations regarding the financial transac-
tion tax, for instance, the related campaign has slowed down. The politicisa-
tion of reforming capital requirements for banks was only partly successful 
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via discourse grafted on related to the bonus cap. One problem from the be-
ginning was the missing technical expertise for the lobbying process regard-
ing financial markets’ regulation. This had only to be established. 
 The emergency operations of the Leviathan were in full swing during 
and shortly after the crisis. Political positions were newly adjusted and the 
sustainability of the implemented measures is now on probation under nor-
malised conditions. The sociology of translation that allows us to follow this 
process enables to understand the structure of the network for politicisation 
and creation of resistance, as well as for overreaching authority in the field of 
financial regulation. In contrast to traditional analyses of civil-society organ-
isations, which tend to analyse the relation between sender and receiver as 
being either successful or not, the concept of translation assumes the principal 
impossibility of unambiguous transmission. Translation by relating different 
contexts does so in a contingent way. It confronts interpretations with existing 
network formations. These relations, though conditioning the way of transla-
tion, also open up unlimited possibilities for adaptations. New protest move-
ments are in a state that is similarly constituted and spontaneous. They may 
already have the potential to take part in rather formalised way to influence 
policy via a variety of technological possibilities. A main access procedure, 
though, concentrates on the formation of alternative expertise, even including 
simulating experts already in place. However, such protest movements adapt 
to the policy world and thus they may lose their initial connectivity to their 
foundational constellations. 
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G – Outlook 
We define shadow banking activities as banking 
intermediation without public liquidity and credit 
guarantees (Adrian and Ashcraft 2012, 101). 
Following this quote by Adrian and Ashcraft and from today’s perspective 
shadow banking has ended via its new connections to public resources. From 
today’s perspective shadow banking is supported by a new regulatory envi-
ronment (for instance regarding money market funds) and by new liquidity 
tools of central banks (for instance by buying mortgage backed securities). In 
this respect, regulation regarding shadow banking ended with (at least struc-
turally) ‘enhancing supervision and regulation of the shadow banking system 
in areas where systemic risk and regulatory arbitrage concerns are inade-
quately addressed is therefore important’ as it has been called for by the Fi-
nancial Stability Board (FSB 2011, 1). Shadow money, i.e. privately 
originated money-like financial products intermediated ‘without public li-
quidity and credit guarantees’, however, is a continuously renewing process 
of financial innovation (Pozsar 2016).  
 The ‘new normal’ of the ‘monetary institutional form’ comes along with 
new social, political and economic hierarchies with respect to how value is 
constituted, legitimized and distributed. With respect to the regulation of 
shadow banking especially the so-called macro prudential paradigm gained 
prominence (Baker 2013). This regulatory agenda instantiates an ‘effort to 
control the social costs associated with excessive balance sheet shrinkage on 
the part of multiple financial institutions hit with a common shock’ (Hanson 
et al. 2011, 5). From a socio-political perspective, it provides a frame within 
which social problems can be governed from afar. Such remote control pre-
conditions, i.e. restricts and enables, local situations which in turn rise con-
cerns for coordination on the macro level (Thiemann and Lepoutre 2017). In 
the aftermath of the financial crisis three aspects seem to be central for under-
standing the change of the financial system and its governance: the new nor-
mal enabled a new frame for seeing (financial) markets; it provided the ability 
to capitalize on the new regulatory framework via readjusting market-based 
business models; and financial institutions gained new technological capaci-
ties to renegotiate the spheres of automation and judgement. 
 Seeing (financial) markets: Markets can be positioned as a prism 
through which socio-political reality can be understood, i.e. as a powerful in-
terpretation of social processes and their alliances to certain routines (Lenglet 
2012). These routines, however, are not foundational but themselves ob-
served, ruled, constructed, reformed or short regulated. The ‘fear of debt’ 
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(Fourcade and Healy 2017, 26) does not come from the market but from the 
way how the market is instrumentalized. The creditor/debtor relation, i.e. who 
should fear whom, is thus contingent on the regulation in place: it is a ‘con-
flict-ridden distributional exercise’ (Carruthers 2015, 390). Thus, markets are 
not spontaneously and neutrally established devices of reorganization but le-
gal instruments for distribution. To read regulation provides the analytical 
perspective for understanding the distributional conditions and implications.  
 Market-based business models: As power-laden strategies for govern-
ance, markets are increasingly used to structure large volumes of information 
as provided by present digital technologies (Fourcade and Healy 2017). This 
brings about new access to informational networks and thus cheaper products 
which can accustom more specific needs – the insurance sector being a prom-
inent instance for harvesting the new amounts of consumer data to customise 
their products (McFall 2017). The Fintech industry instantiates another new 
evolution in providing financial services at low cost for a large amount of 
‘users’ which can indeed also serve as a development policy tool providing 
finance to the ‘unbanked’ (Gabor and Brooks 2016). 
 Automation and judgment: The growing importance of algorithm based 
financial interaction provokes new challenges for regulation not only in scope 
(Coombs 2016) but also in the language applied. Whereas traditional regula-
tion was meant to specify procedures between humans for instance via paper 
work (Preda 2002; Riles 2010) and thus giving a space for interpretation, al-
gorithms as automated interaction demand for regulation with a comprehen-
sive frame for their potential execution, for the effects of their interaction with 
each other and, arguably even more complex, their legitimate interaction with 
humans (Arnoldi 2016).  
 All in all, politics of financial regulation is about the condition of possi-
bility of decision-making, which is logically prior to what politics is usually 
denoted as. It is the latter aspect that served as the pivotal theme of this dis-
sertation and it showed how politics is powerfully limited thereby for the bet-
ter or worse. The role of financial regulation in general, and shadow banking 
regulation in particular, is thus of central importance when it comes not only 
to orchestrating large financial flows across the globe but also when it comes 
to the ‘financialised’ deliberation what value is actually about (Chiapello 
2015). However, whereas the socio-political implications in resent develop-
ments for financial markets and banking has been very well researched, espe-
cially in Economic Sociology and in International Political Economy, the 
implications of future imaginaries inscribed into the present setting of rule 
and rules is still to be explored further as singular examples indeed show 
(Palan 2014). 
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